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Abstract
This thesis proposes a theory of party positions on European integration based on a 
two-dimensional description of party ethos. This new theorisation considers the independent 
impact of a party’s conceptions of political and economic communities on the responses of 
parties to European integration. Parties’ ethos limits the long-term impact of polarising and 
centripetal strategies on European positions. The concept of political and economic ethos 
distinguishes this theory from the static ideological theory of Marks, Hooghe and Wilson, 
represents a critique of the dynamic theory of Sitter, and contributes to the general study of 
political parties.
The validity of the general propositions developed in the thesis is then illustrated with 
reference to the development of Polish political parties, their ethos and competitive strategy, 
between the late 1980s and the early 2000s. The ideological importance of nationalism in 
Poland makes it a vivid example of the interaction between conflicts over the definition of 
political community, on the one hand, and parties’ European integration attitudes, on the 
other. The framework proves sufficient to explain the unusually high number of Eurosceptic 
parties winning a seat in the last Polish parliamentary elections in 2001. The thesis also 
discusses in a more cursory way the application of the ethos theory on other European 
countries.
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Chapter I The wider setting
Research question
Since 1989, five parliamentary elections have been the stage for the foundation and 
demise of successive political parties aspiring to govern the new democratic Polish state. 
When the AWS electoral coalition dissolved in 2001, the decade-long effort to unify the post- 
Solidarity bloc again failed. The centre became devoid of a right-wing pivotal formation and 
several small right-wing parties competed in the parliamentary elections taking place in that 
year. While Eurosceptic parties in average gain 8 percent of the vote, in the 2001 Polish 
parliamentary elections Eurosceptic parties gained around 20 percent. Although the failure to 
create a unified centre-right party1 and the emergence of Eurosceptic nationalist parties are 
not unique events in the history of European democracies, the unusual propensity of parties 
for Euroscepticism makes Poland a paradigmatic case of the kind of ideological conflicts 
emerging in Europe. This thesis attempts to explain why Poland became the arena of such 
conflicts.
In the last decade, Europe has experienced the most significant reallocation of political 
authority that has ever taken place in peace time. While in Western Europe the ideological 
conflicts to emerge from this are only now becoming apparent, in the former Eastern Bloc 
these conflicts were apparent in a vivid way just some years after the democratic transition. 
Intuitively, the reasons for the emergence of sovereignty-related conflicts in newly emerging
1 See Gunther, R. and Hopkin, J. (2002), “A Crisis of Institutionalization, The Collapse of the UCD in Spain" , in 
Gunther, R. et al, (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
democracies appear twofold. First, they derive from the practical and symbolic importance of 
Eu'ope for political actors; second, for the relevance of nationalism to the project of identity- 
buiding of new political parties.
In the Ideological vacuum of post-communism, which some have called "the end of 
history",2 a whole new political discourse had to be created. Post-communism is about 
"reinventing politics".3 Besides creating the institutions of a new political regime, new political 
symbols and political mythology had to be conceived. Europe, as the only future-related 
symbol of post-communism, became ever present in the political programmes of parties.4 In a 
paradoxical way, “Europe” offered a valuable substitute for the communist ideology as it is 
constructed upon a comparable dynamic: the promise of moving towards a better future. 
Communist political mythology was build around the belief in the coming of a Golden Era,5 the 
perfect world of a classless society. The Golden Era is a significant component of any modern 
political mythology.6 And although “there is very little knowledge, even among the elites, of
what the EU actually entails, (...) the prospect of membership is sufficient to sustain a future,
a belief that there is an aspiration”.7 The way support for integration was formulated in parties’ 
founding declarations and electoral programmes revealed the mainly symbolic functions of 
Europe.
Alongside Europe, nationalism emerged as an equally strong political symbol 
substantiating the identities of emerging political elites. The structuration of right and left in 
Poland was defined by parties’ relation to the concept of nation. The strength of nationalism,
2 Fukuyama, F. (1992), The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books.
3
Tismaneanu, V. (19921. Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel. London: Macmillan.
4
Verdery, K. (1999), “Civil Society or Nation? ‘Europe’ in the Symbolism of Romania’s Postsocialist Politics”, in 
Kennedy, M. and Suny, R. Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press; 
Bozoki, A. (1997), ‘The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism: the Day After for the Socialists”, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 13(3): 56-102.
5
Boia, L. (1993), Mvtholoaie Scientifiaue du Communisms. Caen-Orleans: Paradigme.
6 Giraud, R. (1986), Mvthes et Mythologies Politiaues. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
7 Schopflin, G. (2000), Nations. Identity. Power. London: Hurst &Co, p. 69
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and the particular alliance of nationalism and Catholicism that repeatedly based right-wing 
parties’ identities made the Polish party system an arena of conflicts between opponents and 
supporters of European integration. Poland thus became a paradigmatic case of the 
ideological conflicts created by the reallocation of sovereignty to the European level within 
political elites.
Research objectives
This thesis aims to improve the theoretical understanding of political parties’ responses 
to European integration by refuting the hypothesis of the primacy of short-term govemment- 
opposition strategies of competition as determinants of party attitudes towards Europe and 
proposing a new understanding of party ideologies and the way they determine the response 
of parties towards European integration. The thesis addresses the shortcomings of existing 
theories, in particular the inadequate conceptualisation of party ideology, by developing a two- 
dimensional typology of party ethos. While testing the relative importance of other factors in 
relation to party ethos, the ethos theory deals with the interaction between strategic and 
ideological factors.
Chapter outline
Chapter I describes the two main traditions of party analysis, the policy-seeking tradition 
and the office-seeking. Each is based on a fundamentally different understanding of party 
rationality. The policy-seeking tradition sees parties as based on their ideology, while the 
office-seeking analytical framework assumes that parties are primarily geared to gain power. 
Within the policy-seeking framework, a distinction is also made between different 
understandings of the origins of ideology. The understanding of ideology as the direct 
translation of social groups’ interests is counterpoised to the conception of ideology as the 
result of an intellectual elaboration of the particular conditions of society. The chapter then 
presents and criticises the current ideological explanations of party positions on European
13
integration while linking them to the policy-seeking and office-seeking traditions of party 
analysis.
Chapter II defines party ethos, develops a typology of parties and the party ethos theory 
of parties’ attitudes on European integration. It proposes that the fundamental elements of a 
party’s identity are the conceptions of the political and economic communities. The chapter 
spells out the sufficiency and the necessity of their ethos and parties’ strategies for parties’ 
European attitudes, as well as the relative importance of these two sets of factors. Parties’ 
history of mobilisation determines their conceptualisation of political and economic 
communities, and therefore the conditions upon which they support European integration.
Chapters III and IV test the ethos theory in the Polish left- and right-wing parties. The 
empirical material is organised in an analytical narrative that justifies the classification of 
parties according to the fundamental political and economic communities and their respective 
stances on European integration. The empirical material is composed of party documents, 
such as programmes, founding declarations and congress reports. I also conducted a 
considerable number of interviews with prominent party leaders and officials, and a survey of 
the Polish press.
Chapter V presents a critique of Sitter’s government-opposition theory. I then modified 
the theoretical propositions by operationalising the centripetal and centrifugal strategies 
according to Capoccia’s distinction between strategic and ideological extremism. The 
strategic hypotheses are thus rendered more consistent, operational and easier to test for its 
explanatory power. Results show that parties’ strategic choices are in the long-run neither 
sufficient nor necessary to explain their European positions.
Chapter VI develops a strategic hypothesis that contextualises the influence of parties’ 
ethos by examining its interaction with strategic behaviour. This hypothesis is then tested in 
cases where the inconsistency between a party’s ethos and its strategies of competition is 
apparent. These cases made possible the analysis of the reciprocal relations between parties’ 
European attitudes, their strategy of competition, and the intermediation of political values. 
The failure to adapt the ethos to a desired strategic location and European attitude is taken as 
evidence of the predominance of ethos over parties strategies of competition.
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Chapter VII concludes with an assessment of each definition of the political and 
economic communities as a central or secondary element of a party’s ethos as a basis for 
party positions on European integration. The validity of the ethos theory is then tested in a 
more cursory way on other European cases, East and West, by the assessment of the impact 
of party political and economic identities on how political parties position on European 
integration. The chapter assesses the novelty of the cultural understanding of party ideology 
and the derived typology of party ethos as a basis for a theory of party positions on European 
integration, as well as its applicability in Central and Eastern Europe.
Conceptions of parties
The party literature has conceived parties in two fundamentally different ways: either as 
organisations primarily searching to turn their ideological precepts into policies, or as 
organisations seeking above all to elect their members into office. These conceptions are the 
foundations of the academic literature explaining the stability and change of political parties 
within democratic systems. Both intend to expose the reasons for the persistence of political 
organisations established at the time of democratic mobilisation and their establishment in 
stable and structured formations with regulated interactions, i.e., party systems. According to 
these two schools of thought, the analysis of individual parties and party systems either 
portray parties’ competitive behaviour as a result of their persistent ideological disagreements 
or as deriving from competition to attain office. Based on these two traditions, two sets of 
theoretical explanations for parties’ European integration stances emerged.
15
The policy-seeking tradition
The policy-seeking tradition of political analysis views a party as essentially determined 
by its ideology. However, authors of the office-seeking tradition hold different conceptions of 
ideology and the way it determines parties’ behaviour. One strand follows Weber’s conception 
of ideology as part of cultural conflicts. The other more developed strand conceives ideology 
as the translation of social interests, a conception informing Rokkan and Lipset’s macro- 
historical theory of party formation, the cleavage theory. The authors holding a cultural 
conception of ideology ultimately conceive parties as embodiments of political ideas; 
ideologies alone carry through the party and determine their policy positions. The Rokkanian 
school sees social groups as intermediaries between parties and ideology; parties are 
essentially linked to social groups and their interests.
The Rokkanian tradition
According to Upset and Rokkan, the moment of encapsulation of social divisions into 
political identities fundamentally determines a party’s ideology and the policy choices 
available to it.8 The process of party formation implies the re-shaping of fuzzy social identities 
into sharper and more defined political ones, strongly binding their authors and their 
organisations to the representation of the social group they first mobilised. The Rokkanian 
approach conceives ideology as deriving directly from interests of social groups. Therefore 
ideologies are conceived by these authors as a set of specific set of policy prescriptions 
aimed primarily at realising the interests of specific social groups. Political parties’ behaviour, 
and the relative immobility of European party systems, is explained by the influence of these
0
Rokkan, S. and Upset, S.M. (1967), “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" 
in Rokkan, S. and Upset, S.M (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: A Cross National Perspective. New York: 
Collier Macmillan.
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constraints, imposed on parties during political mobilisation. Ideologies are closely attuned to 
the socio-economic conditions present at the moment of mass enfranchising; the 
institutionalisation of these interests in parties’ ideology means that they remain a long-lasting 
element in the structuration of political competition. Parties remain deeply bound by the 
representation of interests long after the enfranchising period is over.
The literature deriving from the Rokkanian concept of ideology and party formation has 
logically focused on the restraining effect of macro-historical circumstances to explain the 
endurance of a party identity throughout social and political upheavals. “It is only through the 
historical process of mobilisation, politicisation and democratization that any specific cleavage 
acquires its distinctive normative profile and organisational network”.9 Bartolini and Mair 
maintain that socio-economic classes provide a closure of the electoral market; cultural 
values are consequently secondary in the creation of political identities. The sociological 
school maintains that social classes provide a boundary of mobilisation that is harder to cross, 
and political discourses are not crucial to the process of mobilisation.10 The focus of this 
literature is therefore on specifying the social macro-conditions and how they determine the 
mobilisation of parties.11
This discussion is also linked to the debate concerning the chances of parties 
developing supra-class strategies. Following Rokkan’s assumptions, Przeworski and Sprague 
describe the restrictions imposed by the representation of blue-collar interests on social 
democratic parties trying to extend their appeal beyond certain occupational classes. The 
authors conclude that a fundamental dilemma is imposed on social democratic leaders: either 
to maintain their core constituency or to enlarge their appeal. Przeworski and Sprague do not 
consider the reinterpretation of their class appeal as a possible strategy and conclude that
9
Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990), Identity. Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European 
Electorates. 1885-1985. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10 Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990), op.cit.
11 See for example Bartolini, S. (2000), The Political Mobilization of the European Left. 1860-1980: The Class 
Cleavage. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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social democracy is doomed to loose its role of “integration and identification” 12, i.e., to 
become a catch-all party or to loose its electoral pre-eminence.
Kirchheimer’s description of the adaptation of mass parties to changing conditions of 
political competition, imposed by increased electoral volatility and the decline of social 
identification is equally based on a Rokkanian understanding of ideology. Kirchheimer’s 
catch-all theory implies that parties have to choose between maintaining their ideology, 
translated in the defence of social groups’ interests, and achieving or maintaining electoral 
success. Kirchheimer observes that European mass parties adapted to the decline of social 
identification by shedding their ideological commitments and transforming into catch-all 
parties with an appeal that transcends the social groups’ interests.13 For Kirchheimer the 
widening of a party appeal necessarily implies severing the link with the particular social 
groups from which ideologies originate.
Party ethos and the cultural conception of ideology
Those authors subscribing to a cultural conception of ideology differ from the Rokkanian 
approach in that they see ideologies primarily as a product of intellectual processes and not 
as direct translations of group interests into the political sphere. For these authors ideology is 
related to, but not deriving directly from, social structures. The creation of an ideology, 
although inspired by social reality, implies an abstracisation from the particular social 
circumstances from which it emerges. Thus, ideological creation is an intellectual process that 
is partially independent from sociological circumstances. Ideologies are typically created in 
such circumstances. However, ideology, as culture, is not a direct product of the conflict of 
interests emerging in circumstances of social change but is decidedly shaped by those
12 Puhle, H. (2002), “Still the Age of Catch-allism? Volksparteien and Parteienstaat in Crisis and Re-Equilibration” in 
Gunther, R. et al. (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 78.
13
Kirchheimer, O. (1996), “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’ in LaPalombara.J. Political 
Parties and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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choosing the central elements of reality to be represented. Political thinkers thus specify “the 
ways social conditions are themselves textualised, structured by basic conceptual distinctions 
and turned into figural elements.”14
The production of ideology consists in a simultaneous articulation of ideas 
corresponding to social and political circumstances and an abstractization of these same 
conditions through the use of representative elements. Although ideologies are linked to the 
historical circumstances on which they are formed, their abstract and representative nature 
allows them to transcend the more immediate circumstances in which they are produced.
In the production of these systems of ideas and their institutionalisation a core group of 
ideas remains available to be used in other contexts and times. The process of ideological 
institutionalisation requires the creation of “communities of discourse”, and political parties are 
one of the institutions that play a crucial role in this process.15 Therefore, at the core of 
political parties are key conceptions of the political and economic reality determining parties’ 
ideological and policy positions, the party ethos. Because the creation of parties has “high 
start-up costs and learning effects”16, their definition is expected to be largely stable. The 
basic values informing a political identity are therefore structural elements of political 
competition.17
Several authors implicitly or explicitly treated the subject of party formation through the 
prism of a cultural conception of ideology. In his book “Political Parties in Western 
Democracies”, Von Beyme subscribes to the vision that value conflicts, rather than the
14
Wuthnow, R. (1989), Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
15 Wuthnow, R. (1989), Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the
Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16
Pierson, P. (2000), “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, American Political Science 
Review. 94(2): 251-268.
17 Shepsle, K. (1986), “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions”, in Weisberg, H. (ed.), Political Science: 
the Science of Politics. New York: Agathon.
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competing interests of social groups, are the basis of political ideology.18 When describing 
party families the author focuses primarily on the intellectual environment of political elites 
rather than on the sociological context of its voters. The literature on party formation 
subscribing to the cultural origins of ideology tends to describe the micro-conditions of party 
formation and focused primarily on the intellectual environment of political elites and the way 
it interacts with the social and political context. Primary examples of this literature are Laitin, 
Kalyvas, and Kitschelt’s descriptions of the formation and transformation of parties and 
ideologies.19 These authors assume that actors are strongly determined by their basic 
assumptions about reality; these conceptions then become crucial for the politicization of 
certain identities, in a particular way, place and time.20 Since these organisational processes 
are costly and electoral victory plays an important role in their consolidation, ideas become 
encapsulated as party identities and are central elements of political competition.
From the cultural conception of ideology arises the idea of a core of central concepts 
that remain available to drive political action in different times and circumstances. At the light 
of such conception, political parties are created to institutionalise these political ideas. The 
ethos thus informs parties’ political role in representative and procedural terms. The ethos is 
distinguishable from party doctrines, which are applied propositions in the electoral sphere, 
and is therefore subject to immediate considerations of electoral success.21 A party’s ethos is 
composed of abstract concepts assuring the long-term party survival22
18
Von Beyme, K. (1985), Political Parties in Western Democracies. Gower: Aldershot.
19
Laitin, D. (1986), Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press; Kalyvas, S. (1996), The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press; Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, p.265.
20
Kalyvas, S. (1996), op. cit., p.134.
21 Druker, H.M. (1979), Doctrine an Ethos in the Labor Party. London: Allen and Unwin.
22 Although Gallagher, Laver and Mair consider that classifying parties according to their identities is one of the 
accepted ways of classifying parties, the literature has largely ignored this classification and concentrated on policy
20
A party ethos limits the party’s ability to adapt to changing conditions of competition. 
However, although parties cannot shed their ethos, the abstract nature of these conceptions 
allows parties a considerable leeway for developing supra-class strategies without losing their 
core ideas.23 Consequently, the response of parties to the declining social identification that 
characterised European democracies in the second half of the twentieth century does not 
necessarily imply the shedding of their core identities. The assumption that ideology is 
derived from an intellectual process, rather than being a translation of social group interests, 
explains the different ways parties adapt to conditions of competition.
Thus, in the light of the cultural conception of ideology, Kirchheimer’s argument that the 
European mass parties’ transformation into catch-all parties has implied a total shedding of 
their ideological commitments does not appear correct. The transformation of European mass 
parties into catch-all parties did not imply giving up their core ideas.24 The widening of parties’ 
appeals was not indiscriminate but was guided by parties’ value commitments. Parties are 
therefore not free to adopt any position that potentially increases their chances to win votes, 
as the small variation in policy positions of European parliamentary parties in the last fifty 
years testifies25 In fact, certain ideologies were always conducive to denominational and 
class parties, like the Italian Christian democrats or the German social democrats, showing a 
tendency towards catch-all strategies since the emergence of mass politics. The search for 
electoral success by the widening of a party’s appeal is in no way an exclusive characteristic 
of European polities in the second part of the XX century. Catch-all appeals also derive from 
the vision of the political environment implied by the core values of a party’s identity.
positions and international linkages. Gallagher, M. Laver, M. and Mair, P. (1992), Representative Government in 
Modern Europe. New York McGraw-Hill, p. 181.
23
This is the debate between, for example, Kitschelt and Przeworski and Sprague on the transformation of European 
social democracy.
24 Kirchheimer, O. (1966), “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems” in LaPalombara, J. and 
Weiner, M. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25 Budge, I. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties. Electors and Governments. 1945-1998. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.274.
21
These conceptions underlie Kitschelt’s analysis of European social democracy. While 
stressing that “the continuity of ideas over time is a critical factor influencing the ways parties 
stake out appeals”26 Kitschelt affirms the possibility of a supra-class strategy. This is possible 
due to a reinterpretation of class; this allowed social democratic parties to succeed in 
maintaining their identity and adapt to the decline of working class identification. The author 
suggests that some social democratic parties were successful in widening their appeal by 
stressing the political dimensions of their ideology and effectively reinterpreting the meaning 
of class while maintaining a commitment to social justice.27
The view that party change implies the reinterpretation of party ethos is shared by 
Panebianco. Panebianco’s conception of integrated change is congruent with the view that in 
the long-term party change always implies a re-operationalisation of a party’s ethos, 
organisation and policies. Panebianco and other proponents of integrated party change 
consider that all aspects of parties, be they organisational, ideological or strategic, are 
interdependent.28 The author asserts that parties’ different dimensions are related; change in 
one aspect implies adjustments in another. Therefore, party transformation can only be the 
result of “consistent organisational transformations”.29 Shifts in a party’s strategy should also 
lead to a change in its organisational format.30 Panebianco suggests that the reinterpretation
26 Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, p.265.
27 Kitschelt, H. (1994), op. cit.
28 Janda, K. et.al. (1995), “ Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos" , Party Politics. 1(2): 171 -
196 and Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 16.
29
Panebianco, A. (1988), op.cit.
30 Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994), “ An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change” , Journal of 
Theoretical Politics. 6(3): 259-288, p. 283
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of a party’s identity can lead to a change in competitive strategy.31 This process can not, 
however, take place in a sweeping manner, and party change is therefore a slow process.32
Assuming that ideas are in the long-term predominant over strategies results in treating 
political competition in a fundamentally different way from economic competition.33 The 
agreement on a set of fundamental values, as a condition for the maintenance of political 
solidarity, is a structural variable of political competition and an impediment to the free reign of 
competitive office-seeking logic.
The ethos view of parties rejects the vision that parties’ rationality should be seen 
mainly as the attempt to attain office. Political values that are at the core of parties’ identities 
provide actors with a fundamental framework for analysing reality; parties’ rationality is 
primarily bound by this framework of reality. In the words of Przeworski: “Ideas are critical for 
explaining the direction in which parties diverge from rational strategies.”34 Therefore, in order 
to deal with the decline of voter-party linkages, parties’ can reinterpret their ethos, but not 
abandon their basic conceptions. A party’s core concept therefore works as an anchor, 
shaping rather than following the competitive environment.35 As such response to electoral 
defeat is limited by the values informing parties’ core identities.
31 Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994), op. cit
32 Wolinetz, S. (2002), “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in 
Contemporary Democracies”, in Gunther, R. et.al (eds.). Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 157-8.
33
Bartolini, S. (2000), “Collusion, Competition and Democracy, Part II”, Journal of Theoretical Politics. 12 (1): 33- 65.
34
Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986), Paper Stones: a History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 224.
35
Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press; Schattschneider, E. (1964), Political Parties and Democracy. New York: Holt, p.64.
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The office-seeking tradition
The pure rationality school
The conception of parties as unbound by value commitments and free to change their 
policy positions in order to be fit to compete was first formulated by Anthony Downs.36 In his 
An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs states that “parties formulate policies in order to 
win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies”.37 Downs applied the 
concepts and methods of analysis of economics to political competition, portraying office and 
its benefits as the equivalents of payments in economic theory. According to this vision, the 
primary goal of parties is winning elections: parties are not locked into policy positions. 
Instead, party elites can manipulate positions in order to maximise support. Parties are 
conceived as ad hoc and loosely bound groups of office-seeking individuals, whose 
ideological preferences are irrelevant for the strategic decisions of the party. Party cohesion is 
assured by the satisfaction of the aspirations to office of its members.
The Downsian view of voters as perfectly elastic consumers, ready to switch their vote 
should an attractive policy offer be made to them, implies that voters’ preferences are seen as 
exogenous to the process of party competition.38 Therefore voters participate and vote based 
on utilitarian considerations of the expected policy output of a party. Modifications to this 
analysis of voting motivations have been suggested by schools named as “subjective 
Downsianism” and “social Downsianism”. Subjective Downsianism maintains that rather than 
an objective and rational assessment of voting and policy utilities, it is the perceived utilities 
and perceived probabilities of influencing the policy outcomes of elections that motivates 
elites and voters. Social Downsianism considers that belonging to social groups reinforces 
individuals’ appreciation of voting utility.
36 Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
37 Although Downs treats ideology as instrumental and as a rational short-cut to policy position, he also considers 
that party ideology should contain a degree of internal and external coherence. However, this idea is never included 
in the model since it would undermine its own foundations. Downs, A. (1957), op. cit., p.28.
38 Laver, M. and Hunt, B. (1992), Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge, p. 3.
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The view that office attainment is the fundamental motivation of politicians and the utility 
output of a certain policy the main consideration for voters, suggests that the form of party 
organisation is unimportant in the short- and the long-term; organisations can be adapted to 
office-seeking considerations in order to win office at all or almost all levels at which elections 
take place (local, regional or national). Parties are therefore weakly hierarchical organisations 
that function more as coalitional structures, broad enough to embrace different social groups 
and give the party a chance of winning a majority.
Downs’ office-seeking party vision was developed through an immensity of literature, 
encompassing both theoretical models and empirical work on party positions and the 
dimensionality of the political space. Based on the premise that competition for office 
determines the content and stability of party policies, the literature on the formal modelling of 
party policy positions grew considerably.39
The bounded office-seeking school
Although inspired by Downs’ conceptions of parties as office-seeking organisations, 
most authors of this school now consider that political actors act in an environment that 
constrains their options. Constrains are formulated mainly in terms of how the institutional set­
up influences parties’ choices. Therefore, scholarship in this field is dedicated to formulating 
how a set of institutional constraints influences office-seeking strategies. Parties act within an 
institutional set-up, the political regime, which fundamentally determines their opportunity 
structure and therefore influences their strategies. The degree to which parties are vote 
maximizers and the manner in which they compete are therefore fundamentally determined
39
Castles, F. and Mair ,P. (1984), “Left-Right Scales: Some Expert Judgments”, European Journal of Political 
Research. 12(1): 73-89, Budge, I. Robertson, D. and Hearl, D. (eds.), (1987), Ideology. Strategy and Party Change: 
Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programs in 19 Democracies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 
Laver, M.J, and Hunt, W.B. (1992), Policy and Party Competition. London: Routledge and Huber, J. and Inglehart, R. 
(1995), “Expert Interpretation of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies”, Party Politics. 1(1): 73-111,
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by the institutional environment, and parties’ strategic decisions are deeply affected by the 
institutional constraints they act in.40
The most studied constraints on parties’ behaviour are electoral systems. Electoral 
systems provide different degrees of distortion on the translation of votes into parliamentary 
seats.41 Distortions are larger in single-member districts than in proportional representation. In 
systems of proportional representation party strategies are also dependent on district 
magnitude, electoral thresholds and the system of seat allocation42 Electoral systems 
therefore oblige parties to act strategically in order to maximise the number of seats obtained. 
Electoral systems also determine to a large extent whether the system is a two-party, three- 
party or a multiparty system, and the number of parties determines the structure of incentives 
in the attainment of office.43 According to this literature, the type of party appeals, whether 
stable or changing, narrow or broad, are to a large extent predetermined by the conditions of 
competition44 In multiparty systems the degree of complexity of coalition politics determines 
whether vote maximisation is the sole consideration of parties when staking out appeals; 
rather, coalition bargaining should also be considered.
The process of coalition formation is also determined by the format of the regime, i.e., 
whether parliamentary or presidential. Muller and Strom argue that party strategies are 
constrained by the way legislative seats are transformed into bargaining power, i.e., the 
process of coalition formation. If legislative seats translate directly into coalition bargaining 
power, parties will try to maximise votes in a more single-minded way, for example by
Kitschelt, H. et.al. (1999), Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition. Representation. Inter-Partv Cooperation. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
40
Muller, W . and Strom, K. (eds.), (2000), Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press
41
Cox, G. (1997), Making Votes Count. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
42
Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. (1989), Seats and Votes: Tthe Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
43 Taagepera, R. and Shugardt, M. (1993), "Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger’s 
Mechanical Effect”, American Political Science Review. 87(2): 455-464.
44 Muller, W . and Strom, K. (eds.), (1999), Policy. Office, or Votes? How Political parties in Western Europe Make 
Hard Decisions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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developing a catch-all strategy.45 If, on the contrary, coalition bargaining is subject to other 
factors, these will constrain the way a party develops its electoral strategy.46 Equally, the 
greater the differential between office benefits when in office and in opposition, the more 
strongly parties will pursue office. Majoritarian systems, by excluding a large number of 
parties from office, encourage a starker fight for votes than more inclusive systems where 
governmental participation is enlarged to a wider set of players47
Theoretical approaches to the determination of parties’ 
European attitudes
The policy-seeking tradition
The study of parties as actors in European integration is a relatively recent strand of the 
study of European politics. Simon Hix and Christopher Lord were the first to research the field 
by analysing parties’ European positions in the context of the European party families.48 
Stating that parties’ European attitudes are relatively stable phenomena, their work suggests 
a linkage between support and opposition to European integration and the party families at 
European level. However, Hix and Lord do not propose a causal linkage between party 
families and parties’ European positions; parties are organised in party families mainly to 
expose the differences in terms of European attitudes within party families.
The first attempt to determine parties’ European attitudes through their ideological 
positions was carried out by Gary Marks and Carole Wilson. These authors started by testing
45 op.cit.
46 Strom, K, Budge, I and Laver, M. (1994), “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies”, 
American Journal of Political Science. 38(2): 303-335.
47 MOIIer, W . and Strom, K. (eds.), (1999), Policy. Office, or Votes? How Political parties in Western Europe Make 
Hard Decisions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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party divergences in the perception of economic integration deriving both from the position of 
the parties in the economic left-right scale and the national states degree of welfare support 
in relation to the European average. Marks and Wilson established that party strategies are 
weak explanatory variables and consider that “political parties (...) have an interest in 
blending the issue of European integration into existing patterns of party competition”.49 
Parties’ attitudes towards European integration would depend on their perception of the EU’s 
contribution to their preferred economic regime. A social democratic party in a relatively liberal 
national economy is expected to become more pro-European as the EU increases its 
regulatory competences. An economically liberal party is expected to become progressively 
less enthusiastic as economic integration goes beyond the single market template in 
regulating the market. This first analysis, based on economic criteria, largely ignored the role 
of political values in determining attitudes towards European integration.
In their 2002 article, Marks, Hooghe and Wilson revise their stance by empirically 
testing the relative weight of the political-cultural axis against the left-right economic axis in 
determining parties’ European positions. The authors conceptualise the New Politics axis as 
an agglomeration of policy positions, bearing on one side the Green, Alternative and 
Libertarian (GAL) positions, on the other the Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN) 
ones. Despite the multi-dimensionality of the axis, the authors conclude that it is the 
nationalist component of the axis that makes parties’ European positions so consistent with 
the GAL-TAN axis. Proximity to the TAN pole is the strongest factor determining parties’ 
attitudes towards European integration.50 Although Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s article 
stresses the importance of the political dimension, in the Introduction of the special issue of 
Comparative Politics Marks and Steenbergen eventually hedge their position by asserting that 
the predominance of the political dimension is inconsequential since the two dimensions
48 Hix, S. and Lord, (1997), Political Parties in the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 240.
49 Marks, G. and Wilson, C.J. (2000), “The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European 
Integration”, British Journal of Political Science. 30(3): 433-460.
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normally fuse and can be considered part of the same left-right economic dimension.51 The 
assertion that European positions are consistent with the left-right dimension undermines the 
previous assumption that party family is the crucial concept underlying parties’ European 
attitudes.
The methodology used by the authors has contributed to the over-simplification of the 
analysis and their findings. Although asserting the importance of the political dimension of 
party ideology, Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s theory is based on a multi-variable statistical 
analysis pitching parties’ ideologies and strategic positions against each other. This 
methodological approach results in a theory that is too simple to account for parties’ 
responses to European integration. By classifying parties through a two-dimensional typology 
serving as the basis of an explanation of parties’ European attitudes, the theory developed in 
this thesis attempts to result in a more precise prediction of party positions on European 
integration and a basis to understand parties’ rationality.
The office-seeking tradition
Downs’ spatial analysis predicts that a party’s strategic behaviour is primarily 
determined by its office-seeking efforts. As a means to maximise votes parties tend to adopt a 
centripetal behaviour and a centrist position in the policy space. When excluded from 
government, parties devise centrifugal tactics that serve as a way of creating effective 
opposition to the government. Deriving from the premise that a party’s primary objective is 
achieving office, two theories of party attitudes to European integration were devised.52 First
50 Hooghe, L. Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2002), “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?”, 
Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 965-989.
51 Marks, G. and Steenbergen, M. (2002), “Understanding Political Contestation in the European Union”,
Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 879-892.
52 Taggart, P. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems”, 
European Journal of Political Research. 33(3): 363-388; Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak (2001), “Parties, Positions and 
Europe: Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe”, Paper Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 10-12 April, Manchester; Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002),
Paul Taggart and then Nick Sitter conceived Euroscepticism as part of the opposition tactics 
of competition, and Europhilism as linked to a strategy aimed at increasing the chances of 
attaining government. Parties permanently or temporarily excluded from governmental office 
take Euroscepticism as a way of marking their opposition to central government, both in 
systematic and in a sporadic way. If parties are essentially seen as vote-and office-seeking 
institutions, the fundamental motivation of a party when devising policy positions is the 
maximisation of its chances of achieving office. It is the logic of vote and office-seeking that 
determines parties’ European positions. The fact that European integration is a process 
essentially driven by national governments makes it logical that parties of power maintain a 
Europhile attitude. In reverse, Euroscepticism has become a “touchstone of dissent”53 from 
mainstream politics, a way of marking opposition to the government.
The difference between Taggart and Sitter’s position hinges on Taggart’s conception of 
opposition not only as a condition of strategic location in the party system, but also as a result 
of parties’ ideological extremism. Sitter, on the other hand, formulates a theory of party 
positions on European integration based solely on the dichotomy between government and 
opposition. Also, while Taggart considers that only parties outside the central cartel express 
Eurosceptic positions, Sitter proposes that any party excluded from government at a particular 
point in time is bound to take Eurosceptic positions.54 Both Sitter’s and Taggart’s theories are 
based on locational variables; Taggart, however, by stating that Euroscepticism is the 
“touchstone of dissent”55 does not imply that centrifugal tactics are the origin of 
Euroscepticism. The author merely maintains that populism is at the origin of both 
Euroscepticism and centrifugal strategies. Populism results in both an ideological aversion to
“The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe”, European Union 
Politics. 3(3): 297-326, Sitter, N. (2001), ‘The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: is 
Euroscepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?”, West European Politics. 24(4): 22-39.
53
Taggart, P. (1998), op. cit.
54 Sitter, N. (2001), “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a 
Government-Opposition Dynamic?”, West European Politics. 24(4): 22-39.
55 Taggart, P. (1998), op.cit.
30
centrist politics compromises and to the EU’s supranational mode of decision-making.56 The 
author does not specify the relations between strategies of competition, ideological factors 
and Euroscepticism. Sitter ascribes Euroscepticism only to a rational opposition tactic, and 
states that a party exclusion from governmental office, and its centrifugal strategies, is the 
primary cause of Euroscepticism.
Conclusion
The present chapter distinguishes the two main strands of party analysis, the policy- 
seeking and the office-seeking traditions. Each is based on a fundamentally different 
understanding of party rationality. The policy-seeking analysis sees party rationality as 
primarily directed at fulfilling ideological goals, while the office-seeking literature assumes 
parties as primarily seeking to elect its members to office. Furthermore, the chapter identifies 
in the literature two different understandings of the origins of ideology, one based on a view of 
ideology as the direct translation of social groups interests, the other based on a conception 
of ideology as the result of an intellectual elaboration, a process during which a core of ideas 
remain available for driving political change in other historical circumstances. To these core 
ideas we call the party ethos.
The chapter then presents a criticism of the current policy-seeking and office-seeking 
explanations of party positions on European integration. Taggart and Sitter’s strategic 
theories are based on an office-seeking conception of political parties’ rationality and Marks,
56
Taggart defines populism as the defense of the heartland. The heartland is defined as an imaged community with 
homogenous people with an exclusive right of belonging, a concept which appears very close to the 
conceptualization of nation by Anderson. However, Taggart defends that “The heartland, in so far as it refers to the 
nation, is a very qualified nationalism, explicitly excluding a series of social groups. It is organized around the idea of 
an organic community that has some natural solidarity and is therefore more circumscribed than the sort of 
community contained within national boundaries”. In my point of view both concepts rely on the continuity between 
territory and population. See Taggart, P. (2000), Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press, p.97.
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Hooghe and Wilson’s theoretical explanation derives from a conception of ideology as the 
translation of socio-cultural and economic conflicts on the political arena.57
In the attempt to achieve a more fundamental explanation for the parties’ positioning on 
the Euroscepticism-Europhilism continuum I develop a theory based on a typology of parties 
according to their core ideological precepts. The core concepts at the centre of parties’ 
ideologies are considered the long-term determinants of parties’ positions on European 
integration. This theory also attempts to overcome the pitching of ideology against strategy by 
conceiving of an interaction between the two factors and European integration.
The ethos theory of parties’ responses to European integration is a contribution in 
theoretical understanding to party-based support and opposition to the process of the 
unification of the continent. Despite the decreased importance of their representative 
functions a party is still guided by the core value embodied in its identity. When responding to 
a fundamental issue affecting the basic political and economic conceptions of modern politics, 
parties are bounded by certain conceptual understandings of the political and economic 
realities and will try to act strategically within these boundaries. This is based on a vision of 
party’s rationality as intrinsically linked to the fulfilment of its core goals, in particular those 
deriving from the cultural and intellectual environment of the party’s elite. Constituting the 
party’s core identity, these concepts provide long-term consistency to their doctrines and 
constrain the elites’ policy options.
57 Hix, S. (1999), “Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan 
Responses”, European Journal of Political Research. 35: 69-106; Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000), ‘The Past in the 
Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party response to European Integration”, British Journal of Political Science. 30(3): 
433-460.
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Chapter II Theory and Methodology
This chapter proposes a new typology of party ideology and uses it to explain party 
positions on a newly-defined Europhile/Eurosceptic scale. Contrary to other ideological 
explanations of parties’ European attitudes,58 the ethos theory classifies parties according to 
their political and economic ethos rather than their policy positions. The newly-developed 
conceptualisation of party ideologies serves as a basis for a new theorization of party 
responses to European integration that considers the independent impact of a party’s political 
and economic ethos on its European attitudes.
This chapter first defines party ethos, and states its novelty in relation to the 
conventional ways of describing parties’ ideological profile. It then creates a typology of 
parties according to their political and economic ethos and proposes a new scale of party 
positions on European integration. Based on parties’ political and economic ethos, the 
chapter then presents a group of theoretical propositions regarding the necessity and 
sufficiency of a party’s political and economic ethos for their attitudes on European 
integration. The remainder of the chapter deals with the operationalisation of concepts and 
the methods of document selection and analysis, as well as with the methodological issues 
raised by the use of methods of Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
Defining Party Ethos
The party ethos, the permanent core of a party’s ideology, is defined as the concepts 
through which parties define the political and economic community. Such concepts establish 
the parameters of the relationship between individuals and the political body. The party ethos
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is thus composed of the concepts justifying the limitation of individuals’ freedom and the 
transfer of authority to a political body. The political ethos is the conception of the political 
community, and regulates the relationship between the individual and the political community. 
The economic ethos is the conception of the economic community, the basic unit of 
economic relations defining the preferred national economic regime.
According to the typology of party ethos, party types differ among them not only 
because of the different content of their political and economic ethos, but also because of the 
relative importance of the economic and the political ethos. Some party types hold an 
economic concept, i.e., the definition of the economic community, as the central element of 
their identity. Other party types are based on a value conflict of a political nature, i.e., the 
definition of the political community. For example, the socialists’ political identity derives from 
the economic conflicts between work and capital; therefore the socialists’ ethos is based on 
an economic concept of class. The Christian democrats’ identity is essentially formed by a 
conception of political community based on Catholic universalism. However, despite the 
centrality of one or the other concepts, the secondary ethos maintains a separate and 
independent impact on the party’s ideological positioning.
The typology of party ethos and, in particular, the conception of political community 
proposed above, is a novel way of ideological classification. Its advantages in relation to 
Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s GAL-TAN axis or Kitschelt’s dimensions of competition derive 
from their fundamental character. A concept of the political community incorporates not only 
the socio-cultural dimension, i.e., it defines the degree of desirable cultural openness within 
the community, but also incorporates the cosmopolitan/nationalist dimension, i.e., the degree 
of the political community’s openness towards other political communities.
58 Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000), "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European 
Integration", British Journal of Political Science. 30(3): 433-460; Marks, G. Hooghe, L. and Wilson, C. (2002), "Does 
Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 965-969.
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The definition of a political community implies intrinsic notions of the community’s 
internal and external features. Therefore, parties’ positions on the socio-cultural dimension 
are a reflection of the internal dimension of the political ethos, i.e. the desirable composition of 
the political community, while the positions on the cosmopolitan/nationalist dimension are the 
external aspect of the political community, i.e., its relationship with other political communities. 
A nationalist party considering the idea of a primordial or constructed common cultural identity 
as the basis of the political community deems the preservation of socio-cultural traditions and 
past values as inherent to the national political project. Nationalist parties will thus take a 
conservative position in the socio-cultural traditional/libertarian continuum. The external 
implication of political nationalism is that the nation-state, as a self-sufficient entity, should 
limit cooperation with other national states to a minimum, and consider higher levels of 
supranational authority unacceptable. Liberals’ conception of the political community as the 
association of free individuals results in the party seeing a variety of lifestyles as an 
acceptable and desirable feature of an open society. Because it considers individuals as the 
basis of the political community, liberals thus assume that political cooperation across states 
is natural and desirable. Socialists’ definition of class as the political ethos implies that the 
socio-cultural status quo is seen by these parties as a reflection of the class system, and 
therefore consider its preservation as an impediment to their main goal: the bridging of class 
differences. Socialists thus encourage socio-cultural change and their positions on the socio­
cultural policies follow a libertarian tendency. Socialists vision of international politics as the 
continuation of class politics at the national level positions them in the cosmopolitan end of 
the cosmopolitan/national dimension.
The concept of political community, and its incorporation of the socio-cultural and the 
cosmopolitan-nationalist dimensions, grounds a typology of parties which tries to overcome 
the lack of a fundamental system for classifying parties according to their ideology. In its Post- 
Communist Party Systems, Kitschelt and the other authors define the socio-cultural 
dimension as a continuum of socio-cultural ideological positions stretching from an 
authoritarian to a libertarian pole. However, the authors do not provide any theoretical
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reasoning for the aggregation of policy positions on education, state-building, support to the 
Church and foreign policy in one single dimension. Kitschelt et al justify the aggregation of 
such issues from parties’ ad hoc attempts to design an attractive package of voters.
Marks, Hooghe and Wilson definition of the vertical axis of competition as a continuum 
between a green, alternative and libertarian pole (GAL) and a traditional, authoritarian and 
nationalist pole (TAN), the GAL-TAN axis, also lacks a theoretical grounding. The GAL-TAN 
axis merely follows the aggregation of ideological positions found in several empirical cases. 
Marks, Hooghe and Wilson and Kitschelt attempt to characterise the ideological space follow 
Inglehart’s logic when conceptualising the vertical axis of competition as the materialist/post­
materialist axis.59 Like Inglehart, the authors conceptualise the vertical axis as the capture by 
political parties of the cultural conflicts within Western societies in the post-War period, i.e., 
they see such a dimension as a mere addition to the fundamental economic conflicts basing 
political parties. Inglehart, like Kitschelt and Marks, Hooghe and Wilson conceive this axis as 
independent of parties’ previous ideological commitments, on parties’ fundamental 
conceptions of the political and economic communities.
A typology of party ethos
The table below describes the combinations of political and economic communities of 
the main party types in Europe. Each party type holds one of the dimensions as central to its 
identity; the other, although secondary, maintains a separate and independent impact on a 
party’s policy positioning. Because it maintains separate the political and the economic ethos,
59
Kitschelt, H. et. al. (1999), Post-Communist Party Systems, op.cit., p. 249; Inglehart, R. (1977), The Silent 
Revolution -  Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press; 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C.J. (2002), “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?”, 
Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 965- 989.
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this typology differs from the conceptualisation of the left-right axis which assimilates the new 
politics dimension into the left-right economic axis.60
By distinguishing and keeping separate the political and the economic dimensions of 
parties’ ideologies and replacing a one-dimensional continuum by a two-dimensional 
classification, this typology differs from the widely accepted one-dimensional left-right view of 
political attitudes and ideologies61 Inglehart first conceptualised the socio-cultural dimension 
as separate from the left-right economic dimension 62 but eventually considered that the two 
should be assimilated in one single axis.63 This proposition has since been adopted by most 
authors, on the assumption that a synthesis of the political and economic dimensions worked 
on the functional level because it enabled political competition to be simplified into either a 
dichotomy of “left-libertarian” and “right-authoritarian” positions. However, this single 
dimension does not appear to explain the structuration of parties in the European policy 
space.
To define the content of the political and the economic ethos of European parties64 I 
derive from the literature on European parties a narrative description of the definition of the 
basic communities at the core of each party type. The social democrats’ identifying 
community is the economic class. Social democrats are therefore committed to the
60 Kitschelt, H. (1995), “Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions”,
Party Politics. 1(4): 447-472; Kitschelt, H. and Hellemans, S. (1989), “The Left-Right Semantics and the New Politics
Cleavage”. Comparative Political Studies. 21(41:141-178.
61
Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000), "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European 
Integration", British Journal of Political Science. 30(3): 433-460; Marks, G. Hooghe, L. and Wilson, C. (2002), "Does 
Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?”, Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 965-989; Hix, S. 
and Lord, C. (1997), Political Parties in the European Union. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
62 Inglehart, R. (1977), The Silent Revolution -  Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. 
Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press and Inglehart, R. (1990), Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
63 Inglehart, R. (1990), op. cit. pp.289-300; Inglehart, R. and Rabier, J. (1986), “Political Realignment in Advanced 
Industrial Society: From Class Based Politics to Quality of Life Politics”, Government and Opposition. 21 (4): 456-479;
Knutsen, O. (1998), “Expert Judgment of the Left/Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal 
Study", West European Politics. 21 (2).
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elimination of differences among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from 
structural positions in the labour market and protecting low and minimum income groups.65 
Adapting to the globalisation’s limiting impact on the opportunities for demand-side 
strategies66, social democrats moved to policies “addressing the physical and social 
organization of production and the cultural conditions of consumption in advanced capitalist 
societies” 67 The social democrats’ cosmopolitanism derives from their definition of economic 
classes as the fundamental community of economic and social activity.
Christian democracy encompasses those parties whose ideology translates the 
Christian message into a political programme.68 Although the autonomy of confessional 
parties from the relevant churches has been achieved to a greater or lesser degree in 
different countries, the reference to a religious conception of the fundamental political 
community remains the essential element of those parties’ identity.69 Catholic social doctrine 
inspires the choice of the family as the basic economic community. Consequently, Christian
f id
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democrats conceive the welfare state as “aiming at ameliorating the sufferings resulting from 
market inequalities but not at replacing or changing market conditions”.70
The liberal parties’ basic unit is the individual human being. Liberals promote the 
individuals’ right of free economic and political association in the market and the civil society. 
While in their formative period liberal parties’ main goal was the achievement of political 
reform, as a consequence of long-term adaptation to the structure of electoral competition, 
the individual’s capacity to act in a sovereign manner in the market-place became their 
dominant identifying trait.71
Among European parties conservatives’ identity is the least consistent and the most 
adaptable to changing political and economic circumstances. Conservatives were created in 
the attempt to protect endangered institutions such as the church and the monarchy. 
However, although conservatives initially opposed liberals in both political and economic 
terms, several factors, among which the socialists’ electoral success, led conservatives to 
progressively adopt economic liberalism and opposing the development of the state’s 
redistributive role. Conservatism in contemporary Europe combines the definition of the nation 
as the political community and the individual as the economic unit.72
Nationalists’ fundamental political community is the nation, and the nation-state’s 
sovereignty the party’s highest value. The national economy is conceived as a closed system 
that can be insulated from the international market by protectionist policies.73 The corollary of 
these two propositions is that states’ external relations are dominated by the need to preserve
70 Huber, E., Ragin, C.and Stephens, J.D. “Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the 
Welfare State”, op. cit.
71 Smith, G., (1998), “Between Left and Right: The Ambivalence of European Liberalism” in Kirchner, E.J. Liberal 
Parties in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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73 Mudde, C., (2000), The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, p. 180. 
Although Mudde admits that all parties are nationalists, he considers that nationalism is not a sufficient category to 
describe the extreme right parties.
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national sovereignty. Nationalists’ focus on these aims creates a very contentious 
international environment where the capacity for cooperation is limited.74
Agrarian parties hold the estate as their identifying concept. In the nineteen-century the 
notion of estate implied that the monarchy granted landowners special rights and privileges.75 
In the context of democratic mobilization the agrarian movements used the concept of estate 
to imply that landowners were entitled to institutionalized support by the state. Contrary to the 
concept of class, estate does not imply the self-consciousness of a common social identity, 
therefore agrarian parties do not a priori conceive of a political ethos.
Ecologist parties owe their identity to the conception of the ecological system as the 
primordial economic community. Ecologists are therefore sceptical of the methods and 
objectives of economic liberalism: economic growth through the mastery of nature.76 
Ecologists’ political ethos is cosmopolitan and derives not only from the view that the 
ecological crisis has a global dimension, but also draws from the concept of universal justice 
at the core of peace movements from which several European ecologist parties derive from.
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Table 1. Party types’ political and economic ethos
The dominant ethos is marked in bold.
Social
democrats
Class based 
cosmopolitanism
Class. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on a class basis
Christian
democrats
Religious cosmopolitanism Family. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on a family and 
residual basis
Liberals Civil society 
cosmopolitanism
Individuals. Acceptance of market 
capitalism.
Conservatives Nation Individuals. Accept market capitalism
Nationalists Nation Nation. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on the basis of the 
nation
Agrarians No a priori conception Estate. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on the basis of 
estate
Ecologists Ecological system 
cosmopolitanism
Ecologic System. Compensate for the 
failures of market capitalism on the 
basis of the ecological system
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A scale of party responses to European integration
Taggart and Szczerbiak define Hard Euroscepticism as the fundamental disagreement 
with the “entire project of European political and economic integration”. A party’s hard 
opposition to European integration is therefore tightly defined. In opposition, Soft 
Euroscepticism is defined as the “contingent or qualified opposition to European 
integration”,77 i.e., it encompasses any type of criticism of the EU while not distinguishing 
between a positive and negative appraisal of European integration. In 2000, while attempting 
to refine the meaning of Soft Euroscepticism, the authors distinguished between “policy 
Euroscepticism” and “national interest Euroscepticism”, and consider that the two categories 
not only are not mutually exclusive but are also compatible with support for the European 
project.78
Attempts to improve Taggart and Szczerbiak’s scale with a more precise definition of 
Soft Euroscepticism added a second dimension to the principled opposition to the EU by 
distinguishing between principled and functional support or opposition to the EU. While 
Kopecky and Mudde’s typology define this second dimension as the assessment of “the 
general practice of European integration”,79 Conti’s scale defines functional attitudes as the 
compatibility between the national goals and European integration while principled attitudes
result from a fundamental and unmediated support/opposition to the values of European
• • 80 integration.
^Tag gart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001), “Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of 
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My criticism of these scales is twofold. First, while Kopecky and Mudde’s classification 
results in a typology that is unfit to be translated in a scale of a decided positive or negative 
evaluation of European integration, all the previous classifications follow the parties’ attempts 
to hedge their fundamental opposition to integration by assimilating the party’s distinction 
between values and practices of integration into a scale of European attitudes. Second, all 
these authors conceive the value of European integration as an unmediated good and 
assume the existence of a primordial European identity.
Considering this assumption unrealistic, I propose a scale of support and opposition 
that takes the nation-state as the primordial framework of identity of European elites and 
masses. Support for the EU is a function of the promotion of national goals.81 The two 
fundamental attitudes, Euroscepticism and Europhilism, are defined as a perceived a priori 
incompatibility or congruence between the national interest and European integration. 
Borrowing from Taggart and Szczerbiak’s terminology, a distinction between Hard and Soft 
positions nuances the categories. Soft indicates the placing of conditions on the fundamental 
and a priori relationship between national interest and European integration, and Hard 
indicates an unconditional support or opposition to European integration. A Soft Eurosceptic 
party deems that despite the a priori assumption of opposition between national interest and 
European integration, under certain conditions these could eventually coincide. By contrast, 
Soft Europhilism considers that the a priori correspondence between European integration 
and the national interest might be overridden by the non-fulfilment of certain conditions by the 
EU.
81
This assumption is substantiated by Eurobarometer data showing that support for the EU is closely related to 
citizens” perceived benefits for furthering domestic interests. Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, A., (2001 ^ Citizenship and 
Governance in the European Union. London: Continuum
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Party’s ethos as determinants of positions on European 
integration
While Taggart and Sitter’s theories ascribe Euroscepticism to a rational opposition 
tactic,82 Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s article in 2002 proposes that parties’ positioning in the 
socio-political dimension are the best explanation of parties’ attitudes towards European 
integration.83 These authors acknowledge the “strong, consistent and largely overlooked 
effect” of the socio-political dimension on a party’s attitudes towards European integration, but 
in the introduction to the Special Issue of Comparative Political Studies the authors maintain 
that the two dimensions are highly correlated, so much so that they form a single (left-right)
84axis.
The ethos theory casts doubt on the accuracy of the left-libertarian/right-authoritarian 
dichotomy and keeps the two dimensions separate. The dominant ethos, be it political or 
economic determines the party’s fundamental choice between Euroscepticism and 
Europhilism. The different nature of political and economic values results in an asymmetric 
impact of the political and economic evaluation of European integration for each party type.
A party based on the political ethos will evaluate the EU through the lenses of indivisible 
and nonnegotiable concepts such as the nation and the civil society. The political ethos’ 
evaluation of political integration is therefore irreversible and unconditional. A party based on 
the economic ethos will adopt Eurosceptic or Europhile positions depending on the evaluation
82
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of the EU’s contribution to the attainment of its preferred national economic regime. Since 
economic concepts are divisible and quantifiable, the evaluation these parties make of the EU 
admits to the gradual approximation to the national desired policy regime, i.e., it is not 
absolute. If the political ethos contradicts the evaluation of the party’s preferred economic 
regime, the party will adopt a conditional support or opposition to the EU. Thus, a negative 
evaluation of the EU’s effects on the desired national economic regime can be made 
conditional by a cosmopolitan political ethos, since the party can conceive supporting the EU 
if certain economic conditions are fulfilled.
Table 2. The asymmetric impact of the political and economic ethos on party European 
positions
Political Ethos Sufficient to determine whether 
party’s attitude is conditional 
(Hard or Soft)
Sufficient to determine whether 
party’s attitude is Eurosceptic or 
Europhile
Economic Ethos Sufficient to determine whether 
party’s attitude is Eurosceptic or 
Europhile
Not sufficient to determine either 
overall position or conditionality 
of the party’s position
Based on the theoretical explanation presented above I put forward a series of related 
hypothesis, concerning the sufficiency and necessity of the different conceptions of 
communities for parties’ attitudes towards European integration. These hypotheses are 
grouped according to the centrality of the political and economic ethos in determining the 
party identity.
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1. Sufficiency and necessity of political and economic evaluations of European 
integration for parties based primarily on political communities
1.1 Nationalism is a sufficient and necessary condition for Hard Euroscepticism.
The perception that European integration is incompatible with a party’s definition of the 
political community is a sufficient and necessary condition for an unconditional opposition to 
the EU. As scholars of European integration have long argued, one of the chief 
consequences of European integration is the weakening of the authority of nation-state.85 The 
transfer of sovereignty to the European level is opposed by those parties whose ethos 
consecrates the nation as the fundamental political community. Nationalism is therefore a 
sufficient and necessary condition of Hard Euroscepticism for a party that holds it as a 
structuring value, and renders both centripetal strategies and the perceived mismatch 
between the economic objectives of the party and European integration irrelevant for its 
European attitudes.
1.2. Cosmopolitanism is a sufficient and necessary condition for Hard 
Europhilism.
A cosmopolitan political ethos is a sufficient and necessary condition for Hard 
Europhilism. The EU appears to these parties as the embodiment of their conception of the 
natural political order, i.e., one overcoming the national borders. Being the only central and 
cosmopolitan concept of European parties, religious cosmopolitanism has been a source of 
unconditional support for European integration.
85 Borzel, T.and Risse, T., (2000), “Who Is Afraid of a European Federation? How to Constitutionalize a Multi-Level 
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1.3. The perception of the EU as detrimental to the party’s desired economic 
regime is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for determining a party’s 
response to European integration
Parties based on the political ethos will accept or reject the EU in an absolute way, 
depending on their stance on the cosmopolitan/nationalist divide. Since political notions are 
absolute and non-divisible, the economic ethos will not impact on these parties’ European 
attitudes.
2. Sufficiency and necessity of political and economic evaluations of European 
integration for parties based on the economic ethos.
The set of conditions of parties based on the economic ethos are more complex. The 
economic left-right positions of the parties are not directly relevant for their European 
attitudes, but are mediated by perceptions of the limitations and potential of the European 
Union (EU) policy regimes.86 Differences in the evaluation of the Single Market and the 
Economic and Monetary Union are both inter and intra-party types, as the impact of the EU 
policy regimes on the national economic regime varies from country to country. Since the 
question of whether the regulation of the Single Market should be based on a liberal or a 
social democratic model is open,87 a party can also alter its appreciation of European 
economic integration over time, following the evolution of specific EU policy regimes.88
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2.1. The perception of the EU as detrimental or beneficial to a party’s desired 
economic regime is sufficient and necessary for the party’s positioning on either side 
of the Euroscepticism-Europhile divide (Soft Euroscepticism or Soft Europhilism).
A party based on the economic ethos derives its European attitudes from the evaluation 
of the EU’s impact on the national economic regime. If this evaluation is positive, the party will 
consider European integration a priori compatible with the national interest. However, the 
economic left/right position of a party is not directly relevant for its European attitudes but is 
mediated by the relative position of the country in relation to the EU’s economic regime.89 
Parties considering the economic effects of integration as conducive to the attainment of the 
economic regime professed in their economic ethos will embrace Europhilism.
The conversion of communist parties to social democracy resulted in these parties 
progressively reassessing the European policy regimes. The Europhilism of Central and 
Eastern European left-wing parties’ resulted from the fading of the belief in centrally-planned 
economies in favour of a supply-side approach to the correction of class inequalities. By the 
mid-nineties the transformed parties adopted the view that by integrating the EU they would 
be in a relatively better off position to maintain a redistributive regime than they would by 
integrating the global market. The transformation of their understanding of class was 
strengthened by a decidedly cosmopolitan view of the political order.
69 Marks, G. and. Wilson, C., “The Past in the Present”, op. cit.
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2.2 Although it does not determine the overall position of a party on the 
Eurosceptic/Europhile divide, nationalism is sufficient for the setting of conditions 
within a Europhile position (Soft Europhilism) and leads to unconditional 
Euroscepticism in case of a negative economic evaluation of European integration 
(Hard Euroscepticism).
Although being a secondary concept of a party’s identity, the political ethos still exerts a 
residual influence on the party’s European attitude. A nationalist political ethos will reinforce a 
negative evaluation of European economic integration and render Euroscepticism 
unconditional.
A nationalist ethos renders a positive evaluation of economic integration conditional on 
the maintenance of policy regimes relevant to the party’s core values (i.e. Soft Europhilism). 
Considering the mismatch between the party political vision and the mode of governance of 
European integration, even in the case of a positive economic evaluation, the party can only 
adopt a Soft Europhile position.
2.3 Although it does not determine the overall position of a party on the 
Eurosceptic/Europhile divide, cosmopolitanism is sufficient for the setting of 
conditions within a Eurosceptic position (Soft Euroscepticism) and no conditions 
within a Europhile position (Hard Europhilism).
A cosmopolitan ethos exerts residual influence on a party’s European attitude even if 
economic conceptions are the party’s identifying element. As a mirror image of nationalism, 
political cosmopolitanism determines that a party holding a negative economic evaluation of 
European integration will adopt a conditional Eurosceptic position if certain economic 
conditions are met. Also a cosmopolitan political ethos will reinforce the Europhile positioning 
of parties based on the economic ethos that consider European integration as positive, 
rendering their attitudes unconditional.
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3. Party strategy is not a necessary condition, and in the long-run is not a 
sufficient condition, for determining a party’s European positions. In the short-run, 
however, party strategy can be sufficient to condition a party’s European positions.
Following Downs’ conception of parties as organisations whose primary goal is to 
achieve votes or office, this hypothesis refers to party strategies primarily geared to those 
goals.90 Parties follow office-seeking strategies through a centrist behaviour. Conversely, 
vote-seeking strategies can lead parties to a polarising behaviour in the attempt to capture 
electoral niches.91 Competitive strategies are operationalised as behavioural concepts, i.e., 
independent of ideological considerations.92 Centrist party strategies are defined as the 
strategic behaviour of parties intending to gain office and maintain it by choosing a mode of 
moderate competition that implies a fight for the centre position in the axis, where the majority 
of the votes are cast, through the use of moderate propaganda tactics and consensual 
politics.
On the contrary, a polarising party, although not ideologically anti-systemic, is defined 
by its behavioural opposition to centrist politics. A polarising party “adopts isolationist 
strategies, tends to build a separate pole of the system, refuses to enter coalitions (at the 
national level) and resorts to outbidding propaganda tactics, systematically opposing and 
discrediting some founding values of the regime, on which all other parties agree.”93 The 
evaluation of a party’s coalition and propaganda strategies, rather than its location in the 
ideological space, is used to classify a party.
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3.1 A centripetal strategy is not a necessary condition, and in the long-run is not 
a sufficient condition, for Europhilism. However, in the short-run a centripetal strategy 
can be sufficient to drive a party to Europhilism.
Although never a necessary condition, a centripetal strategy can in the short-run be 
sufficient for Europhilism. Since the multilevel system of governance makes Eurosceptic 
parties an odd-fit in government, parties are able to temporarily suspend their ethos to signal 
their determination to integrate government. However, in the long-run, centrist parties will not 
be able to maintain a Europhile position that is in contradiction with the conception of the 
national interest dictated by the definition of the political or economic community. Parties can 
suspend their ethos-derived evaluation of European integration only temporarily, and their 
long-term Europhile stance depends on the compatibility between a party’s European stance 
and its political and economic ethos.
3.2 A polarising strategy is not a necessary condition, and in the long-term is not 
a sufficient condition, for Euroscepticism. However, in the short-run it can be sufficient 
to drive a party to Euroscepticism.
Although a polarising strategy is not a necessary condition for Euroscepticism, in the 
short-run it is sufficient for determining parties’ opposition to European integration. In the long- 
run, however, parties are determined by their ethos, and a polarising strategy is not a 
sufficient condition for the maintenance of a Eurosceptic position. In the long-term primacy of 
a party’s political and economic ethos means that polarising strategies are neither sufficient 
nor necessary conditions of Euroscepticism. Since the limits to the transformation of the 
definition of the basic communities are extremely severe, a party’s identity is a long-term 
determinant of its competitive behaviour.
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Party responses to European integration.
The use of the ethos concept to understand a party response to European integration is 
spelled in this table.
Table 3. Party responses to European integration.
Social Democrats Soft Euroscepticism Hard Europhilism
Christian democrats Hard Europhilism Hard Europhilism
Liberals Soft Euroscepticism Hard Europhilism
Conservatives Hard Euroscepticism Soft Europhilism
Agrarians Euroscepticism Europhilism
Nationalists Hard Euroscepticism Hard Euroscepticism
Ecologists Soft Europhilism Hard Europhilism
The placement of liberal parties on the scale of European attitudes is decided by the 
parties’ evaluation of economic integration. If the Single Market is seen as promoting market 
liberalism, liberals are Europhiles. However, when conceiving the EU’s regulatory role as 
impeding the good functioning of the free market, liberals will be Soft Eurosceptics. The 
liberals’ cosmopolitanism is derived from the idea that individuals should be free to associate, 
and that civil society is the basis of political legitimacy. Liberals’ cosmopolitanism, as a 
second order factor, determines that their Euroscepticism is Soft and their Europhilism 
unconditional.
As a mirror image of the liberals, the social democrats’ placement on either side of the 
scale of support to the EU is determined by their conception of economic class as the 
fundamental element of identity. Social democrats are permanently engaged with the 
elimination of differences among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from
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positions in the labour market.94. Whenever a social democratic party perceives the EU as a 
market opening enterprise which undermines the redistributive role of the state, social 
democrats are Eurosceptic. If the EU is seen as the promoter of regulated capitalism, social 
democrats become supporters of integration. The social democrats’ class-based political 
cosmopolitanism, being a secondary element in the political identity of these parties can lead 
them to adopt a conditional scepticism or an unconditional Europhilism.
Agrarians and ecologists have also tended to favour European regulatory policies, but 
their definition of the EU’s desirable policy regime is more limited than that of social 
democrats. Agrarian parties will be Europhile if they consider that European integration 
fosters the protection of farmers and Eurosceptic if European integration is considered as 
harming the protection of farmers. Therefore, by extending the CAP provisions to the new 
states of the EU has been the condition of the Central and East European Agrarian parties’ 
support for European integration. Since Agrarians have no determined political identity, the 
definition of their political ethos will depend on the circumstances of their mobilisation. 
Ecologists are Hard Europhiles if EU-harmonised environmental standards are perceived as 
more restrictive than the national environmental standards.
Since conservative parties are not a priorii determined by economic liberalism or 
political nationalism,95 conservatives are the parties with the widest range of attitudes on the 
EU. The conservatives’ attitudes towards European integration are not only dependent on 
which economic regime the EU is seen as promoting, but also on which faction predominates 
within the party. If nationalism is the party’s structuring value, conservatives will be Hard 
Eurosceptics. If the party identity is dominated by economic liberalism it will define its position
94
Huber, E., Ragin, C., and Stephens J., “Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the 
Welfare State”.
95 The two types of conservatism, the liberal conservatism and the national conservatism, result from the accent 
being put in one dimension of identity. Nonetheless, the accent can be changed over time, as a way to adapt to 
political transformations. Girvin, B. (1998), “The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism” in Girvin, B. (ed.), 
The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism. London: Sage, p.9; Smith, G., “Between Left and Right: The 
Ambiguity of European Liberalism”, p.23.
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based on an evaluation of the EU as a market liberalising agent, and normally adopt Soft 
Europhilism.
Christian democratic and nationalist parties are largely immune to evaluations of the 
European integration’s impact on domestic economic regimes. Christian democracy 
unconditionally supports integration. The reluctance of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine to 
accept the nation as the ultimate political community led Christian democrats to promote 
staunchly European integration in the post World War II period, and ever since Christian 
democrats have been the most consistent Hard Europhiles. The nationalists’ belief in the 
nation as the basic political community determines the priori opposition between the parties’ 
perception of national interest and European integration, unless the EU‘s governance reverts 
to an intergovernmental mode. Nationalists have therefore considered European integration 
as unconditionally incompatible with the national interest.
Parties’ preferences concerning European integration
From the analytical framework presented above, I derive parties’ preferences on the 
course of European integration. These preferences are drawn from the set of goals 
constituting each party’s ethos. Therefore, a party is likely to support the EU if the Union 
develops features that help the party to attain its fundamental goals. The table bellow 
summarises each party preferences for the development of European integration.
The present theory also explains why parties whose identities rely primarily on political 
values are more entrenched in their European positions. The supranational character of 
European integration is its intrinsic feature, and more political integration will not substantially 
change the supranational character of the EU. The unquantifiable and immutable nature of a 
political concept makes its reinterpretation difficult. The immutability of both the nature of 
political integration and the party’s political ethos makes the European positions of these 
parties both unconditional and irreversible.
Economic evaluations of European integration are also both sufficient and necessary 
conditions for parties whose identity is based on economic values. However, the hardening or
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softening of these positions will be determined by the political ethos of the party. While parties 
might base their Europhilism or Euroscepticism on the compatibility of the EU economic 
regime with a party’s economic values, this attitude will be conditional or unqualified 
depending on the party’s political ethos. The column on economic conditions for European 
integration also shows that economic attitudes can more easily change since these depend 
on the development of the EU’s policy regimes, and not on the EU’s political nature.
Table 4. Parties’ preferences concerning European integration
Christian Democrats European supranational 
integration
Policy regimes favouring mild 
regulated capitalism
Liberals European supranational 
Integration
Achieving the single market 
European neo-liberal 
capitalism
National conservatives Inexistent Inexistent
Economic conservatives Low level of supranational 
integration
Achieving the single market 
European neo-liberal 
capitalism
Nationalists Inexistent Inexistent
Social democrats Supranational integration in 
support for European market 
regulation
European Regulated 
Capitalism;
Fiscal coordination
Ecologists Supranational Integration Policy regimes providing a 
high level of environmental 
protection
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Methodology
Progress in finding the causes of parties’ European attitudes has been mainly achieved 
through empirical enquiry.96 The determination of the causes of parties’ European attitudes 
has so far largely turned to one or a handful of individual case-studies or, alternatively, has 
followed variable-oriented statistical analysis. While the case-oriented analysis are weak on 
external validity, variable-oriented analysis fail to take into account multiple or conjectural 
causation, i.e., cases when recurrent events may be caused by any of several circumstances 
or combinations of circumstances. Theoretical disagreement between proponents of strategic 
and ideological explanations has also been linked to the choice of methods. When variable- 
oriented methodological approaches have been chosen, the hypotheses were tested in a way 
as to be pitched against each other.
Attempting to overcome this tendency, I adopt the logic of Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) to approach the testing of the theoretical propositions advanced above. This 
methodology was developed by Charles Ragin to deal with causal heterogeneity while using 
small numbers of cases.97 This method allows surmounting the divisions between case- 
oriented and variable-oriented research by treating cases as configurations of theoretically 
relevant combinations of features. QCA is used both in the theory-building process and in 
theory-testing since it focuses not so much on discarding causes as weak explanations, but
96
Marks, G. Hooghe, L. and Wilson, C. (2002), “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?”, 
Comparative Political Studies. 35(8); Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000), ‘T he  Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory 
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97 Ragin, C. (1987), The Comparative Method: Moving Bevond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. 
Berkeley:University of California Press.
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on attempting to establish which combinations of causes and which single causes are 
sufficient or necessary to determine causality.
Basic to Qualitative Comparative Analysis are the logic of qualitative comparison 
systematized by Mill, termed the methods of agreement and of difference.98 Mill’s method of 
agreement is the search for a single common condition among cases having the same 
outcome. Such conditions can be relevant to a discussion of necessity. The method of 
difference is the search for a single distinguishing feature among cases disagreeing on the 
outcome -  i.e., experimental design. While both may be important to the discovery of 
connections between phenomena, only the method of difference is reliable for substantiating 
causality.
The main new element provided by QCA is set-theoretic algebra, which provides the 
formalisation required to apply Mill’s logic reliably. The original formulation of QCA uses crisp 
(or Boolean) sets, implying that cases are either inside or outside a given category. The QCA 
method makes possible a dialogue between the theory and the data, leading to conceptual 
clarification and adjustment by connecting the features of a single case with the patterns 
displayed across cases. QCA is therefore a method that serves well the purpose of theory- 
building, since it allows the adjustment of propositions of causality.
Ragin’s 1987 book also launched the first serious debate about causal necessity and 
sufficiency, as well as making it possible to identify the so-called “chemical reaction”, i.e., 
identify when variables lead to an outcome only when in each other’s presence. The first step 
in the theory-building exercise is the proposition of theoretically-based propositions about 
necessary and dependent conditions. Factors which are either present or absent for all cases 
with a given outcome may, if corroborated by other knowledge, will be considered relevant to 
claims about necessary conditions for that outcome.99 Propositions about sufficient conditions 
can be explored by identifying causal configurations which are present for at least one case
98 Ragin, C. (1987), discussion in page 36-42. 
"R a g in , C. (1987), p. 93.
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with that outcome but in none of the cases with a different outcome. 100 A further step is to 
identify theoretically interesting dichotomies of variables and identify cases that can be 
analysed.
Operationalising political ethos and the empirical material
The party ethos is a qualitative and discreet category that can be judged from the 
analysis of party documents. However, the abstract nature of the concepts constituting the 
party ethos demanded the operationalisation of the political and economic communities into 
more workable concepts. This thesis thus operationalises the concepts defining the political 
and economic communities as the justification used by parties for limiting individuals’ political 
and economic freedoms. Naturally, the analysis of party documents focused on identifying the 
principles used to legitimise the limitation of individual political and economic freedoms. The 
political ethos is operationalised as the principles of social aggregation, or the values and 
principles underlying the policies regulating the relationship between the individuals and the 
community. The economic ethos is operationalised as the principles of economic aggregation, 
i.e., the values justifying policies compensating for distortions of market capitalism.
Parties’ political and economic ethos can be identified not only in parties’ election 
manifestoes and founding declarations, but can also be deducted from the more applied 
policies devised by parties. For example, a socialist party’s conception of class as the 
fundamental principle of economic aggregation is revealed not only in the party’s general 
declarations but also through the principles governing the party’s labour policies.
To identify the parties’ definition of the political and economic communities in their 
documents I first analysed parties’ programmatic preambles and looked for the general
100 Probabilistic procedures can be introduced: a causal configuration can be ‘almost always’ or ‘usually’ necessary
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statements of how the society, the state and the market is conceived by the party.101 
Naturally, because parties tend to define themselves at the moment of their creation, parties’ 
founding declarations are particularly useful to identify the core concepts of social and 
economic organisation. When parties do not produce a founding declaration, the party’s first 
election manifesto normally extensively spells out the party’s basic political beliefs. Such 
principles are often revealed in subsequent party election manifestoes’ general statements.
The way parties’ define their electorate often follows the party’s fundamental beliefs of 
social organisation. For example, a nationalist party frequently addresses the electorate using 
nationalist concepts, while a Christian democratic party tends to address those called by the 
Christian message. Therefore the particular address a party uses to define their electorate is 
frequently an indicator of the party’s identifying concept. Party programmes preambles also 
frequently indicate the historical political inheritances claimed by the party. When a new party 
is formed, and particularly in a country where the political history was interrupted, it is frequent 
that parties define their ideological profile by claiming the inheritance of past political 
movements and parties.
Secondly, I analysed parties’ political and economic programmatic stances and 
identified the proposed legitimising fundaments and principles of the economic and social 
policies. The policy positions taken by the parties when fundamental issues of the political 
system were being discussed, such as constitutional amendments, were equally considered 
as indicative of the definition of political community. The rhetorical justifications of parties’ 
change of policies, or their permanence, are also often useful for the analysis of the 
permanent elements of parties’ identities. When more than a principle was invoked as a 
legitimising tool in parties’ documents, often in composed concepts such as Catholic
for a given outcome.
101 Here I use Gerald Pomper’s analytical division between general statements, ideological stances and policy 
positions to analyse political parties. See Pomper, G., (1988), Voters. Elections and Parties: The Practice of 
Democratic Theory. Oxford: Transaction Books
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nationalism, or national agrarianism, I tried to assess the predominant element in such 
relationship.
Thirdly, I searched party documents other than programmes for the rhetoric justifying 
parties’ alliances with other political parties and civic associations. The choice of parties’ 
social and economic partners generally indicates the conception of political and economic 
community underlying a party’s action. Such associations often have the function of 
strengthening the party’s identifying profile. Diverse party documents were also used to 
document the reassessment of a party’s identity, for example, at the moment of change of 
leadership.
Fourthly, newspapers’ reports of party activities, in particular of those media 
ideologically linked to particular parties, were also considered evidence of parties’ strategic 
alliances, and of party’s identity conflicts. Interviews with present or historical leaders, 
conducted by the author or published in the printed press, were also analysed. When 
analysing party leaders’ interviews the focus was on the values shared by the party 
leadership at crucial moments of party identification, i.e., at identifying the formation of 
“communities of discourse” among party leaders. The discontinuity of party organisations that 
prevailed in Poland makes a large part of this analysis dealing with the ideological 
background of parties’ dissolution and re-organisation, as well as with the problematic of 
ideological succession. Therefore, the analysis of newspapers and party leaders’ interviews 
frequently deals with the challenges and choices faced by the leadership at key moments, 
and the capacity or incapacity to maintain the parties’ identity coherence.
The thesis takes a liberal approach to the use of empirical material, thus ignoring the 
rules set out by the European Party Manifesto Project. The Manifesto Project defines as 
usable party manifestos and platforms those that are a “recognizable statement of policy 
which has the backing of the leadership as the authoritative definition of party policy for that
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election”.102 This implies that only programs, platforms and other documents that are 
produced immediately preceding the election are legitimate empirical material.103 Following 
Harmel and Janda’s criticism to the Manifesto Programme I use a wide range of party 
documents, press analysis and interviews to determine a party’s ethos, its strategies and 
positioning on the Europhile-Eurosceptic axis.104 ‘The Manifesto data themselves are not very 
useful for establishing the party’s actual positions on any of the issues that together constitute 
its issue profile (...) or at least not precisely enough to be useful in studying changes in issues 
positions.”105
To determine the concept defining the parties’ political and economic community (and 
not only the relative intensity of the party positions) a judgemental approach to the data was 
chosen. Party documents, interviews and press were then organised so as to justify the 
classification of parties’ ethos. Since parties exist in a historical context, the analytical 
narrative appeared to be the best way to present party material and depict the evolution of 
parties’ ethos and strategies while exposing its qualitative context.106 To gather the contextual 
understanding of parties’ ideological definition I conducted interviews with members of the 
leadership of the main parties and carried out a survey of the main newspapers and news 
services. Being more flexible than discourse analysis or any quantitative methods, the 
analytical narrative integrates the evolutions of ethos and strategies with the evolution of 
parties’ creation, mergers, splits and demise, all being relevant to determining the causes of 
parties’ attitudes towards European integration.
102
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105 idem, p.176.
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Classification Criteria
There are three generally accepted party classification criteria: programmatic identities, 
“issue positions” and membership in international parties’ organisations.107 The first criterion 
refers to a categorisation that presupposes that parties can have a similar “genetic code” 
emanating from the circumstances of their birth or from the intention of representing similar 
interests. Programmatic identities refer to the normative propositions of a programme; they 
are about general values. The method of issue positions or policy similarity categorises 
parties according to the similarity between the policies pursued by one party to those pursued 
by another party. The third method of classification, through cross-border organisational 
linkages, became more relevant in Europe after the creation of party groups in the European 
Parliament.
The present classification follows the method of programmatic identities; classifying 
parties according to their organisational linkages appears inappropriate as international 
linkages are created frequently for instrumental purposes rather than to reflect parties’ values 
and policy positions. The fact that the European party groups have tended to sacrifice their 
identity in order to increase their power in the European Parliament108 shows that the 
membership in a party group can be misleading in indicating what individual parties stand for.
Since the theoretical framework relies on an abstract level of ideology, the party ethos, 
as an explanation for party’s European choices, Polish parties are classified through the 
criterion of programmatic identity. Despite the constant flux of the Polish party scene and the 
de-consolidated nature of parties’ organisations109 ideological identities appear remarkably
106Bates, R. et al. (1998), Analytical Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
107 Gallagher, M. Laver, M. and Mair, P. (1992), Representative Government in Modern Europe. New York McGraw-
Hill, p.181.
108Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997), Political Parties in the European Union. London: MacMillan Press, p. 25-7.
109 Kitschelt, H. et. al. (1999), Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition. Representation, and Inter-Partv 
Cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 211.
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constant. Following the demise of a party it is very common that another organisation appears 
to take its ideological space. This indicates a rather strongly consolidated ideological space. 
Therefore it appears pertinent to classify Polish parties according to their positioning in the 
ideological space, i.e., through their self-definition of the political and economic communities. 
In cases where the consolidation of an identity is not achieved or a previously agreed identity 
is under threat I point to the divergent factions’ definitions of the political and economic 
identities.
Case Selection
In choosing to use all cases -  parties -  from a single party system, the Polish, 
advantages and disadvantages ensue. Advantages stem from the fact that by using a whole 
party spectrum, the strategic variables can be understood in the context of the party system, 
making it possible to take conclusions on the interaction between the variables and its impact 
on the European issue for the level of the party system. Within the Dmowskist interwar 
tradition, when nationalism was often justified in religious terms, Polish conservative and 
nationalist parties referred almost obligatorily to Catholic moral values as part of the definition 
of national identity.110 The Polish party system is therefore an example of the predominance 
of the political dimension in structuring party competition. This makes its analysis very rich in 
insights on the kind of conflicts caused by European integration in such party systems. The 
strength of nationalism as a political identity, and the way Polish ideological inheritance mixes 
nationalism and Catholicism, makes Poland an illustration of the high levels of the 
independent and dependent variables, i.e., an extreme case.111
110 Walicki, A. (2000), “The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski”, East European Politics and Societies. 14(1): 12- 
46.
111 For a classification of possible choices of cases see Flyvbjerg, B. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social 
Enquiry Fails and How it can Count Again. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p.204.
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It is important to note that the conclusions on the level of party system are limited to 
cases with resembling background conditions, i.e., the mobilisation of the political cleavage. 
In party systems where the socio-economic axis is predominant, nationalism is less prone to 
be a sufficient condition for Euroscepticism, not the least because chances are that it will not 
be mobilised as a party identity. In countries where nationalism is absent or very weak, other 
effects, like economic opposition to integration, can emerge as an important cause of 
Euroscepticism. There are, however, indications that this background condition is becoming 
more common, not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe.
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Chapter III Explaining right-wing European attitudes
This chapter tests on the Polish right-wing the claim that party ethos is the long-term 
sufficient and necessary condition of party attitudes to European integration. The combination 
of political and economic ethos explains party support and opposition to the European project. 
In order to carry out this task, the chapter starts by describing the formation of Polish right- 
wing parties from 1989 to 2001 and classify them according to their ethos.
The development of the Polish right-wing in the last decade demonstrates the 
importance and validity of the distinction between the political and the economic ethos in a 
typology of parties that takes into account the different dimensions of a party’s identity. The 
Polish right-wing parties’ attitudes towards Europe demonstrates clearly the specific impact of 
the political and the economic ethos on party European positions and is a vivid example of the 
sufficiency and necessity of a party’s identifying ethos on its European positions.
The chapter deals with the persistence and increased importance of nationalism on 
the right of the political spectrum. Nationalism has contributed to the failure of Christian 
democracy, which in turn provides an effective explanation for the unusually high propensity 
of Polish right-wing parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions. Although nationalist parties proved 
to be unstable organisations, the nation showed more resistance as a political ethos than civil 
society or Christian cosmopolitanism.
The replacement of the idea of civil society as the core concept of liberal parties by 
economic neo-liberalism as the liberal’s identifying ethos diluted the parties’ distinctiveness 
vis-a-vis conservative parties. Consequently, the reorganisation of the right-wing party scene 
in 2001 not only confirmed the demise of Christian democracy but also of political liberalism 
as the right’s identifying concept. The political spectrum now consists of two conservative 
parties, based respectively on political nationalism and economic liberalism, flanked by a 
nationalist party.
The empirical material of this chapter is primarily composed of party documents.
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Party founding declarations are the main source used for understanding the core concepts of 
their ethos, as parties use these documents to position themselves in the ideological space 
and spell out the fundamental concepts that guide their political action. When parties do not 
adopt a founding declaration, their first election manifesto performs this function. Subsequent 
election manifestoes are also used to determine the evolution of a party’s ethos.
Creating parties was an unusually popular activity in Poland. Around each election, a 
de-consolidation and subsequent consolidation of the core and the margins of the party 
system took place, and this provided the opportunity to observe the adaptation and evolution 
of party ethos. To take account of the strong intra-party ideological conflicts over the definition 
of party ethos I also analysed documents of party congresses and undertook a survey of the 
printed press. Since classifying party ethos and European positions requires the use of 
qualitative judgemental data, I present the empirical material through an analytic narrative that 
places the data in the context of party formation.
Stages of Polish relationship with the European Union
Polish integration in the EU was a long process going through different formal stages. 
As time went by and accession became increasingly more concrete, the accession became 
an exercise of legislative transposition and negotiation. The Commission became the 
monitoring body of the candidate states’ progress in fulfilling the EU’s conditions. One can 
therefore identify the formal stages of Polish relationship with the EU based on the degree of 
commitment and conditionality of the EU.
The first stage of Polish relations with the EU lasted from the first elections in August 
1989 to the ratification of the Europe Agreements in early March 1992. During this phase the 
EU did not make any formal commitment to the eventual integration of Poland and the relation 
between the two parties was to a great extent still open. The second phase was initiated by 
the ratification of the Europe Agreements and the first clear statement of EU commitment to 
the integration of Poland, which took place in the 1993 Copenhagen Council. The third stage
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started with the EU’s decision to open negotiations with seven of the accession countries in 
September 1997. This third phase was characterised by strong conditionality and the EU 
becoming an important issue of domestic politics. The last phase started with the ratification 
of the accession treaty in May 2004 and full integration of Poland in the European institutions.
The changing institutional context of Polish relations with the EU saw the replacement 
of the symbolic clout of Europe by a more concrete assessment of its real-life implications. 
This had a strong impact on Polish public evaluation of accession. As the end of the 
millennium approached public support for European accession strongly declined.
First Phase: from 1989 to the Europe Agreements
The 1989 elections initiated the first phase of Polish relations with the EU. Taken by 
surprise by the fall of communism in the Soviet satellite states, Western leaders answered 
with a mixture of grand rhetoric and considerable caution regarding the future shape of the 
European order. For two years Poland and the other Central European states were eager to 
obtain security guarantees from the West, but the European institutions and Member States 
were not prepared to promise future membership of the Western institutions. Despite the 
rhetoric of the West European leaders, it took considerable effort for the EU to concede to 
further economic and trade relations with Poland and the other Central and Eastern European 
democracies.
On 19 September 1989 Poland signed the agreement for trade co-operation with the 
(then) European Community (EC). That agreement was not only the basis for further relations 
but also a starting point for future negotiations on the subject of association with the EC. Such 
an intention was expressed by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his speech in the 
European Parliament in February 1990. On 19 May 1990 Poland officially applied to start 
negotiations for an association agreement which subsequently started in December of that 
year. In June 1991 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski declared in the 
Polish Parliament that Poland was determined to become a member of the European 
Community. Financial assistance was then provided through the Poland and Hungary Aid for
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Reconstruction in Europe (PHARE) programme, and help was targeted at helping Poland and 
Hungary make the transition to market economy.
In the early nineties “Europe” was the political myth driving the transformation of the 
country. Public support for integration was almost unanimous, and accession to the EU was 
synonymous with democracy and market economy.
Second Phase: from the ratification of the Europe Agreements (1992) to the opening of 
negotiations.
Signed in December 1991, the trade parts of the Europe Agreements were ratified in 
March 1992. They were a bilateral agreement between the member states and the EU, on 
one side, and Poland, on the other side.112 Despite their political provisions (there is a title on 
political dialogue as well as one on cultural, economic and financial cooperation), the Europe 
Agreements were fundamentally a free trade agreement in which the trade barriers to imports 
from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) were to be eliminated earlier than 
the imports from the EU to the CEEC. They foresaw a gradual opening over 10 years 
resulting in a free trade zone. The Agreements also foresaw anti-dumping measures and 
provisions on state aid and established the creation of Association Councils to regularly 
control the implementation of legislation.
However, to the dismay of the Polish political elite, the Agreements substantially limited 
free trade to industrial products, while trade in services and agriculture was subject to strong 
restrictions. The restrictions to trade in agriculture were particularly badly taken by Poland as 
the EU appeared oblivious to the economic crisis caused by shock therapy and did nothing to 
mitigate some of its effects by opening its market to Polish agriculture and steel products.113
112 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Poland, Official Journal of the European Union, L 348 , 31/12/1993.
113 Sharman, J. (2003), “Agrarian Politics in Eastern Europe in the Shadow of EU Accession”, European Union 
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The first Polish experience of negotiations with the EU was therefore marked by a strong 
protectionist attitude by the EU member states, which seriously hampered the development of 
a cooperative spirit between the negotiating parties.114 The Europe Agreements were also 
modest in political terms, establishing only a limited form of political cooperation.
It was only at the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 that membership was 
acknowledged as the goal of the integration process.115 The Copenhagen Council also 
established the basic criteria for membership of the EU. The first set of criteria concerns the 
establishment of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities, the second a functioning market economy and 
third the preparedness of the EU for enlargement.116 The conditions were designed to 
minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically burdensome 
to the EU, and to ensure that the countries joining were ready to meet all the EU rules, with 
only minimal and temporary exceptions.
After Poland officially became a candidate state in 1994, its relations with the EU 
changed significantly. The EU became referee as well as player in the accession process. 
Since all three Copenhagen criteria are very broad and open to considerable interpretation, 
they were translated into more detailed conditions during the negotiations, creating the 
perception that the criteria for accession were a moving target. During this phase the 
Commission became the central institutional interlocutor for Poland and the other candidate 
states. While the EU set the criteria, the Commission “put flesh on the bones” by determining 
their more precise content.117 For example, in 1995 the Commission issued a White Paper on 
the Single Market, which outlined primary and secondary tasks and provided a hierarchy of 
the large number of tasks implied by its conditions. As arbiter of the Copenhagen criteria, the
114 Mayhew, A. (1998), Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe. 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
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Commission also gained further powers in its relationship with the candidate states. This 
meant that the Polish political elite had a subordinate relationship with a technical and 
bureaucratic body with the power to determine policy outcomes.118
During this phase public support for European integration remained substantially high, 
with 77 percent of the population supporting accession in June 1994 (the year that Poland 
formally submitted its application). Support peaked at 80 percent in May 1995.
Third phase: the accession negotiations
Another formal stage of Poland's relations with the EU started with the Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997, at which the EU accepted the Commission's opinion to 
invite five states to start talks on their accession to the EU.119 The negotiation process started 
on 31 March 1998, when the first sitting of the International Accession Conference took place. 
After the meeting, screening sessions began to determine the extent to which Polish law was 
in accordance with community law, followed by the two parties developing position papers for 
each issue.
The negotiations for accession were characterised by tightened surveillance of the 
progress of candidate states by the Commission. The Accession Partnerships were created to 
monitor progress, and provided a direct lever on policy-making by setting out a list of policy 
priorities.120 The Commission then reported on applicants’ progress in meeting each priority 
every autumn, laying down short- and medium-term priorities in each issue area, thus 
providing a clear ranking to guide allocation of resources in applying the Copenhagen 
conditions.
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The opening of negotiations also implied reorientation of the PHARE programme to 
focus on pre-accession priorities.121 The whole relationship of Poland with the EU thus 
became focused on preparing for accession. PHARE was now a strategic and financial 
instrument for preparing for accession, its chief aim being to prepare candidate state 
administrations to absorb Structural Funds after accession.
The dynamics of EU accession were altered in 2000 after the Helsinki European 
Council (December 1999) endorsed a change in accession conditionality.122 Countries started 
moving at different speeds within the negotiation process, no longer opening the same 
negotiating chapters around the same time, but rather following their progress in 
implementing the acquis, as judged by the Commission. This principle of differentiation meant 
that the better-prepared countries could move faster through the chapters of the acquis than 
their slower neighbours. Countries that started negotiations later were even able to overtake 
candidates from the first group that fell behind.
The differentiation between candidates had an important impact on Polish-EU relations. 
In early 2000, after the Commission had issued an unfavourable report in the autumn of the 
previous year, the Polish press made failure of the government to implement legislation an 
important political issue. The immediate and visible results that unfavourable reports by the 
Commission had in closing negotiating chapters resulted in non-implementation of the acquis 
becoming a chief liability of the AWS government. Governments had to strike a balance 
between appearing to protect the national interest in the negotiations and efficiently managing 
the legislative transposition.
Obviously, certain negotiation chapters were subject to more public and political 
scrutiny than others. Of particular sensitivity were those dealing with agriculture and the free 
movement of labour. Informal negotiation linkages emerged between the transition period on
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land acquisition by foreigners and the transition period on the freedom of labour, creating a 
conundrum only solved by the change of negotiation position brought by the new government 
after 2001. Due to its controversial character, the agricultural chapter was negotiated last. The 
drama intensified as the Commission announced in January 2002 that farmers in candidate 
states would not receive full agricultural subsidies for the first nine years of membership and 
would initially be paid only 25 percent of what farmers in members states received in direct 
payments in the first year, increasing incrementally in the following years. This not only 
violated the principles set by the government but also emerged as a touchstone issue during 
the last phase of the negotiations, only resolved during the Copenhagen Summit in late 2002. 
The settlement on agriculture resulted in a mixed subsidy system in which higher production- 
based grants would only be given to farmers whose products are subsidized within the EU.
During the period in which the negotiations progressed, the opinion polls observed a 
decline in public support for integration to 55 percent in March 2002. Simultaneously, a 
significant segment of anti-EU opinion began to emerge with the number of opponents 
increasing from only 6 percent in 1994 to 29 percent in 2002. Polish public opinion seems to 
have interpreted the conditionality inherent in the negotiations as a sign of an unequal 
relationship between Poland and the EU. For example, several surveys found that 60 percent 
of Poles (including 50 percent of those who supported Polish EU membership) believed that 
the country would be a second class member when it joined the EU, while only 30 percent 
thought that it would join with full membership rights.123 Also, in the late nineties, as the 
government pressed the EU hard for an “accession date”, public support for an “as fast as 
possible” accession declined.124
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Taking opinion polls at face value, saliency of the European issue for Polish voters was, 
as for other European voters, relatively low. In July 2001 the survey conducted by the 
Pracownia Badan Spotecznych (PBS) found that only 4 percent of respondents cited EU 
membership as one of the issues that would have the greatest impact in determining which 
party they would support, coming in seventh (last) place.125 Similarly, a July 2001 Pentor 
survey found that, when asked which three election issues were important to them, only 7 
percent chose EU membership.126 However, despite the low salience attributed to the 
European issue by respondents in the opinion polls, some authors argue that the European 
issue was in the 2001 elections a proxy of other issues, and party European attitude has 
determined voters’ sympathies towards right-wing parties.127
Fourth phase: the end of the negotiations, the European Constitution and accession
Poland, together with the other candidate countries, completed accession negotiations 
at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty was signed in 
Athens in April 2003. In May 2004, fifteen years after breaking free from communist rule, 
Poland became a full member of the EU. By this time, the EU was a different institution from 
the one to which it had applied a decade before. Poland had a taste of the decision-making 
process of the EU during 2002 and 2003, when it was asked to participate in the European 
Convention to prepare the Constitutional Treaty. In the midst of adverse popular opinion, the 
Polish government accepted a compromise that would unblock the deadlock in the signature 
of the European Constitution. This happened at the December 2003 EU Summit, when 
against the majority of the public opinion and all opposition parties, the Polish government
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accepted revision of the previously acquired voting rights at the Nice Intergovernmental 
Conference for a voting formula that took into account a double majority and appeared to 
leave Poland less in control over the legislative outcomes at the Council of Ministers. 
Nevertheless, the sense of loss of sovereignty seems to have been mitigated by the change 
of status of Poland after accession. Membership gave Poland a sense that it could exert 
influence, and not only obey the will of the European institutions The membership of Poland in 
the EU altered fundamentally its status and eliminated the asymmetry between the two.
The accession to the EU, the discussions on the European Constitution, the referendum 
on accession and the elections for the European Parliament did not affect the level of public 
support for EU membership. Opinion polls showed this to remain stable at around 55-60 
percent while the level of opposition was kept at around 25 percent.128
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Christian democracy
Christian democratic parties are carriers of the idea that Christians, independently of 
their nationality, constitute the fundamental political community. The autonomy of 
confessional leaders from the church hierarchy was a necessary condition for Christian 
democratic parties’ formation in the XIX century.129 However, until World War II, Christian 
political action was mainly about defending the privileges of the church in response to attacks 
from socialists and liberals.130
In the post war period, when Christian democracy replaced nationalist parties in several 
European countries, the process of autonomisation of Christian democrats from the 
respective churches took a further step when Christian democrats recognised that no specific 
political programme can be derived from the Christian faith. However, a tension remained 
between the parties’ autonomy as political actors and the preservation of their confessional 
character.131 In order to solve this dilemma, Christian democrats redefined their confessional 
nature in a way that while embracing liberal democracy, they did not discard Catholicism but 
contested the Catholic Church’s monopoly of religious interpretation. Therefore, Christian 
democrats’ ethos is predominantly political: the definition of the political community based on 
the conception that a shared faith bounds political individuals across national borders. As a
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consequence, Christian democracy is reluctant to treat the nation-state as the natural political 
unit.132
Christian democrats’ search for a middle way between liberalism and socialism is based 
on the conception that the family is the basic economic community. Christian democrats, 
although acknowledging the usefulness of the welfare state, do not conceive it as an 
instrument to alter the social order, on which families are based, but rather as a safety net for 
those excluded from it. Deriving from the tradition of Christian charity and Catholic social 
doctrine, Christian democrats propose creating transfers “aiming at ameliorating the 
sufferings resulting from market inequalities”133 and not at replacing or changing the structural 
conditions of market competition. Therefore, the expansion of state transfers created by 
Christian democrats tends to reproduce the disparities stemming from positions in the labour 
market, rather than reducing them.
Liberalism
Liberal parties are a product of the Enlightenment, agents in the fight for democracy 
against the powers and privileges of the church and the monarchy, by reinforcing the rational 
elements of the state. Liberals’ quintessential belief in the goodness of human nature elevates 
individuals to the fundamental political and economic community. Individuals should be free 
and capable of participating in political life and act freely in the market.134 In its inception, 
liberal parties’ goals were political. In its plight to reinforce the state against traditional 
institutions, liberal forces fought conservatives and other defenders of the status quo. Liberals 
were fundamentally based on its political ethos: the citizens associated in an autonomous,
132 Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997), Political Parties in the European Union. London: MacMillan Press, p. 25-7.
133 Huber, E. Ragin, C. and Stephens, J. (1993), “Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure 
and the Welfare State", American Journal of Sociology. 99(3): 73-111.
Smith, G. (1988), op.cit.
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self-organising civil society which counterbalances the powers of the state.135 The fight for 
individual liberties overthrew monarchies and promoted the secularisation of the state. Since 
individuals are the basic unit of the state, there are no reasons to believe that individuals 
cannot or should not be associated across national borders, and the international 
environment is viewed by liberals as open to cooperation.136 Liberals therefore conceive 
international relations as a continuation of national political life.
Once liberals’ main political battles were won and civil liberties became increasingly 
taken for granted, liberals focused on the establishment of economic freedoms. Economic 
liberalism won the central place of liberal parties’ ethos, more so since liberals were 
confronted with the rise of socialism. Socialism was not only an ideology that represented a 
threat to economic freedom, thus providing a platform against which to rally, but also 
represented the stiffening of electoral competition by imitating liberals’ plea concerning the 
strengthening of state powers. As a consequence, liberal parties focused on defending the 
market as the main regulator of economic relations.
Conservatism
Conservatives’ main goals have been the protection of traditional institutions against the 
winds of change. In the XIX century this implied the protection of respected institutions like 
the church, the monarchy and the elites that benefited from their power against the liberal 
drive to centralise and strengthen the state. Thinly organised, conservatives were allied in an 
ad-hoc fashion and held a pragmatic attitude to ideology and an aversion to mobilise through 
mass organisations. Among mainstream ideologies conservatism is the least consistent and
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the one that most strongly defies classification. Conservative parties remain exceptionally 
flexible in order to adapt to the changing circumstances of political competition resulting from 
rival parties defying their electoral space.
Although conservatives initially opposed liberal parties in both political and economic 
terms, in the early XX century changing conditions of political competition led conservatives to 
take over liberals’ economic and political ethos. The end of the ideological antagonism 
between the two parties is a result of several factors. The attainment of conditions of 
economic freedom within European states, the secularisation of the state and the 
accomplishment of nation-building made conservatives’ previous pleas anachronistic. 
Adapting to these new circumstances, conservatives ended up supporting the construction of 
democratic nation-states and the establishment of economic freedoms, a plea that went 
against the rising success of left-wing ideologies pleading for an increasingly interventionist 
role of the state in the economy and an internationalist view of the political order.137 A broad 
definition of conservatism in contemporary Europe combines two principles: the nation as the 
basic political community and the individual as the fundamental economic unit.138 The 
preferences of conservative constituencies, combining social conservatism and economic 
liberalism, insured the electoral success of such a formula.
Nationalism
The present typology redefines the category of right-wing extremism by classifying 
parties solely on the basis of a nationalist definition of the political community.139 Von Beyme 
and Mudde consider that nationalism is not sufficient to determine a party’s right-wing
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extremism. Mudde asserts that although “the identified ideological core (of radical right 
parties) is clearly nationalist, not all nationalists can be considered right-wing extremists 
because they are not simultaneously xenophobic and stressing law and order.140. The present 
classification of nationalist parties considers that the nation, regarded as the basic political 
and economic community, is not only the ideological core of extreme right parties, but it is 
sufficient to describe these parties’ ethos. Nationalists’ central plank is the attainment and 
preservation of the nation’s political sovereignty.
The nationalist party family has been mobilised at two different times. During the XIX 
century nationalist movements fought against multi-national empires and the church to assert 
the right of nations to self-determination. Nationalists’ main plea is political; the establishment 
of the nation-state as a political entity and economic nationalism is of secondary relevance. 
The second period of nationalist parties’ mobilisation was well into the XX century. The 
second wave of nationalist parties used the nation as the central element of a critique of 
established elites. Contrary to the democratic nationalist movements of liberal origin, the 
second wave of nationalist parties rejected the system of decision-making developed during 
the process of democratisation. Nationalists use deeply felt convictions about the destiny of 
the nation as justification for the restoration of its unity and the quelling of civil liberties.
In countries where the process of nation-building has been traumatic and hazardous, 
like in Austria, Belgium or Poland, the legacies of conflicts over the nation-building process 
serve more easily as the basis for the creation of nationalist movements.141 Nationalists adopt 
the nation, normally interpreted in its ethnic version, as the natural unit of the state’s 
community and economy. The national economy is also conceived as a closed system that 
can be insulated from the international economy by protectionist policies. The corollary of
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these two propositions is that states’ external relations are dominated almost exclusively by 
the national interest. Nationalists’ perceive the international sphere as an aggressive 
environment where the capacity for inter-state cooperation is very limited,142 National egoism 
gives rise to a hostile international environment where inter-state cooperation is impossible.
142 Skotnicka-lllasiewicz, E. and Wesolowski, W . (1995), “The Significance of Preconceptions: Europe of Civil 
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Classifying parties
1991-1997: The failed experiments of right-wing unification
The first Christian democratic attempts
The first Polish free parliamentary elections in 1991 were fought in the context of 
Solidarity’s dissolution, caused by the “war at the top” waged by Lech Wat^sa and his 
associates. Marginalised from the first government, Wat^sa’s group was determined to 
dismiss the governments’ intellectual elite led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and dissolve the 
Solidarity movement. They justified the drive for dissolving the Solidarity movement by the 
need to create a European-style party system where parties would be based on clear 
ideological profiles and not the amalgam of different orientations present in Solidarity. 
Wat^sa’s sponsored group created a new party, the Centre Agreement (PC). Initially the PC 
drew its ethos from an amalgam of Endek and Polish romantic thinking, which attributed the 
source of political legitimacy to a spiritual and ethnic identity. Endecja, or Renewal, was the 
nationalist ideology spelled by Roman Dmowski in his major publication MySli Nowoczesnego 
Polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) and constituting the ideology of his political movement, 
the National Democracy. Dmowski opposed Polish romantic nationalism with a more 
combative ideology that equated Polishness and Catholicism. The PC’s programmatic 
documents frequently referred to Roman Dmowski’s assimilation between Catholicism and 
Polishness, on whose ideas it based a fierce anti-communism and the proclaimed moral 
superiority of the Polish nation.143 However, the party’s aspiration to “building in Poland a
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strong centre as a factor of equality and political innovation”144 lead the leadership to choose 
Christian democracy as the party’s central identity. Therefore, despite the extensive quoting 
of Dmowski’s ideology, Christian democracy remained the party’s dominant identity. The PC’s 
concept of political community was based on the Catholic faith: “the PC counts on the support 
of the part of the society that follows the Christian message and is ready to build the Republic 
accordingly”.145 Although advocating a programme for social modernisation, the PC 
demanded this renewal to be conducted according to the Catholic precepts. ‘The Polish 
national interest requires a major work of national economic, organisational, and social 
modernisation. This modernisation should respect the moral values defended by Christianity 
constituting our identity. Without this change of system we will never bridge the civilisational 
gap between Europe and us. (...) The bases of every change in Poland must be the 
restoration of our moral system. (...) The role of the Catholic Church is of immense 
importance to the build up of our moral system, bitterly attacked by the left-wing post­
communist environment.”146
The contradictions between the Dmowski’s tradition and Christian democracy within the 
PC soon emerged. These took the form of a fight between the faction of Prime Minister 
Olszewski, which identified above all with the nation as the central conception of political 
community, and the Kaszynski brothers pledge for a Christian democratic centrist identity.147 
The PC’s Christian democratic identity also faced external problems in affirming its Christian 
democratic identity since the Catholic Church had given semi-official endorsement to the 
Christian National Union (ZChN). When the PC dissolved in the wake of the conflict provoked 
by the lustration law148 proposed by the faction linked with Jan Olszewski, the PC’s vice­
144 Deklaracia Porozumienia Centrum. (Declaration Centre Agreement), Warsaw: May 1990.
145 POC. Deklaracia Proaramowa. (POC Programmatic Declaration), Warsaw: 1991.
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president noted that the party’s failure was due not only to personal and ideological infighting 
but was also a consequence of the impossibility of pursuing its identity consistently.
The economic ethos of the PC
The PC saw the family as the basic economic community. Emulating the Catholic 
Church’s social doctrine it declared that “our social policy is concentrated on the family as the 
central social unit.”149 The party promoted an economic policy aimed at supporting families 
and maintained that agricultural reform should be undertaken on the condition of keeping the 
family as the basic unit of agricultural exploitation. Similarly, the PC’s social policy featured a 
pro-family approach. The main objective of the state’s economic policies, following the party’s 
Christian democratic aspirations, should be that of preventing the impoverishment of families 
in need.
The PC positioned itself on the economic left-right scale as a middle-of-the-road party 
proposing a friendly attitude to market liberalism and opting for a gradualist approach to 
reforms. Modernisation and external competitiveness were important considerations: ‘The 
current economic and social structure condemns Poland to backwardness and being unable 
to compete in Europe and the world. If we do not compete in Europe, we will have our 
sovereignty threatened, first economically, and then politically.” 150
The PC programs excluded tax increases as a solution to the budget deficit and 
proposed favourable tax regimes for new enterprises and for fostering the competitiveness of 
Polish products in foreign markets. Economic development was served by a rational financial 
policy that excluded augmenting inflation and increasing the budget deficit. The programme
149 Program Wvborczv Porozumienie Centrum-Ziednoczenie Polskie. (Electoral Program Polish Agreement -  United 
Poland), Warsaw: 1993.
supported efforts for a faster privatisation.151 The PC was also a supporter of economic de- 
communisation and denounced the “nomenklatura” privatisation.
The liberal renaissance
The communist system was arguably the antithesis of liberal ideals, effectively 
suppressing both civil society and economic freedoms. The fight against communism 
provided the environment for liberalism to flourish. The Solidarity movement’s liberal faction, 
the dominant force within the first post-communist government, under attack from Wat^sa’s 
faction, formed a party of a pluralist character, the ROAD, later the Democratic Union (UD). 
The pluralism of the UD was justified as “a reflection of the history of Solidarity, a grouping of 
people with different beliefs and world views.”152 Liberal politicians promoted a neutral 
discourse on socio-cultural issues. “We value the common action of all social groups, all 
active citizens who promote tolerance, avoid violence and adhere to an ethos rooted in the 
Christian tradition. We hope that these values are shown clearly in our positions and 
actions.”153 The party was composed of “people from different worldviews and religions”.154 
Therefore its leaders maintained that although “the state - its system of law -  is part of a 
defined system of values, which in our culture is rooted in Christianity and human rights”,155 it 
cannot be “taken over by any specific ideological group”.156 This acceptance of people with
151
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different political conceptions within the party as well as support for civil society organisations 
and local government was seen as liberalism in action.
The second element of the party’s political ethos was concern for strengthening the 
state.157 Mimicking early European liberals’ efforts to strengthen the rational elements of the 
state against the power of traditional institutions, the UD’s documents state that: ‘The 
essential reference of the UD is of a democratic state serving civil society. This fundamental 
idea synthesises the political thought of the UD and determines our political identity. The 
state, understood as a common haven for the citizens, should provide security and the feeling 
of being at home; however, we reject the understanding of the state as an absolute in the face 
of which everything else must be given up.” This limited state “must protect the freedom of the 
citizens (...) without discriminating on grounds of gender, age, nationality or way of life”.158
The UD defined itself as a rational and anti-demagogic party. “We serve the voters that 
value balance and measure, the voters that understand that in public life reason should 
prevail over emotion.”159 This stance emerged in an environment they perceived as highly 
polarised by National Catholicism. Practicing Catholics, such as former Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, justified the creation of a liberal party (at the time the Democratic 
Union). “Some people accused me of not creating a Christian democratic party, but I believed 
in the foundation of a pluralist group reflecting the history of the opposition movement, a 
group with different beliefs and world views.160
The UD’s social and political liberalism was a novelty in Polish political history, since no 
liberal parties had existed either before or after the World War II, and no political group in 
exile had proclaimed liberalism as its ideology. The modern roots of Polish liberalism are 
found exclusively in the intellectual dissident groups that gave birth to Solidarity. Therefore,
157
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although Polish liberalism emphasises individual rights, the Solidarity experience stressed the 
need for organising society against the state. The free association of individuals, i.e., civil 
society, became the key political concept of Solidarity activists. The “us against them”, “us” 
being society against “them” the communists, demanded a collective identity. An individualist 
ideology did not provide a sufficiently strong base to fight the communists. Solidarity between 
individuals, the key experience of dissidents under communism, strengthened the associative 
aspects of liberal ideology. Belief in the value of individuals was complemented by the 
collectivist spirit that dissident groups within Solidarity had to forge to fight communism. The 
idea of civil society was put in practice not only by creating a pluralist party that would reflect 
the heterogeneity of society, but also by supporting civil society organisations. Liberal parties 
from the early 1990s were therefore a repeat in post-communist Europe of the early liberal 
parties’ fight for the freedom of individuals against all oppressive institutions.
The economic ethos of the UD
The UD’s clear political ethos contrasts with its contradictory economic propositions. 
The UD was divided between strong liberal and socialist factions. The UD’s economic identity 
was initially closer to socialism than to liberalism. The small Liberal Democratic Congress 
(KLD), created by Jan Krzyztof Bielecki, twice prime minister in the early post-Solidarity 
governments, occupied the niche of neo-liberalism. In its early years, conflicts between the 
UD’s social democratic, liberal and conservative wings made it difficult for the party to take 
concrete policy stands. The lack of clarity of the party’s economic identity was pointed out as 
the main reason for the party’s partial defeat in the 1991 elections, despite its lead in the 
opinion polls before the elections.
On the one hand the UD presented itself as a party of progress, liberal and reform- 
oriented. However, during the 1991 and the 1993 election campaigns it frequently referred to 
the need for a “new industrial policy” and more economic measures aimed at achieving a
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higher social protection and proposed a series of micro-economic policies to alleviate the 
effects of shock therapy reforms.161 The party economic ethos attempted to combine social 
solidarity and liberalism. The party leaders consider that these two principles “kept together 
guarantee economic growth.”162 The UD’s leftist belief in the role of the state to provide equal 
life chances was openly displayed. ‘Thorough development of social security is a fundamental 
part of our programme. Health Services should be enlarged and remain state-owned.”163
Nationalism: a widespread ideology
Two major nationalist parties competed in the right-wing camp, one representing the 
legacy of socialist nationalism of Josef Pitsudski -  the KPN - and the other representing the 
Catholic nationalism of Roman Dmowski -  the ZChN. In the 1993 elections, another party of 
nationalist character, the Movement for the Republic (RdR), emerged by secession from the 
PC. Although it only lasted for a number of years and remained outside parliament, it was 
important as the predecessor of the ROP, founded by Jan Olszewski in 1995.
The political ethos of the KPN
The Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) was the only party independent of 
communist rule established in 1979. Its leader, Leszek Moczulski, was a radical anti­
communist and anti-Soviet that condemned the compromises that the Solidarity leadership 
had made with the communist regime at the Round Table. The KPN uncompromising attitude 
mimicked Pitsudski’s call for the Polish elite to actively pursue independence. For the KPN, 
the nation’s salvation is the affair of a few chosen individuals, with no need for religious
161 Uchwata Proaramowa Unia Demokratvczna. (Programmatic Decision of Democratic Union) Warsaw: May 1991.
162 Stabilizacia I Rozwoi. Uchwala Proaramowa II Konaresu Kraioweao Unii Demokratvcznei. Broszura Wvborcza 
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legitimisation. The KPN represented the most consistent of the radical independentist groups. 
Although the great majority of political groupings -  led by Solidarity -  recognised full 
independence as a goal, the KPN emphasised independence above all else. “Independence 
is the pre-condition for solving all major problems: only in an independent state can 
democracy be implemented and problems solved."164 The democratic transition was seen 
exclusively in terms of the chance to attain independence. “We are the generation of change 
in the long march of generations. The martyrdom of Poland in Yalta and under the Soviet 
Union is the basis for future action.” 1989 is seen as the historic moment “that cannot be 
wasted”.165
The economic ethos of the KPN
The 1993 electoral programme of the KPN spelled out vague and populist economic 
proposals. The KPN demanded the abandon of privatisation, asked for higher levels of 
subsidies for agriculture, pensions and social security benefits and demanded that the right to 
work becomes statutory. The KPN also proposed an increase in salaries as a way to increase 
consumption and production, and consequently create employment as an anti-recession 
measure.166 The KPN’s uncompromising nationalism and messianic attitude made it the only 
right-wing party to remain outside the AWS. By withdrawing from the electoral coalition during 
the 1997 elections, the party faced total defeat and disappeared.
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The political ethos of the ZChN
The second party of the nationalist group, the Christian National Union (ZChN) 
combined national and religious elements. The ZChN was established by Wiestaw 
Chrzanowski in October 1989 in an attempt to consolidate several Catholic and national 
groups in a broader right-wing party, attracting almost 20 religiously-inspired organisations. 
Although some activists were uneasy about this straightforward association, the party was 
directly influenced by Roman Dmowski’s ideology and proudly stressed its links with the 
legacy of National Democracy.167
The ZChN’s ideology exemplified how the national tradition can overrule the religious 
universal values of Catholicism. In the tradition of Dmowski, the ZChN professed an integral 
nationalism so conceived, according to some analysts it “conflicts with individual liberalism 
and Christianity”.168 Dmowski, by declaring Catholicism as “embedded in the essence of 
Polishness”, subordinated Christian universal ethics to nationalism. Polish Catholics’ highest 
mission was the preservation and development of the nation. The Polish Catholic Church, at 
the time under the direction of Cardinal Glemp, supported semi-officially the ZChN.
The particular fusion of nationalism and Catholicism in ZChN ideology was based on 
the party’s protection of the national version of Polish Catholicism. Modernising inputs, either 
in the secular sphere or in the Catholic Church, were rejected.169 Condemnation of secularism 
was frequent in the ZChN’s ideological declaration. The party rejected “the concept of an 
ideologically neutral state according to individualistic and liberal conceptions. Social 
structures should encourage society’s observance of Catholic ethical principles.”170 Of the 
post-1989 mainstream parties, the ZChN was the most radical in the defence of a Christian
167
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state. Publicists affiliated with the Union were wary of modern secular culture, rejecting both a 
capitalist and consumerist society as well as modernist trends in the Catholic Church. Marian 
Pifka, a well-known Catholic activist, observed that Catholicism was in danger of loosing its 
universal character to leftist pseudo-universalism. According to such reasoning, the Catholic 
Church had granted excessive power to lay liberal groups to the disadvantage of the Church 
hierarchy’s power. According to the publicist this had frequently prevented the Church from 
affirming its opinions in public fora. Instead, the Church should devote more care to Catholic 
doctrine, restoring its integral character and thus its ability to inspire culture.171
The ZChN’s fundamental apology of a Christian state occupied almost entirely its 
ideological declaration. This reads that “the Catholic religion is the expression of truth which 
binds not only private matters but also public life”.172 Its fusion of a conservative interpretation 
of the Catholic doctrine and nationalism lead the ZChN to draw a divide between true Poles 
and half-Poles through a definition of Polishness as moral purity. The ZChN’s rhetoric also 
stressed the higher value of the Polish moral system: ‘The fundaments of the new Poland 
should be the Christian values that have shaped the culture and identity of the Polish People 
for a thousand years.”173
The absence of any economic policy stances in the party’s founding documents 
indicated the predominance of Catholic nationalism in the party’s ethos. In the late nineties 
this lacuna would eventually be filled with the adoption of a liberal economic programme.
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The European attitudes of right-wing parties between 1991 and 1997
The early days of transition were characterised by widespread support for European 
integration. Europe was in practice a synonym to liberal market economy and democracy. 
Membership of the European Union promised the arrival of large sums of investment capital 
and the opening of Western markets to Polish products, together with political integration and 
incorporation into the Western security system. However, the gap between the expectations 
of the elite and the reality of the negotiations of the Europe Agreements in 1991 opened the 
way for a variety of party responses. The symbolic nature of Europe made an open critique of 
the European Community (EC) sound anti-democratic, so parties used caution in their critique 
of European integration.
In 1991 the Centre Alliance (PC) portrayed Polish integration into the EEC as a matter 
of raison d’etat The PC claimed to support European integration based on Christian 
democratic values. The PC elites accused “the diplomatic activity of the Citizens Club", i.e., 
the liberal wing of Solidarity for it was “dominated by left-wing leaders”. The party’s Christian 
democratic and centrist aspirations still reflected a positive appraisal of European integration. 
However, when the PC disintegrated, the faction linked to Premier Olszewski created a party, 
the KdR, that opposed integration more openly. The identity conflict in the PC prevented the 
party to find a consensus on the definition of the political community. Such failure was later 
repeated within the AWS, showing that the contradictions between nationalism and Christian 
democracy were a structural impediment of an Europhile stance.
The UD distinguished its Hard Europhilism from those of its opponents - Christian 
democrats and nationalists. In 1990 Adam Michnick enunciated two sorts of anti-communist 
forces - those who are “liberal, pluralistic, and European”; and the others (...) “who are 
xenophobic, authoritarian, turned towards the past and towards restoring the life of the 
past”.174 The Hard Europhilism of the UD was a key element of its liberalism. Since the days
174
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of Solidarity the liberal elite took up the mission of integrating Poland in the EU. Solidarity’s 
1989 electoral programme stated: ‘This election should be a return. It should come the time 
when Poland becomes a country where everyone is at home. The time when Poland should 
return to Europe. The road to prosperity and independence is a slow and distant one, but the 
economy and justice will be protected in the Sejm and the Senate and then we will be able to 
say -  we chose that road.”175
The “road back to Europe” constituted the first expression of political liberalism in 
Poland. Freedom for Poland and the post-Soviet states, translated into the immediate 
recognition of Lithuanian and Byelorussian independence in 1991, despite the fact that Red 
Army troops were still stationed in those countries. Contrary to the tradition of international 
politics during the Polish inter-war republic, respect for the 1945 borders was pledged. This 
position was far from certain from the government of a country that had just de facto attained 
sovereignty and where the mainstream thinking before the fall of communism was that, when 
communism would collapse, Poland should recover the territories in the East lost in Yalta, 
including Vilnius and Lwow. Although respecting the 1945 borders was made easier by the 
fact that all the neighbouring Polish states had disappeared - Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany -  the decision to accept the 1945 borders 
remained a remarkable choice of the first liberal post-communist government.
The KLD’s Hard Europhilism, anchored in economic ideas of liberalism, justified the pro- 
Western choice taken in the early nineties mainly in economic terms. “In 1989 we were in a 
horrible situation because of the heavy debts faced by the Polish economy. We had no choice 
but to leapfrog, since the Polish economy was on the verge of collapse. So we had to move 
very quickly. The commitment to liberal economic reforms was intrinsically linked to the 
symbolic “return to Europe”. That was why in the beginning we tried to discuss immediate 
trade agreements with the EC (...) because the Polish market was especially open and 
exposed to external competition. This openness of the economy made politics and economics
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completely mixed. On a daily basis the symbolism of the return to Europe was connected with 
economic conditions. There was no possibility of running a protectionist policy from the 
outset.”176
When the expectations held by the political elite regarding European integration were 
first disappointed by the protectionism of the Europe Agreements, the nationalist parties were 
the first to doubt that national interests were being served by integration. In these early days, 
the symbolic clout of Europe resulted in parties expressing Euroscepticism in conditional 
terms. The ZChN was the first and at the same time the only party to become critical of the 
terms of the Europe Agreements in 1992. ‘The EU is egoistic since it did not help Poland to 
overcome the economic crisis by opening trade in the most important areas for the Polish 
products.”177 The ZChN also pointed out the Europe Agreements’ negative consequences for 
the Polish economy, especially in the agricultural sector. The ZChN Soft Euroscepticism 
reflects its economic and political nationalism. “In the foreign policy domain Polish politics 
must have an independent character. We must ensure that our international economic 
relations have a character of partnership. Poland must protect the interests of its producers 
and its market. We should correct the current disproportion in our balance of trade with the 
EEC.”178 ‘The Polish position regarding the EU should restrict our loss of sovereignty. 
European integration should not mean replacing the Polish state with a unified and strongly 
bureaucratised state system of United Europe.” 179
In 1993 the leader of the recently formed KdR, Jan Olszewski, demanded the 
renegotiation of the Europe Agreements, assuming an uncompromising tone when calling for 
the protection of national economic interests from the EU, in particular concerning the internal
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agricultural market.180 The KdR was equally critical of the dictates of international 
organizations, and called for a “Europe of the Nations”. The Euroscepticism of the ZChN, the 
KPN and the KdR shows that despite the symbolic clout of “Europe” in post-communist 
politics, already in the early nineties nationalism was a sufficient condition for a Hard 
Euroscepticism.
The unification of the right between 1997 and 2001
While the 1991 elections gave parliamentary representation to a high number of right- 
wing political groups, the 1993 elections were a disastrous defeat for the right. The 1993-97 
parliament was highly unrepresentative with 34 percent of votes wasted and an extremely 
high deviation from proportionality creating an artificial situation of empty political space. This 
situation provoked a total re-alignment of parties’ between 1993 and 1997 resulting in the 
temporary unification of the right around three party types: Christian democrats, liberals and 
nationalists.181 Although party organisations often dissolved, their leaders reproduced their 
ethos in new ones by regrouping or fusing with other parties.
The AWS: Christian democracy’s last words
The winner of the 1997 elections, the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS), was a fusion of 
more than 30 political groupings organised by the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ). The AWS 
attempted to rescue the Christian democratic identity by drawing on the Trade Union’s 
Christian democratic economic and political ideology. The AWS, and in particular the party to 
be born out of it, the AWS Social Movement, was the most ambitious attempt to establish
179 . , idem.
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Christian democracy in Poland. Therefore, the AWS’s failure to surpass the 5 percent 
threshold in the 2001 parliamentary elections and its subsequent dissolution was a heavy 
blow on the chances to establish Christian democracy in Europe.
Despite the attempts of its leadership after the successful elections of October 1997 the 
AWS never became a unified political party, In strategic terms the maintenance of a unified 
centre-right party appeared necessary for defeating the SLD. With the Trade Union as its 
most powerful constituent, the AWS managed to become a rallying point for the right-wing 
electorate although the coalition was short of an absolute majority. Agreeing on a common 
political identity proved a more difficult enterprise for the right-wing. The different parties 
constituting the AWS remained oblivious of constructing a common definition of a political 
identity for this implied giving up the constituent parties “ideological purity”.182
During the coalition talks in the autumn of 1997 the AWS leaders’ choice of partners 
indicated the willingness to build a centrist formation, both in strategic and ideological terms. 
Although the liberal UW was reluctantly accepted as a coalition partner by the nationalist 
members of the AWS, its choice appeared a good omen for the formation of a centrist 
Christian democratic party. By choosing the UW rather than the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 
as its coalition partner, the AWS leadership reinforced such profile.183 In the first year of 
government, the AWS also attempted to consolidate this choice with a symbolic alliance with 
the pre-war Christian democratic party, the Labour Party (SP). The declaration of 
understanding between the two parties was, however, an illustration of the obstacles Christian 
democracy faced in its attempts to transcend the traditional vision linking Polish nationalism 
with Catholicism. “We, the representatives of Christian democracy -  the Labour Party, the 
AWS and the PC, political groups professing and accomplishing the independence of Poland
181
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and the patriotic ideals of Christian democracy, inheritors or pursuers of the ideological and 
political inter-war Christian democratic movement -  recognise the fundamental heritage of 
Poland and the Nation.”184
This declaration illustrates the difficulty of the Polish right-wing to overcome Roman 
Dmowski’s conceptions of National Catholicism even when it spells Christian democracy as 
the party’s political ethos. Polish Christian democracy was therefore overtaken by the 
nationalist heritage. The party’s stances on social issues follow Catholic Church doctrine. The 
AWS’s position on abortion revealed the belief in God-given Natural Law as the “right to life of 
each human being from conception to natural death”.185
In 1998 the ZChN showed its willingness to build a centrist consensus by expelling from 
the AWS parliamentary club extremist nationalist elements linked with Jan Lopuszanski. 
Lopuszanski then created its own parliamentary club, the Polish Agreement (PP). The 
restraint showed by the ZChN was, however, not followed by other nationalist parties, and 
their confrontational behaviour made the prime minister, Jerzy Buzek, a negotiator between, 
on the one hand, the different parties of the AWS and, on the other, the AWS coalition 
partner, the UW.
The economic ethos of the AWS
The 1997 electoral platform of the AWS was mainly based on the economic programme 
of the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ). The NSZZ maintained the family as the basic economic
184 PC-AWS Chrzesciiariska Demokracia-Stronnictwo Pracv “Umowa Politvczna w Sprawie Ziednoczenia 
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community, which created conflicts with its European unionist counterparts stressing class as 
the fundamental economic concept.186 ‘The family is the basis of the society, where each 
human being is educated and develops. We will foster the economy of the family with pro- 
family taxes and benefits.”187
Because it was an amalgam of political parties and lacked an overarching identity, the 
AWS frequently found it difficult to maintain a coherent set of economic positions. It embraced 
a mixture of protectionist and liberal measures, reflecting the variety of interests and world 
views present in the electoral coalition.188 The AWS defended the limitation of the state’s role 
as a redistributive entity by privatising pension funds, decreasing subsidies for industry and 
diminishing corporate taxes. However, as other Christian democratic parties in Western 
Europe, the AWS defended that the reform of the health system should guarantee a high level 
of protection and supported strong public financial backing for the agricultural sector.189 Its 
positions regarding reform of the labour code followed unionist values in its fundamental 
defence of workers rights.
The creation of the ZChN’s economic ethos
After it joined the AWS, the ZChN added an economic liberal ethos to the ZChN’s a 
previously exclusively national Catholic. This transformation came about after the party lost 
parliamentary representation in 1993 and faced the unification of the right-wing in three 
blocks. The party’s economic programme urged the state to create a pro-entrepreneurial 
economic environment by increasing benefits to enterprises, ensuring low interest rates for
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investors, low pensions and low taxes.190 The addition of an economic ethos to the party’s 
nationalist identity was an attempt to moderate the predominance of the nation as the party’s 
identifying ethos with the principle of individual sovereignty in the economic sphere. Thus, by 
combining moderate political nationalism and economic liberalism the ZChN resembled more 
seriously a conservative party. However, the move from nationalism to a conservative identity 
remained a very problematic process, for strong factions within the party opposed it. Although 
at the end of the AWS term the ZChN’s profile was far from the extreme clerical nationalism of 
the early nineties, the party’s transformation was limited by its ethos, and the economic 
elements never replaced the nationalist ethos as the party’s core identity.
The remake of the liberal project within the UW
In preparation for the 1997 elections the liberal camp underwent widespread ideological 
and organisational restructuring. While in the early nineties the predecessor of the Freedom 
Union, the UD, embodied the notion of civil society, when the restructuring of the party scene 
took place in the mid-nineties, economic liberalism became its fundamental identifying 
element. This ideological transformation was far from peaceful and the latent conflict that it 
provoked would eventually split the party in 2001.191 Created in 1995 from the unification of 
the UD and the KLD, the Freedom Union (UW) had its economic and liberal wing strongly 
reinforced; this put the liberal intellectuals in a relatively weaker position within the party.192
The liberals’ decision not to join the AWS was ideologically motivated as the UD leaders 
disagreed both with the economic protectionism and the social conservatism of the emerging 
AWS.193 The party therefore attempted to define itself mainly through economic liberalism,
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and elaborated a programme focusing on furthering the marketisation of the Polish economy. 
By electing Leszek Balcerowicz, the politician that most clearly embodied economic 
liberalism, as party leader, the party signalled its new economic liberal profile. As a result that 
the political issues such as state-church relations, the interventionism of the state on social 
and cultural issues, which had been at the core of the UD’s policies, became secondary.194
In the period leading up to the 2001 parliamentary elections, the party was to suffer 
from a severe internal conflict between the followers of Balcerowicz and economic liberalism, 
and the UD’s former elite composed of old time dissidents defending conceptions of political 
liberalism.195 The first group was accused of transforming the UW into a pure party of power, 
while the political liberals were accused of a extreme and unpopular left-wing libertarianism. 
The conflict also concerned divergent political conceptions: the economic liberals tended to 
support authoritarian social attitudes and wished for a party with a conservative profile, while 
the former UD’s intellectual political elite was strongly attached to the idea of a plural civil 
society. In June 2000, in the midst of this conflict, the party pulled out of government and 
failed to put forward a candidate for the October 2000 presidential elections.
Nationalism: a replacement
While during the 1993-1997 parliamentary session the nationalist space was occupied 
by the KPN, a party in the Piisudkist tradition of anti-clerical nationalism, the failure of this 
party to integrate any of the coalitions emerging prior to the 1997 elections and its subsequent 
implosion before the 1997 election left empty such as space. The Mouvement for the 
Reconstruction of the Republic (ROP) appeared to be the party to fill that space. The ROP 
was created in the aftermath of the first round of the presidential election in 1995, after a 
relatively successful electoral performance of Jan Olszewski. The ROP succeeded the
194 Deklaracia Zatozvcielka Unia Wolnosci. (Founding Congress Documents), Warsaw: 1995.
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Movement for the Republic (RdR), the party created by Jan Olszewski after it split from the 
PC in 1993. In the RdR’s ideological declaration, Olszewski applied nationalist principles to 
the economic sphere and defended protectionist policies that argued for imposing limitations 
on foreign trade and foreign direct investment. In socio-economic terms the party took vague 
stances, generally attributing a strong role for the state in the economy to regulate the labour 
market. Although advocating a formal separation between church and state, the party argued 
for a strong role for the Catholic church in politics and society.
Serving as an alternative rallying point to the AWS, the ROP attracted to tis ranks 
nationalist and religious personalities. The ROP’s ideological declaration gave an absolutely 
central role to the nation in its identity.196 To convey the image of a patriotic Catholic party, 
religious symbolism was repeatedly used, and rhetoric distinguished between the true patriots 
and the elites (mainly the UW and the SLD) who were portrayed as anti-independentist.197 
The ROP received around 10 percent of the votes in the 1997 parliamentary elections, which 
was considered a success.
During the campaign on the 1997 Constitutional referendum the ROP strongly 
campaigned against the amendments 90 and 91, arguing that they “threaten Polish 
sovereignty.” The New Constitution was regarded as “anti-Christian, because it allows the 
creation of religious sects and limits citizens’ rights. It is an act of anti-independentist, anti- 
Christian forces in the Polish parliament.”198 The ROP’s nationalism resulted in a strong social 
authoritarian position. Jan Olszewski insisted in defining those lifestyles that were acceptable 
by the nation and rejected the existence of different minorities, not only of ethnic but also of 
religious and sexual orientation.
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The ROP’s nationalist economic ethos
The main theme of the ROP’s founding declaration, the Agreement with Poland, is a 
plea for state control over the national economy.199 The ROP argued that unemployment 
should be tackled through the creation of public jobs and pension funds guaranteed by the 
state, supported housing for young couples and a pro-family tax system. Social policies were 
also justified in nationalist terms: “A nation where a third of the population lives under the 
poverty level will not be able to behave independently.”200 The ROP called for the 
establishment of a new system of health insurance, a position that was close to that of the 
Solidarity Trade Union. The approach to agricultural reform was conservative in that it 
defended the primacy of the family farms.
The European attitude of right-wing parties between 1997-2001
The AWS’s stance towards European integration reflected the pact forged by the 
leaders of the different parties composing the electoral coalition, a formulation that attempted 
to find a minimum common denominator between the different partners. The alliance of such 
diverse political orientations resulted in often contradictory programmatic propositions in the 
economic sphere. The AWS’s Europhilism was initially based on strictly political appreciation 
of integration. The AWS’s position on Europe reinforced the party’s Christian cosmopolitan 
pledge while reflecting classic Polish nationalist conceptions. In a parallel metaphor of 
Mickiewicz’s portrayal of Poland as the Christ of nations, the AWS reserved for Poland the 
role of missionary in a “Europe that is loosing its roots”.201 Poland’s integration in the EU had 
the objective of bringing Europe back to its Christian values. ‘We cherish our thousand-year
199 Umowa z Polska. (Agreement with Poland), Warsaw: May 1996.
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history. These traditional values are what we need, first of all in the whole Europe, and then in 
the entire world.”202
Despite the party’s vocal Europhilism, the presence of nationalists in the coalition made 
the government’s management of the accession process rather unsuccessful. As accession 
negotiations progressed, the government’s commitment to European accession was to be 
tested on the transposition of European legislation to the Polish legal system. Not only was 
the government strongly criticised for its inefficiency but the AWS would disintegrate along the 
lines of support and opposition to European integration, showing that the European issue was 
by then the hallmark of ideological disagreement within the Polish right-wing 203 The AWS 
experiment showed both the impossibility of changing nationalists’ opposition to European 
integration and its heightened divisiveness in the context of Europeanization.
During the early days of the AWS government, Christian democrats and moderate 
conservatives within the AWS tried to convince some of its most reluctant members of the 
goodness of European Integration. An example of such tactics was the appointment of one of 
the Eurosceptic politicians of the ZChN, Rychard Czarnecki, to head the European Integration 
Committee (KIE), the governmental body dealing with the issues of accession to the EU. At 
the time it was thought that the inclusion of an activist from the ZChN in the technical aspects 
of European integration would make the party’s allegiance to the EU stronger.
Just after the ZChN leader Ryszard Czarnecki was appointed to the Committee for 
European integration (KIE) chair in late 1997, the UW’s leaders started contesting his 
leadership on the grounds of his anti-European rhetoric. The KIE’s leadership dysfunctional 
behaviour led the prime minister to preside over the Committee, despite Czarnecki being
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formally the KIE’s chair.204 The conflict between the liberals and Christian nationalists over the 
KIE’s leadership did not end with Czarnecki’s resignation in June 1998. For two years the 
appointment of a permanent chair to KIE was impeded by the UW’s insistence on its right to 
propose a candidate for the KIE secretary and the Christian National Union’s opposition to the 
idea.
In parliament an efficient transposition of legislation was also encumbered by nationalist 
members of the coalition who opposed the process. In order to make the process more 
efficient, the AWS expelled one of its most vocal nationalists, Jan topuszanski, from its 
parliamentary caucus. Although the party was eager to remain in power and influence the 
process of accession, the ZChN claimed that European integration was acceptable “under the 
condition that political integration does not go further and only economic integration is 
strengthened” 205 To overcome the animosity between nationalism and European integration, 
ZChN’s founder and ideologue Wiestaw Chrzanowski attempted to reformulate the 
relationship between the national movement and the transfer of political power to a 
supranational authority. ‘The national movement (...) has a new look and sees an historical 
chance for Poland. This is first of all to unite Europe. Protest against unification is sterile. (...) 
The only question is: which Europe? The task of the national group is to look for partners with 
similar outlooks in different countries and fight for a Europe of the Fatherlands, not of the 
regions. (...) a Europe respectful of the peculiarities of the national cultures, not a 
supranational bureaucracy.”206
The consensus attained within the AWS concerning integration in 1997 was both 
shallow and dependent on the maintenance of the equilibrium of forces existing at the time of 
the elections. When Marian Krzaklewski was no longer autonomous from extreme nationalist
204
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parties, the Europhile stance of the party, and the party itself, was in danger. The fragility of 
Polish right-wing thus appears related to the impossibility of dissociating Catholicism and 
nationalism. The relationship of the Polish Catholic Church to nationalism, especially after the 
election of Karol Wojtila as Pope John Paul II in 1978, made the formulation of support for 
supranational integration for Catholic-inspired politicians in the short-run more improbable. 
Nevertheless, had the centripetal forces within the party prevailed, a Europhile Christian 
democratic party could have been a possible outcome.
Despite the attempt of parties like the ZChN to make nationalism compatible with 
European integration, the AWS’s Hard Europhilism fell victim to the infighting between parties. 
The difference between Marian Krzaklewski’s address in the Sejm in August 1999 and his 
inaugural speech of Presidential campaign in October 2000 is subtle but significant. In August 
1999 Krzaklewski speaks in name of the AWS parliamentary club as a party unifier, in 2000 
his speech is that of a polarising nationalist. In the Sejm Marian Krzaklewski pronounced that: 
“Poland wants to be a member of the EU not because Brussels wants it, not because of the 
desire of some lobby. We want to be part of the Union because that fits our national interest, 
because thanks to that we will protect effectively our national interest.” Krzaklewski’s Soft 
Europhilism assumes that European integration is a priori compatible with the Polish national 
interest. ‘The AWS shares a vision of the EU as an economic and political union of national 
peoples that shares its internal questions according to our tradition and identity.”207 In this 
speech Krzaklewski stresses that the AWS’s vision of integration is the result of a debate 
between the different orientations of the party. However, in August 2000, speaking as a 
presidential candidate, Krzaklewski is more sceptical of the compatibility of European 
integration with the national interest208
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The UW’s shift to economic liberalism as its identifying value resulted in a conditional 
Europhilism. While in the early nineties the UD had Hard Europhilism speak for its internal 
and external commitment to civil society, after 1997 some factions showed a veiled 
scepticism regarding EU’s regulatory framework. Sporadically the EU was negatively 
portrayed as imposing too much bureaucratic constraints on the Polish and European 
markets. Although the overall evaluation of integration was still positive, the economic liberals 
made clear that this support was conditional on the maintenance of an overall balance 
between the promotion of free market and market regulation. Therefore, taking market 
liberalism as the identifying value resulted in a conditional approach to integration.
The Eurosceptic faction in the 1997-2001 parliament was initially confined to ROP, but 
was later joined by the Hard Eurosceptic splinter of the ZChN lead by Jan topuszanski, the 
Polish Agreement. The Euroscepticism of Jan Olszewski included an ingrained opposition to 
the economic and political integration of Poland into Europe. The ROP invented the term 
Eurorealism, which although apparently aimed to objectively assess European integration, 
effectively meant opposition to the project. A “realist” assessment of integration by ROP 
judged European integration incompatible with the Polish national interest.209
In its founding declaration, “Agreement with Poland”, the ROP demanded that 
integration takes place only if defined as a partnership project, and advocated tough 
conditions on the Polish accession, especially in agricultural terms.210 This attitude appears as 
most significant as it was formulated in 1996 when 80 percent of the population supported 
Poland’s accession to the EU.211 The ROP eventually rejected integration and assumed that 
the EU essentially threatened Polish sovereignty. The stressing of economic sovereignty in 
the ROP’s discourse disguised a politically motivated antagonism to a project that goes 
against the conception of state control over its destiny.
209 Umowa z Polska. (Agreement with Poland), Warsaw: May 1996.
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Jan topuszanski’s Agreement with Poland (PP) was the first parliamentary party to 
openly oppose European integration. Jan topuszanski ran his presidential campaign in the 
autumn of 2000 solely on the European issue, and he argued that his opposition to integration 
was meant to avoid “the future spill of blood”.212
2001 Elections
As factional infighting based on the lack of a unified identity made the AWS common 
future unsustainable, individual parties and factions started arrangements to compete in the 
2001 parliamentary elections in new and ideologically more coherent formations. The 
leadership conflict within the UW resulted in the splitting of a neo-liberal faction. The amalgam 
of conservative, liberal, Christian democrat and nationalist-minded factions composing the 
UD, the PC, and the AWS were disentangled with the disintegration of the coalitions and the 
new parties strived for more ideological coherence.
Two brands of conservatism
The failure to create a centre-right party around a Christian democratic identity provided 
the space for the creation of two conservative parties. While the Citizens’ Platform (PO) has 
concentrated its appeal on economic liberalism, the Law and Justice (PiS) emphasizes 
political nationalism and engages on the constitution of a traditionalist authoritarian platform 
based on the conception of the nation as the fundamental political unit.
212 Program Wvborczv Kandvdata na Prezvdenta RP Jana iopuszanskieao. Wvbieram Neipodeota Polske. 
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The political ethos of the PO
The Citizens’ Platform (PO), a joint initiative of conservative and liberal politicians of 
independent forces, the SKL 213 and the UW is an attempt to create a right-wing movement 
that rejects the experience of the AWS and avoids “being too broad in the representation of 
interests, trying to focus on some promises rather than attempting to fulfil too many.” 
However, of the two models of right-wing formations in Europe, “the example of unified 
formation in Germany and Britain is preferred to the Italian and the French.”214 These two 
apparently contradictory pledges, one for a narrow interest representation and the second for 
a broad and unified right-wing party are in fact a disguised attack on the inclusion of the 
Solidarity trade union in the AWS and a pledge for a classic neo-liberal conservative party.
The PO has a political programme modelled on the Scandinavian conservative parties. 
Based on a liberal economic ethos, the party made the de-bureaucratisation of economy, 
through the thinning down of the state, its central pledge. Although the PO initially attracted 
liberal politicians that were at odds with the party’s socially conservative profile and its early 
manifestoes announced a commitment to civil society -translated in propositions of new 
mechanisms of direct control of politics by the citizens, the party’s primary commitment was to 
economic liberalism. 215 The choice of economic issues as the central party identity 
disappointed those among its ranks that hoped for a more traditional conservative party.
213
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The economic ethos of the PO
The PO is the inheritor of the KLD’s fundamental belief in the market, and economic 
neo-liberalism is the identifying ethos of the party. The PO defended a flat income tax rate of 
15 percent for which Leszek Balcerowicz had fought for in 1999 as Finance Minister. As a 
measure to create a favourable entrepreneurial environment, especially for the small and 
medium-sized enterprises, it supported the Labour Code’s liberalisation. In terms of social 
policy it supported the annihilation of the recently formed Health Agencies and its 
replacement with a regulatory package of basic sen/ices guaranteed by the state. The PO’s 
electoral platform views social aid as a way to create a safety net for the poor. In order to 
increase the control of public finances the party backs the independence of Central Bank to 
dictate monetary policy. The party’s policy proposal for agricultural reform considers that 
agriculture should be governed through the same principles of other economic sectors. In the 
social-cultural sphere the party asserted a conservative position by opposing the liberalisation 
of abortion and drugs consumption and defending pro-family policies.216
The political ethos of the PiS
The Law and Justice (PiS) started as a “taxi party” for the Kaszynski brothers, building 
on the reputation of Lech Kaszynski as Justice Minister in the AWS government. Kaszynski, 
who was never a member of the AWS, reacted to the disintegration of the electoral coalition 
by calling to those that were “clean” to join him and form a new party. This call was heard by 
several politicians of the ZChN and therefore the PiS has a wing of Catholic nationalists, such 
as Artur Zawisza and Marek Jurek. The party programme starts by declaring: “Poland is in a 
state of crisis. For many years several sectors suffer from lack of state control; the state is
216
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dysfunctional and corrupt and the economic system suffers from a dangerous pathology.”217 
The party contrasts the terrible situation of the state with the “unusual dynamism of the Polish 
nation”, which deserves to be supported and be made use of. ‘The tempo of our march was 
too slow, matching neither our needs, nor our possibilities.”218
The PiS’s foundational declaration defines the nation as the basic political unit. 
However, the party’s nationalism appears more relative than that of the Catholic nationalists. 
Early party documents use the dichotomy between the nation and the state: the state is 
portrayed as betraying the potential of the nation, a discourse common to other conservatives 
that use nationalism to defend the rights of individuals against the state. Also, although the 
PiS still alludes to anti-communism, the rhetoric was much softer and used as a way to praise 
the Polish nation for their role during the communist period.
The PiS’s nationalism is tempered by the commitment to individual citizens; the party 
appears as the defender of the “small man” not only from organised crime but also from a 
corrupt and abusive elite that controls the state and the economy. Therefore, although the 
party programme refers extensively to the nation, it also attributes a central role to the 
individual, as the one to be protected from the state. The leaders portray the party as an 
arbiter and a judge of governments’ capacities to serve the nation.
The economic ethos of the PiS
The PiS’s economic ethos remained undefined for a long period of time. Although the 
party’s focus on its political ethos justifies the economic lack of definition, this deficiency also 
derives from the conflict between the neo-liberal and the interventionist wings of the party. 
The propositions of the ultra liberal factions of Wiestaw Walendziak formerly linked with the
217 Program Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc. (Program of Law and Justice), August 2001, Warsaw: 2001.
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ZChN were opposed by the remaining leadership.219 Indeed the party’s top leaders, Lech and 
Jarostaw Kaszynski, throughout their long adventures in Polish politics, have been supporters 
of strong state intervention in the economy.
Dmowski’s remake: the political ethos of the LPR
On the aftermath of the AWS dissolution, a new version of Catholic nationalism 
emerged in the form of the League of Polish Families (LPR). The party joined some members 
of the ROP and Jan Lopuszanski’s Polish Agreement in a new Catholic nationalist party. Its 
leader, Roman Giertych, is the descendent of a family of nationalist ideologues. The LPR’s 
main political concept of community is the nation. The LPR’s mission is therefore the 
protection of the Polish version of Catholicism.
The party is a federation of small political and religious organisations close to the 
nationalist wing of the Polish Catholic Church, and combines the same extreme clericalism 
and nationalism particular to part of the Polish Catholic hierarchy, and was at the time of its 
formation closely connected with father Ryzyk, the director of the Catholic fundamentalist 
Radio Marjia. Radio Marija has an extremely problematic relationship with the Polish Church 
hierarchy. Father Ryzyk had a direct role in the creation of a political party and was for some 
years considered the eminence grise of the party. The LPR is associated with extreme-right 
movements with fascist overtones like Mtoda Wchechpolska (All-Polish Youth). The party thus 
indirectly supports the extremist rhetoric founded in integral religious nationalism present in 
Polish political thinking since the XIX century.
The main political idea of the party is clear: defending the nation and its particular 
devotion to Catholicism from its enemies. Such objectives occupy almost entirely its
219 Wronski, P. “PiS Pracuje Nad Programem Gospodarczym. Co Zamiast Hausnera?”, (PiS Works on its Economic 
Program: What Instead of Hausner?), Gazeta Wvborcza. 3 February 2004.
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programme.220 This mission is to be accomplished, first of all, by the abolition of articles 90 
and 91 of the Constitution, which lead to “the annihilation of Polish sovereignty”. The national 
principle urges the party “not to accept the subordination of Polish politics to foreign purposes. 
(...) The LPR pursues Polish interests instead of the doctrine of international adjustment that 
predominates nowadays.”221 In every declaration the party’s nationalism is justified in terms of 
its Catholicism. The Polish special brand of Catholicism is the prime object to be protected 
from foreign influence. The religious extremist character of the party makes it a defender of a 
strong interference by the Church in state affairs, and of the strict implementation of the 
Catholic Social Doctrine222
The economic ethos of the LPR
Despite its support for a national economic system, the party has not produced a 
populist economic programme; on the contrary, it defends neo-liberal economic ideals. 
Proposals for tax cuts for small family businesses are directed towards the middle-class and 
the petty bourgeoisie.
The European positions of right-wing parties in 2001
The victory of Catholic nationalism in the 2001 elections resulted in the emergence of a 
Eurosceptic lobby in parliament. The presence of such parties in parliament had important 
consequences for the last phase of European accession negotiations, on the debate on
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membership preceding the accession referendum and the debate on the European 
Constitution.
The attempts to consolidate a Christian cosmopolitan identity were replaced by 
conservative identities conceiving the nation as the political community. The PiS’s undefined 
identity resulted in an equally unclear attitude towards European integration. The PiS’s 
election manifesto for the 2001 parliamentary election did not mention European integration 
and the party maintained an ambiguous attitude until the March 2003 party congress, when a 
vote on the issue took place. Since then the PiS has portrayed EU accession as a lesser evil. 
The PiS leaders adopted the position that integration is in the Polish national interest due to 
security considerations. “It is impossible to maintain a position of neutrality due to Poland’s 
geographical position.”223 However, the question of transfer of sovereignty to a supranational 
body is still a very controversial issue within the party, and one that has not been settled. The 
faction linked with the Kaszynski brothers and other leaders attempted to de-link the issue of 
European accession from issues of morality, like the support for abortion laws, as a way to 
convince nationalists like Artur Zawisza or Marek Jurek to support European integration 
before the accession referendum.224
The party ended by supporting the accession referendum campaign in June 2003. 
However, during the debates regarding the position to adopt at the Intergovernmental 
Conference regarding the European Constitution, the PiS adopted a very hard stance against 
the revision of the voting formula gained at Nice, during which Poland had obtained what was 
considered a good deal, with 27 votes in the Council. The PiS ended by rejecting the 
Constitutional Treaty, and this position was also endorsed by the LPR and the Samoobrona. 
The importance that the maintenance of the voting formula obtained in Nice owes to its 
association with the sovereignty protection that nationalist parties cherish. Another expression
223 Program Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc. (Program of Law and Justice), Warsaw: August 2001.
224 Author's interview with Pawel Wronski, journalist of Gazeta Wyborcza, July 2003. PiS’s Second Congress was 
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of PiS’s nationalism during the debate on the Constitution is that of the inclusion of a 
reference to Christian values, a position that was supported by practically all the parties, but 
especially emphasized by the PiS and the Christian national parties.225 The PiS equally joined 
the LPR, the PSL and the Samoobrona in the demand for a referendum on the ratification of 
the European Constitution.
The PO’s Soft Europhile position was expressed both in the declarations of its leaders 
and in the actions taken during the electoral campaign. During the referendum campaign the 
party’s leaders supported only conditionally the SLD’s efforts to secure public support for 
integration and criticised the governments’ negotiating tactics as being too soft.226 Moreover, 
the party’s critique of excessive state bureaucracy and red tape, a theme at the core of the 
party’s identity, was extended to the EU level. As a disguised attack on the EU’s economic 
regulatory role, the critique of the EU bureaucracy is mainly undertaken by the economic neo­
liberal faction within the party. Hard economic neo-liberals, like Janusz Lewandowski, the 
Minister for Privatization in the first democratic government, articulated this critique more 
openly by considering the projects of social Europe as incoherent with market liberalisation, 
the party’s objectives for EU integration.227 During the debates of the Constitutional Treaty on 
the change of the voting formula, the PO took a stance coined by one of the PO’s leaders, 
Jan Maria Rokita, as “Nice or Death”. The penchant for viewing the nation as the basic 
political community became clearer as the party affirmed its conservative identity.
Of the right-wing parties, the LPR is the most openly Eurosceptic, and uses every 
parliamentary means to disrupt the process of integration, such as trying to impede the
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workings of the European Law Parliamentary Commission which main goal was to speed up 
the process of law harmonization.228 The LPR ran the 2001 parliamentary campaign on an 
anti-European ticket, based on the premise that this position is contrary to the sacred 
sovereignty of the Polish state. This leads the LPR to point as one of the highest points of its 
anti-European agenda the question of supremacy of European legislations over the Polish law 
and Constitution.
However, unlike other Hard Eurosceptic parties and political groupings, the LPR 
entered in dialogue with pro-European political milieus and accepted to participate in the 
parliamentary elections. Immediately after the referendum on European accession took place 
in June 2003, Roman Giertych declared that although not changing its opinion on the 
goodness of European integration, he accepted the overwhelming endorsement of accession 
by the Polish population and considered the referendum results as an expression of popular 
sovereignty.229 In this way Giertych distanced himself from other far-right nationalists who 
claimed the results of the referendum to be flawed.
Analysis
The evolution of Polish right-wing parties illustrates the usefulness of separating political 
and economic ethos when classifying parties. The increased importance of nationalism, both 
as a central identifying element or as a secondary political concept in parties’ identities, has 
meant the weakening of both political liberalism and religious cosmopolitanism, i.e., the basis 
for political support for European integration. The UW’s liberalism and the AWS’s Christian 
democracy were replaced by parties whose primary identifying value is either nationalism or 
economic liberalism.
228 Author’s interview with Mariusz Daca, UKIE’s official in charge of relations with the Polish Sejm for issues of the 
law harmonization, July 2002.
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The empirical material presented in this chapter confirms the sufficiency and necessity 
of the identifying element of party’s ethos for determining parties’ European positions. 
Nationalists, national conservatives and Christian democrats are based on political 
conceptions. The indivisible nature of political concepts as identifying ethos makes right-wing 
parties to be either unconditionally Europhile or Eurosceptic. The weakening in Poland of 
parties based on political concepts compatible with European integration, like religious 
cosmopolitanism and political liberalism, has increased right-wing parties’ propensity for 
Euroscepticism.
The success of different parties in occupying the right-wing space explains the strength 
of the parliamentary lobby against European integration. The increased importance of 
nationalism made the Europe becoming a highly divisive issue in Europe. Nationalism has not 
only been a sufficient cause of Euroscepticism, but has also impeded the unification of the 
right around a Christian democratic identity in the European state where Christianity most 
inspired politics.
Nationalism and Christian democracy
Although the failure of unifying a right-wing party is related to factional fighting within 
parties, the failure of Christian democracy to thrive as a unifying political identity has also 
deep historical roots in Polish political history. The divergence of political ideas within the 
post-Solidarity leaders and the Catholic Church explains the demise of the PC and the AWS 
and is crucial to understand the replacement of Catholicism with nationalism as the 
predominant political identity.
Catholic nationalism is the most important political ideology bred in Poland, and the 
justification for national fight for independence in the late XIX and XX century. The partitions 
were the background for the development of different types of ideologies to solve the “national
229 Interview of Roman Giertych with Gazeta Wyborcza, June 2003.
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question”. Whereas Western European traditionalist movements were concerned with the 
relations between religion and politics, the Polish political class discussed the correct way to 
be nationalist. The romantic nationalists defined the Polish nation as “morally superior". Being 
wary of practical politics, romantic nationalists defined the nucleus of the nation as a spiritual 
way of feeling. Opposing this ideology, Roman Dmowski conceived national independence as 
autonomous to concepts of morality. Dmowski considered the romantic’s national conceptions 
as an escape from the concrete situation of subjugation by “idealising the past and opiating 
self-contentment based on a comfortable and gratifying sense of an alleged moral 
superiority”.230 This sense of moral superiority towards its orthodox and protestant neighbours 
was considered by Dmowski as a compensation for the military and political defeats inflicted 
by them. Any attempt to approach the state’s conduct from the point of view of abstract justice 
was portrayed as a betrayal, and relations between nations were conceived as a fight for 
survival.231
Dmowski distanced himself from the romantic nationalist tradition by creating an 
alternative conception of the Polish nation. The nation was justified in religious terms, 
conceptualised as a symbiosis between the Polish national identity and Catholicism. This 
justified the re-emergence of political activism, non-violent but confrontational, mobilising 
resistance against the occupying powers.
When in 1989 the communist system fell, the Catholic Church tried to keep its role as 
the warrantor of the nation’s survival. During the communist period, from 1945 to 1989, the 
Catholic Church, as the only independent institution in a communist state, became the place 
and inspiration of dissent and opposition to the system. However, in 1989, the Church, as the 
political elite, became divided between those supporting its cosmopolitan character, and 
those advocating a Church closed to the outside world and concerned with protecting the
230 Walicki, A., (1994), Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: the Case of Poland. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
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special brand of Polish Catholicism. Therefore, when democracy was instituted, the Church 
was far from being a unified actor, which made it difficult for it to support one or another 
political party and to play a constructive role as a political mediator. The split between the 
liberal and the nationalist clergy added to the divisions within the post-Solidarity political elite, 
and resulted in the demise of those political formations attempting to institutionalise Christian 
democracy. As a result, the liberal wing of the Polish Catholic church has no political party 
that represents its ideals of social and economic development. Instead, the Catholic 
nationalists gained increasing political prominence in the League of Polish Families, the party 
supported by Radio Marjia and other conservative Catholic media under the leadership of 
Father Rydzyk.
A preliminary explanation for the extraordinary number of Eurosceptic parties on the 
right-wing of the Polish party spectrum is the proliferation of parties that base their political 
legitimacy on the concept of nation. The sufficiency of the nationalist conceptions to 
determine parties’ European positions is illustrated by the positioning of several nationalist 
parties during Poland’s hazardous political history. Both Catholic and laic nationalist parties 
present in each of the parliaments during the nineties took an a priori dislike of European 
integration. The empirical material in this chapter shows that parties adopting the nation as 
the fundamental political community choose to be a priori sceptic of the goodness of 
European integration for the national interest. In the early nineties such propositions are 
illustrated by the ZChN and the KPN and between 1993 and 1997 by the RdR’s and the ROP, 
and on the wake of the 2001 elections by the LPR. The LPR’s success in the 2001 elections 
illustrates the persistence of nationalism for the Polish party system.
The propensity of Polish right-wing parties for Euroscepticism results from the 
persistence and increased importance of nationalism. Such persistence results from the fact 
that in each new election the national ethos was transferred from defunct nationalist parties to 
new formations and from the difficulty to transform nationalist identities already established in 
the political scene. The national ethos was successively passed from a defunct party
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formation to new ones. In 1993 the nationalist wing of the PC was replaced by the KdR, in 
turn replaced in 1996 by the ROP and, finally, in 2001 by the LPR. In contrast ZChN’s 
persistent nationalism, despite the addition of a neo-liberal dimension and the attempt to 
reinterpret the legacy of “national democracy” in a way compatible with European integration, 
illustrates the difficulty in abandoning a fundamental and indivisible conception of the political 
reality: the nation as the fundamental political community.
Liberalism and conservative parties’ identities
When the economic ethos is the party’s identifying element, the assessment of the EU’s 
economic impact is the determinant condition of parties’ attitudes towards the EU and the 
political ethos is in a secondary plan, merely determining whether parties have a conditional 
or unconditional support or opposition to European integration. The combined effect of 
political and economic ethos is relevant for parties’ attitude towards the EU. The configuration 
of parties’ ethos and the replacement of the political liberalism with the conservative’s 
adoption of economic liberalism as the identifying concept resulted in a more Eurosceptical 
and divided right-wing.
The Freedom Union’s factional conflict pitched economic and political liberals and 
resulted in the split of the party before the 2001 elections. Its successor, the liberal 
conservative PO, dominated by economic liberal faction of the UW, stakes more conditional 
support for integration. This position reflected a critical evaluation of the effects of European 
regulation on the Polish economic system and the replacement of civil society as the 
conception of political community by the nation. The party’s leaders, although generally 
supportive of European integration, often criticise the bureaucratic nature of national and 
European bureaucracies. The demise of political cosmopolitanism in the liberal camp in the 
2001 elections meant that not only nationalist parties became increasingly important in the 
Polish party system, but also that nationalism replaced civil society as the secondary identity 
of liberal parties.
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Chapter IV Explaining left-wing European attitudes
This chapter tests in the Polish left-wing the hypothesis that the fundamental community 
on which parties base their identities determines their attitudes towards European 
integration.232 According to the ethos theory parties whose identities are established on 
communities of an economic nature will decide their European attitudes based on their 
evaluation of the effects of European integration on the attainment of the economic regime 
preferred by the party. Party stances on European integration depend primarily on whether 
the party judges the EU as supporting or hindering the attainment of the preferred national 
economic regime.
However, a party’s definition of the basic economic community is perse  not sufficient to 
determine a party’s evaluation of European integration; attitudes of parties based on their 
economic ethos also depend on the relative position of EU and national policy regimes.233 
Social democrats’ identifying concept is the economic class. Social democrats’ evaluation of 
the a priori coincidence between the national interest and European integration depends on 
whether the party considers the EU economic regime as beneficial to the attainment of a 
European regulated market. If this evaluation is positive, social democrats will be Europhiles. 
However, if the EU is considered as diminishing the chances to regulate markets and quell 
the differences deriving from structural positions in the labour market, social democrats will be 
Soft Eurosceptics.
232 This classification is based on the voter and elite survey conducted by Kitschelt, H., et al. (1999), Post- 
Communist Party Systems. Competition. Representation, and Inter-Partv Cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, p.285.
233 Marks, G. and Wilson, C.J. (2000), “The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Positions on European 
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Social democrats’ class-based cosmopolitanism is an important element of these 
parties’ attitude on European integration. Since their inception both the socialist and 
communist movements shared the practice of defending workers’ interests at the international 
level. Combined with a positive appraisal of the European Union’s policy regime, the 
socialists’ cosmopolitanism leads to a Hard Europhile position. However, socialist 
cosmopolitanism is only a secondary element of parties’ identities and is often overshadowed 
by the perception that the EU is mainly a market opening enterprise. Therefore, several social 
democrats maintained a Soft Eurosceptic position. Lately, the EU’s role of market regulator 
has made social democrats staunch supporters of integration.
In Western Europe the transformation of social democrats’ attitudes to European 
integration coincided with the inclusion of a social democratic agenda by Jacques Delors in 
the sequence of the Single Market accomplishment in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.234 After 
Maastricht the EU developed policies relevant to left-wing agendas, such as social cohesion 
and environmental policies. The Central and Eastern European ex-communist parties owe the 
change of European positions not only to the transformation of European policy regimes, but 
also to their own transformation to social democracy.
Agrarian parties are strongly determined by their definition of estate as the identifying 
community. The concept of estate determines the right of state support to be granted to land 
owners. Agrarian parties do not have an a priori definition of the basic political community 
from the particular circumstances of its formation. This means that agrarians’ European 
positions will be determined by their evaluation of the impact of European integration on the 
granting of state support to farmers. Since their definition of the political ethos is not a priori 
determined, the conditionality to their European position is specific to each party. The
234 Daniels, P. (1998), “From Hostility to ‘Constructive Engagement’: the Europeanisation of the Labour Party”, West 
European Politics. 21(1); Christensen, D. (1996), “The Left-Wing Opposition in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: 
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Common Agricultural Policy transfers have made the EU a popular enterprise for farmers 
since the early sixties.235
Ecological parties will equally derive their stance on European integration from the 
evaluation of the contribution of the EU to the national policy regime of environmental 
protection. Their cosmopolitanism determines a conditional Euroscepticism in case the EU is 
seen as degrading the national standards of environmental protection. If the EU is seen as 
improving them, Ecologists are Hard Europhiles.
The transformation of the Polish social democrats, anchored in a strong political 
cosmopolitanism inherited from the communist concept of class internationalism led to an 
interpretation of social justice that resembles the one adopted by several West European 
social democratic parties in the 1980s and the 1990s. Throughout the last two decades most 
European social democratic parties abandoned policies leading to full employment and 
generous welfare state programs and adopted policies aiming at countering class inequalities 
by shaping the supply-side, i.e., by shaping the conditions of production.236 The ethos theory 
predicts that the transformation of communist parties to social democracy should lead them to 
see the EU as a beneficial regulator of the conditions of production and consumption in the 
European market. Indeed, Polish social democrats progressively became Hard Europhiles 
and the strongest pillar of the country’s pro-EU coalition.
The PSL provides another strong case for testing the strength of core party values in 
the determination of a party’s European attitude. The agrarian parties will be Europhile if they 
consider that European integration fosters the protection of farmers, and Eurosceptic if 
European integration is considered as harming the chances of defending farmers against
235 Gabel, M. (1998), Interests and Integration: Market Liberalisation. Public Opinion and European Union. Ann 
Arbour: University of Michigan Press
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market distortions. Therefore, the Central and Eastern European agrarian parties have held 
the preservation of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the extension of their provisions to 
the new member states of the enlarged European Union, as the condition for supporting 
European integration. Since the agrarian parties have no determined political identity, the 
definition of their political ethos will depend on the circumstances of their mobilisation. The 
ecologists are Hard Europhiles if EU harmonised environmental standards are more 
restrictive than the national environmental regime.
The PSL is an especially interesting case to test the ethos theory since the definition of 
the party’s basic economic community is strongly linked to its political ethos and both 
dimensions are relevant for the determination of the party’s European attitude. The PSL’s 
evolution therefore provides a good case for the study of the interaction between the political 
ethos, the economic ethos and the party’s European attitude. The PSL’s nationalism renders 
the party’s support conditional and opposition unconditional. The party evaluated European 
integration on the merits of the CAP’S application to Polish farmers. However, the evolution of 
the relationship between Poland and the European Union allowed for a changed evaluation of 
the extension of the CAP to Polish farmers. The change of leadership of the party in 1997 and 
the start of the negotiations gave way to a re-appraisal of the adoption of the CAP. Pawlak’s 
leadership had opposed integration mainly because the European Commission 
recommended the increase of the size of agricultural exploitations and the negotiations of the 
Europe Agreements had showed the EU as determined to protect the interests of the present 
farmers. As negotiations progressed Kalinowski’s more global appreciation of the effects of 
the CAP extension led the party to declare that the PSL would support EU accession if a level 
playing field would be created between farmers of the East and the West.
This chapter also shows that Sitter’s expectation that agrarian parties that fashion a 
liking for the central state are Europhiles proves wrong in the Polish context.237 Sitter 
attributes agrarian parties’ Euroscepticism to their opposition to central authority, be it the
9 ^ 7
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national state or the EU. Since the Polish Peasant Party is not anti-state, one would expect 
that the party is a priori favourable to integration. However, until 1997 the party was 
Eurosceptic and its change of attitude on Europe is independent of its change of strategy.
The enquiry carried out in this chapter on the adequacy of the ethos theory to explain 
left-wing parties European attitudes is more complex than the one of the right since it implies 
testing the interaction between the political and economic ethos and parties’ European 
attitudes. This test shows how European integration is ultimately linked to the parties’ core 
identity and, in particular, on whether European integration helps the state to fulfil its 
commitments towards the chosen economic community, be it of economic or political nature.
Classifying parties 
Social democracy
The social democrats’ main identifying trait is the commitment to the elimination of 
differences among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from positions in the 
labour market and protecting low and minimum income groups.238 These goals were 
traditionally pursued by the extension of the right to free or subsidized goods and services, 
and by policies destined to shape the labour market to full employment. However, in recent 
years, globalization has been setting a number of conditions that exclude the possibility of 
state interventionism to shape the conditions of consumption.239 Several authors explain the 
mechanisms of adaptation of European social democratic parties to these changing
238 Huber, E. Ragin, C. and Stephens, J. (1993), op.cit.
239 Garrett, G. (1996), “Capital Mobility, Trade and Domestic Politics”, in Keohane, R. and Milner, H. (eds.), 
Internationalisation and Domestic Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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conditions. Boix describes it as a shift from “the arena of resource distribution to address the 
physical and social organization of production and the cultural conditions of consumption in 
advanced capitalist societies”.240 Social democrats are in the “pursuit of a new growth path to 
compete in global markets by maintaining certain instruments for influencing the supply-side 
of the economy. (...) These include the increase of workers’ skills, favouring the production of 
high value-added and high quality goods.” These policies are also seen as “favouring the 
workers and the poor".241
Social democrats are traditionally internationalist, a trait that derives from their definition 
of economic class as the fundamental community upon which the state should compensate 
for market failures. However, the commitment to left libertarian attitudes of which 
internationalism is an element, has varied across Europe. Although the legacy of social 
democracy has a strong commitment to individualism, individuals’ social and economic 
positions are determined by their integration in socio-economic classes. For social democrats, 
the class is the fundamental determinant of economic and social activity, and the inequalities 
for individuals ensuing from this fact should be addressed by the state. This has led some of 
these parties to remain more attached to the concept of nation-state, considering that the 
protection of workers’ interest can more easily be achieved in that context.
The present social democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe had to adapt their 
economic ethos to an extent that is unprecedented in Europe. Their transformation from 
communism into social democracy implied the reinterpretation of class as the economic 
ethos. Not only was the party to abandon the commitment to central planning but it would also 
renounce Keynesian policies as a means to correct the market distortions inflicted by class. 
As described in this chapter, some of the ex-communist parties quickly reformed their 
economic views and came to conceive the correction of class distortions as a question of 
supply-side economics.
240 Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
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Agrarianism
Before 1989 classifying separately European parties in an agrarian party type was 
controversial since most of European agrarian parties transformed into Christian democracy. 
However, the democratic transition in Central Eastern Europe has given rise to a number of 
parties that can only be properly classified in a separate category. Agrarian parties emerged 
out of the rural-urban cleavage to protect the interests of the rural population. The 
fundamental identifying community of agrarian parties is the estate.242 This concept was 
current in XIX century Europe, where social divisions and conflicts were understood in terms 
of estate, when the rights and privileges granted by the monarchs to some social groups 
stemmed from land ownership. Therefore the notion of estate linked land ownership with 
established rights and privileges. The agrarian movements re-utilized the concept of estate to 
the enlarged group of landowners in the context of democratic mobilization. Agrarians’ 
reinterpretation of estate meant that land-owning farmers were entitled to institutionalized 
support by the state.
Contrary to the concept class, the concept of estate does not imply the self- 
consciousness of a common social identity. Therefore, the political ethos of the agrarian party 
family is not a priori given, a circumstance that has led these parties to be easily absorbed 
into conservative or liberal movements in Western democracies; the agrarians’ conception of 
political community derives from liberal, Christian or nationalist traditions.243 The agrarian 
parties define their political ethos according to the political circumstances of their foundation.
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Ecologism
The ecologist parties’ core identity derives from a critique of the Enlightenment’s 
reliance on the individual as a rational being and his domination over the remainder of the 
ecological system. Ecologism is based on the conception of the ecological system as the 
primordial community. The ecological system is conceived as a holistic entity that 
encompasses all beings, alive or inanimate. Ecologism therefore defies liberals’ assumptions 
that human rational capacities elevate individuals to the primordial elements of politics and 
economics. Ecologists are therefore sceptical of the method and objectives of economic 
liberalism: economic growth through the mastery of nature. Ecologists defend the concept of 
sustained development.244
The ecologists’ political ethos derives not only from the view that the ecological crisis is 
global and results from the imbalance in man relationship with nature but, in some cases, also 
draws from the cosmopolitanism of the peace movements from which some ecological parties 
originate. The different origins of ecological parties are reflected in a tension between the 
interpretations of the cosmopolitan nature of their political ethos. While some parties, or 
factions within parties, are primarily concerned with the application of universalistic principles 
of justice, other parties or factions aim for a revolutionary transformation of the substantive 
relations between humans and nature, away from the anthropocentric conceptions founding 
political liberalism.245
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1989-1993: The first experiments
The political ethos of the SLD
The transformation of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) into a mainstream social 
democratic party was one of the most successful transformations of communist parties in the 
region.246 From the Round Table negotiations in 1988 until 2001 the PZPR gradually changed 
its traditional ideological discourse. The dominant faction of the PZPR’s pragmatic centre 
succeeded in maintaining the party unity by retaining some of the socialist elements, namely 
the left libertarian discourse and the commitment to the class, but re-interpreted these 
commitments according to the new circumstances 247 This strategy was one of a middle way 
between, on the one hand, the factions that advocated the complete dismissal of the leftist 
character of the party and proposed an alliance with the liberal faction within Solidarity (the 
globalists) and, on the other, the Marxist conservatism of the orthodox hard-liners.248 The 
redefinition of the party’s ideological discourse was determined by the moderate faction that 
took over the party centre.249
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The PZPR’s transformation from communism to social democracy was based on two 
elements: first, a centrist strategy, second, the successful reinterpretation of the core 
concepts of the party’s identity. Both were devised by the group of young, middle-rank 
reformist group within the PZPR. This group was elected to the leadership of the re-founded 
party in January 1990 on a platform of radical and rapid change. Their election to the party 
leadership was facilitated by the discredit of the regional party structures during the 1989 
election and by the old party leaders’ abandon of party control. The new party leadership 
shared a reformist interpretation of class politics that made it compatible with market economy 
and democratic principles, therefore abandoning the commitment to a centrally-planned 
economy.250
The sequencing of events proved crucial to determine the reform outcomes. Once 
reformists were elected to the party leadership in January 1990, agreement with the new 
reform program by the rest of the party was a foregone conclusion. Not only had the 
delegates to the new party been compelled to agree on the new statutes before they could 
join it, but also, at that stage, they were unwilling to disagree with the leaders whom they had 
just elected. The writing of the party program was undertaken by a close number of members 
of the Executive Council and swiftly approved by the delegates.251
The interpretation of left-wing ideals developed by the SdRP was equally useful for the 
staking of a broad electoral appeal demanded by an office-seeking strategy. The party 
specifically claimed to represent all Poles, and renounced to appeal primarily to the losers of 
transition or the traditional working class. Aleksander Kwasniewski explained: “In order to 
achieve programmatic goals, the party must rule, and it can only do so through elections -  we 
are for parliamentary democracy. Therefore the party must be an effective tool for winning 
elections, with a program that reaches out to potential voters.”252 As this statement makes
250 op.cit.
251 Grzymala-Busse, A. (2002), Redeeming the Communist Past: The Reaenration of Communist Parties in East 
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clear, for the young elite that came to dominate the party, office- and policy-seeking strategies 
were closely connected and complementary. The interpretation of class as the basic 
economic and political unit not only served to rebuild the party and adapt it to the new 
democratic circumstances, but also defined it as the main centre-left formation for the next 
decade. The party leaders’ agreement over the interpretation of its ethos made it possible for 
them to stake programs geared to generate broad support and assure electoral success. The 
sequencing of events proved crucial.253 The success of reformist leaders to take over the 
party apparatus meant a successful programmatic transformation and this proved crucial to 
assure the party’s competitiveness and further conversion of its programmatic 
commitments.254
The resolution of the last Congress of the United Polish Workers Party and the 
documents of the Founding Congress of the SdRP would read: ‘The long-term ideological aim 
is that of framing a new formula of democratic socialism away from the axiological system of 
communism. We are for the ideals of a rational society and against nationalism, chauvinism 
and the neutral state.”255 As early as 1991 the SdRP’s secularism was one of its most noted 
characteristics.256 Although the staunch secularism and internationalism of the party was 
noted as making the party’s appeal narrower, the party leadership never changed its definition 
of the political community. Arguably, by anchoring the party’s identity in a left libertarian 
discourse, the party leaders could more easily reinterpret the party’s commitment to social 
justice.257
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By abandoning orthodox Marxism and denouncing Stalinism, the ex-communists 
performed an ideological jump that attempted to reverse the ideological bifurcation resulting 
from the rupture of communists and social democrats’ international movements in the 1920s 
and laid the foundations of a new party identity in the tradition of European socialism. The 
reference to the socialist origins and values was accompanied by the incorporation of the 
historical socialist party of Pitsudski, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The Polish ideologues 
returned to the core values of the European rationalist ideals of Enlightenment.258 ‘The left 
must also change, anchored in the values of humanism and rationalism, the equality of 
chances and expectations of the majority of the society. (...)”. The accent put on left libertarian 
values helped the party to successfully reinvent itself by creating an alternative rhetoric to the 
conservative authoritarianism of the post-Solidarity block.259 The internal ideological 
transformation put the accent in left libertarian values and allowed the party to smoothly 
change its economic commitments. This outcome allowed the party to overcome socio­
economic differences thus widening the party’s appeal, serving equally well the new party 
leaders’ office-seeking strategies.260
In the aftermath of the Presidential election of 1990 the SdRP’s centrist strategy led it to 
organize a broad leftist coalition of forces. By mid-1991 a coalition, the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), came into being, the SdRP being its dominant actor.
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The economic ethos of the SLD
The SLD’s economic ethos reflected also the evolution of Western European social 
democracy. Arguably this conversion was facilitated by the disbelief of a great number of 
party leaders in the effectiveness of communist centrally-planned economy.261 By the mid­
eighties an important faction of the party’s leaders had abandoned their faith in state 
ownership. During the negotiations that resulted in the Round Table Accord and the peaceful 
power transfer performed in 1989 the reformism of the communist leaders showed the 
potential for the transformation of the party.
Between 1991 and 1993 the party reacted to the radical marketisation measures of the 
right-wing governments by showing a strong commitment to the state’s redistributive role. The 
Balcerowicz plan had severe economic consequences for the majority of the population and 
resulted in a sudden surge of social inequalities. During the SdRP’s First Congress the party 
opposed shock therapy and declared its commitment to third road solutions. Although 
approving the overall direction of the reforms, the party objected to the government’s methods 
and objectives, such as the absolute necessity for curbing inflation.262 By 1991 the party 
supported the marketisation measures but advocated state intervention to protect the 
workers’ interests. During the period between 1991 and 1993 the party hardened the tone of 
its criticisms regarding the economic policy followed by the post-Solidarity governments, and 
in particular, the effects these had in deepening income disparities among classes. The 
leaders explained that “voting for the SdRP you will support people who want radical 
reforms...but would rather implement them with minimal social costs.”263 The SLD was for
260 This would be plausible since the party was united on socio-political issues while economic stance were sources 
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higher consumer taxes and more benefits for small- and medium-sized enterprises. ‘Taxes 
should be paid by those that consume more, not those that invest more.”264 The advocacy of 
a slow decrease of profit tax illustrated the gradualist preference of the SLD. Fiscal policies 
were intended to ensure that state revenues “cover the budget for the most important social 
needs.”265 This tax regime was also intended to fund the creation of new jobs and the 
transformation of education policy. The reform of education should serve the needs of 
developing skills useful in the new economy.
In the early nineties, the SdRP was still strongly committed to a traditional 
operationalisation of social justice: “We are for a type of social policy guided by the principles 
of social justice in guaranteeing equality in access to education, culture, medical care, leisure 
and social security.” The SLD’s social policies differed from Christian-inspired social policies 
by declaring its belief in “an active policy of employment creation.” In terms of agricultural 
policy the SLD was against the total liquidation of state-controlled agricultural economy.
In the 1993 election campaign the party was one of the fiercest critics of shock therapy, 
pointing to the plan’s dire results -  high unemployment, widespread pauperization, decrease 
of real incomes (of white-collar workers), bankruptcy of the agricultural sector due to a lack of 
agricultural and industrial policies. The SLD’s manifesto opted for more state intervention, 
internal market protectionism and higher taxes for the wealthy. Both the SLD’s manifesto and 
campaigns favoured general privatization policies, but with explicit substantial amendments 
aimed at more employee-friendly solutions. Their electoral slogan: ‘Things do not need be like 
this” indicated both general support for marketisation but also the party’s strong opposition to 
shock therapy.
265 . . Idem.
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The economic ethos of the UP
The Union of Labour (UP) was created in 1992, when the SLD was not yet considered a 
viable centre-left party. Worried at the rising of class inequalities, ex-Solidarity activists 
attempted to fill a perceived gap on the left-wing spectrum by creating a social democratic 
party that would maintain “the Solidarity tradition of workers and intellectuals’ cooperation 
while leading this forum to new realities and forms”.266
The UP’s economic ethos was well illustrated by the theme of the V Congress of the 
party, “Poland of Equal Chances”. The programme opposed “the neo-liberal utopia” which 
disregards Polish reality, neglects social justice and the reform of the health and education 
systems. “Poland can only be successful when market economy, a just social system and 
parliamentary democracy are linked harmoniously." 267 The party’s ethos was based on the 
understanding of class as the fundamental economic community. This commitment was 
shown by the party’s generous welfare state policies, as well as its strong links with both the 
Solidarity and the ex-communist trade unions. The party pressed for a strong role for the state 
in creating structural industrial and employment policies financed by the state budget,268 and 
straightforwardly attacked the neo-liberal assumptions that privatization is always beneficial 
and that market rules should overrule considerations of social justice.
The political ethos of the UP
Being based on the concept of class solidarity, the UP believed that social justice was 
the basis for a state’s international action. Moreover, UP’s roots in the Solidarity Trade Union 
reflected in the party’s political ethos and its commitment to the development of an
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international civil society. In its programmatic declaration the party declares its willingness to 
strike a balance between a communitarian view of society deriving from the concept of class 
and individual autonomy and to combine ideological consistency with pragmatism, market 
economy with democracy, economic dynamism with respect for the principles of justice and 
the environment. The party’s humanist view of economic development was reflected in its 
priorities: the promotion of human, cultural and social capital, both with civic and economic 
goals.
The UP saw the development of civil society as a task for the state, through programs 
of citizens’ education. The UP also defended the rights of minorities and was committed to the 
decentralization of the state. The anti-clerical tone in the party programmes derived from the 
elite’s belief in the freedom of religion. However, UP’s origins in progressive social 
movements led the party to claim more universalistic principles of justice, going beyond the 
narrower claim of international solidarity based on the concept of class.
The economic ethos of the PSL
The transformation of the United Peasant’s Party (ZSL), a communist satellite party, 
into the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was founded on the XIX and XX century peasant 
ideology: biological agrarianism.269 Biological agrarianism is based on a metaphor of the 
nation as a living organism where family farms have a vital role.270 The particular history of 
the Polish agrarian movement determined that the PSL’s concept of estate was initially 
specified as family farms.
The party’s ethos prescribes farmers as the economic community to be primarily 
supported in face of inequalities generated by the market. In post-communist Poland, the
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PSL’s neo-agrarianism meant a strong interventionist role for the state to support family- 
based agricultural units and resist a drive for commercially more profitable exploitations. The 
PSL’s statist attitude is also inherited from inter-war agrarianism, where the intervention of the 
state to assure an equitable distribution of land was essential.
The PSL’s warrants the state as the guarantor of the farmers’ welfare. The party shared 
the SLD’s aversion to shock therapy, and this stance became the programmatic ground for 
the party coalition. “Shock therapy has no program for the development of agriculture while 
gradualism has a clear one: the family-based agricultural exploitation.”271 The defence of 
family farms was the principle guiding the privatization of state farms. ‘The privatization of 
state agricultural farms should serve primarily the re-construction of the family economy.’’272 
The defence of small peasant properties has determined its anti-reprivatisation position, 
which could open claims to the peasant properties by institutions like the Church. The strong 
preference for shaping farmers’ opportunities reflects on the promotion of regional 
development as a way of fighting regional structural unemployment.
The political ethos of the PSL
Due to the coincidence of peasant mobilization and nation-building in the late XIX and 
early XX century in Poland, the PSL’s definition of estate was intertwined with nationalism. 
Biological agrarianism, the ideology of the peasant movement of Stanislaw Witos, justified the 
fight for peasant emancipation and land redistribution in the early XX century by conceiving 
the Polish nation as a living organism. In this organic view of the nation, and according to its 
rather elevated conception of the farmers’ estate, family farming is considered as the nation’s
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most important moral and material resource.273 In the XIX and XX century this led the peasant 
movement in a campaign for land reform, both in radical and moderate forms.
The party’s neo-agrarian ideology conceived the nation as the fundamental political 
community where peasants have an outstanding mission. This sort of nationalism resulted in 
the attempt to preserve rural values, in the Polish case strongly attached with Catholicism. 
“Natural Law and principles of Christian ethics as well as the historical experience of the 
Polish nation are the fundamentals of the PSL program.”274
The European attitudes of left-wing parties between 1991-93
The SLD’s European attitudes: Until the 1993 elections the SLD kept its proximity to 
Moscow by objecting to NATO’s expansion, supporting instead Gorbatchev’s concept of a 
“Common European Home.”275 A declaration of the Supreme Council of the party read: ‘The 
change of policy of the German states illustrates that interests run higher than illusory hopes. 
After several months of unsuccessful attempts of rapprochement with the Federal Republic of 
Germany (...) it becomes clear that Europe remains divided in military blocks, and therefore 
that NATO expansion to the Polish border is not acceptable, as it is not acceptable to quit the 
security guarantees of the Warsaw Pact.”276 The uncertainty regarding the future of the Soviet 
Union has determined the conservative attitude of the party regarding the geopolitical choices 
that Poland faced.
The SdRP remained extremely cautious in its attitude on European integration. This 
reflected a conditional scepticism towards the a priori compatibility between European 
integration as a political, economic and security project and the national interest. However,
273 Dziewanowski, M. (1996), “Polish Populism”, in Held, J. (ed.), Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism. Nationalism 
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Euroscepticism was expressed more clearly in the refusal to support NATO extension and the 
reunification of Germany.277 It was only during the Second Congress of the SdRP’s in March 
1993 that Aleksander Kwasniewski, then party leader, advanced a clearly positive attitude 
towards NATO expansion.278 The geopolitical context of the demise of the Soviet Block 
should be taken into consideration in explaining the SLD’s Soft Euroscepticism and its 
opposition to Polish integration in the trans-Atlantic defence system. However, the SdRP 
opposition to European integration in this period also reflects the stage of the party’s 
transformation into a social democratic party. Until attaining governmental office in 1993 the 
party contested the right-wing’s government radical marketisation measures by maintaining 
that the state should remain strongly involved in regulating the market through redistributive 
policies. The SdRP’s scepticism regarding European integration reflected an opposition to a 
supranational policy regime that appeared to impose a further downsizing of the state and the 
deepening of marketisation measures.
The PSL’s European Attitude: Already in the early nineties, underneath the general 
consensual statements on EU accession, the PSL clearly doubted the goodness of opening 
agricultural markets. “Being favourable to the integration of Poland in the EEC, we underline 
the need to question whether this road leads us to a false objective. We should know whether 
integration is separate from liberal fundamentalism”.279 The PSL also considered that “market 
openness is not always a good thing” and that the formula of “Europe of the Nations”280 suits 
the party best. This attitude was a reaction to the protectionist attitude of the EU during the 
negotiations of the Association Agreements regarding Polish agriculture and steel products.
277 . .Idem.
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When the effects of the 1991 Association Agreements became clear, the PSL became 
particularly critical of the protectionist attitude regarding Polish products and demanded its 
renegotiation. After the Europe Agreements the party’s position on the EU was of an 
unconditional Euroscepticism. The discrimination felt by Polish farmers had long lasting 
effects and set the party’s attitude towards accession negotiations. In 1997 this theme was 
still present in party declarations: “one can not tolerate the asymmetry advantaging the EU in 
opening the Polish market to agricultural products.”281 However since the full implications of 
accession, both in terms of access to the European markets and the CAP direct income 
contributions were not known, the PSL’s stance remained conditional on concessions of the 
EU towards Polish agriculture, and could be classified as Soft Eurosceptic.
281 Przeslanki i Generalne Cechv Proaramu Spoteczno-Gospodarczeao PSL (Premises and General Features of 
PSL Socio-Economic Program), Warsaw: 1997.
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1993-1997: The governmental experience
The political ethos of the SLD
The September 1993 elections constituted a monumental change in the fortunes of left- 
wing parties in Poland. Although the victory of the ex-communists in the parliamentary 
elections was aided by the fragmentation of the right-wing parties, this success would have 
been impossible without the gradual and consistent transformation of the party’s identity.282 
The domination of the party’s oligarchy established in the transition period was crucial for the 
continuing reinterpretation of the party’s ethos. “Closed oligarchic procedures, accompanied 
by a controlled members’ mobilization, decide over the leadership recruitment outcomes. The 
choice of the leader is based on the consensus among the party elite, which contributes to his 
strong position within the party as well as outside it.”283 The time sequence proved equally 
important for the outcome: the elite group that promoted the PZPR’s transformation into social 
democracy in the late eighties kept control over the party identity evolution.284
During the 1993 election campaign the modernizing leadership of the SdRP dwelt with 
the political legacy of left-wing modernisation and carved out a left-libertarian profile, first of all 
by presenting an absolute commitment to secularism. The party was unequivocal in its 
support for the liberalisation of the restrictive abortion law, and its secular stances took nearly 
11 percent of the program.285 At the time the Catholic Church became notorious for its 
attempts to influence public policy through its instructions to voters during Church services
282
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and by pressuring post-Solidarity political parties to heed Church teachings. The party’s 
libertarian stance was therefore appealing to all those that opposed this influence.286 The 
SLD’s secularism and criticism of the Church became an appealing feature of the party, and a 
sufficiently relevant one in the context of the heated debates on socio-cultural issues taking 
place in Poland.
For the SLD the left libertarian stance ensued easily from the progressive tradition of 
communism and the profile of its leaders. Carving a new identity based on this tradition 
proved a successful strategy for the oligarchy controlling the SLD. Equally natural and 
intertwined with its left libertarian tradition was the adoption of an internationalist identity, 
deriving from the PZPR communist traditions. In practice, such tradition was reinforced by the 
search for external legitimacy of the reformed ex-communists, and in this context the efforts 
the party put on gaining membership of the Socialist International are easily explainable.
The international isolation to which the ex-communists were condemned in the early 
90s was progressively brought to an end by the party’s electoral results and the efforts of the 
party leadership. Tadeusz Iwinski, the party’s International Secretary recalls the long efforts 
made by the party to achieve international recognition 287 The search for international 
legitimacy still appeared to be the driving force for the definition of SLD’s international identity: 
‘The membership of the Socialist International is the most important and meaningful event for 
us. It is a word of acknowledgement for the transformation achieved in our country and the 
depth of change of the Polish left. Membership is also seen as a weapon against 
discrimination: ‘Those who would want to call us ‘communists’ and ‘post-communists’ will
286 As a consequence of the Church and right-wing governments, the Parliament curtailed access to abortion rights 
and passed new laws instituting religious education in schools. This led to a drastic decline in the Church approval as 
a majority of the population considered these acts to be inappropriate interference in public affairs, and the Church 
approval rate declined from 88percent in 1989 to around 30percent within two years. CBOS, “Spoteczne Ocena 
Dziatalnosc Instvtucii Politicznv". Komunikat z Badan, Warsaw, October 1990. By May 1993 38 percent approved and
54 percent disapproved of the Church role. CBOS, “Instvtucie Publiczne w Opinii Spofecznei”. Komunikat z Badan,
November 1994.
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expose themselves to the ridicule.”288 Internationalism and the party’ commitment to a 
libertarian position seem to go hand in hand: “We hope to deserve the current membership of 
the International Socialist, whose principles of social justice are combined with the principles 
of freedom, individualism and autonomy of the citizens.”289 By anchoring its identity on the 
tradition of European socialism, the Polish left became susceptible to influence by the 
transformation under way in the West European left.
The victory of the SLD in the 1993 elections meant that the UP had to make a choice 
between integrating the SLD and remaining oblivious to the SLD’s success. The UP refused 
SLD’s invitation for participating in government, hoping for a reassertion of a separate identity 
and the opportunity to become a more genuine social democratic alternative to the SLD.
The economic ethos of the SLD
After taking office in 1993 the SLD changed several of its economic stances. The main 
question was whether the party would continue Balcerowicz economic policies or abandon 
them for deficit-funded demand-side policies. By choosing finance ministers eager to continue 
Balcerowicz’s reforms and assure sound fiscal policies, the party made clear that the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the campaign had been replaced by economic “real politics” aimed at 
controlling the budget deficit, combating inflation, cutting down expenditures and opening the 
economy to foreign investment. This implied, with time, a strong change in the party’s 
economic ethos and the abandon of the early nineties slogan of “marketisation with state 
interventionism” policy. In 1997 the party’s economic program had dropped all elements of 
economic policy which could have made their discourse seem backward in the context of the 
European left transformation. The emphasis on a traditional understanding of social justice
288
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remained in the party’s programme until 1997, being supported by a faction committed to 
traditional leftist redistributive values.
In the 1997 campaign the party’s strategy was to prove that it would implement market 
reforms better. The SLD’s program was marked by an evolution in economic values, in 
particular regarding the redistributive role of the state. Classical social democratic policies, 
like employment or social welfare, lost their centrality in the party’s programs. In part, this 
evolution seems to reflect the party’s governmental experience when it had to implement 
economic reforms imposed by the World Bank and the IMF.290
The economic ethos of the UP
In contrast to the SdRP, the UP maintained its commitment to a large-sized state 
budget ready to provide for welfare programs and to intervene in the economy to compensate 
for market failure. The party also prescribed that the process of privatization should be 
stopped, since the structure of ownership in terms of public and private ownership of the 
Polish economy in 1996 was then ideal.291 For that reason in its V Programmatic Document, 
prepared for the 1997 parliamentary elections, the UP reasserts its traditional leftist identity 
and demanded that the state should further control privatization of state economic assets 
through a “map of privatization”, rather than letting market forces prevail.292 This policy 
intended to protect the market from further foreign acquisitions. In line with this, tax revenues 
were deemed to be used strategically to protect the Polish economic potential from the 
competition of international business and the market instability of its eastern neighbourhood.
290Author’s interview with Krzysztof Szamalek, advisor of President Kwasniewski, October 2000.
291 V  Documentv Proaramowe Unia Pracv. (V Programmatic Documents), Warsaw: June 1997.
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The economic ethos of the PSL
Between 1993 and 1997 the PSL’s nationalist faction, led by Waldemar Pawtak, was 
reinforced by the authority derived from the tetter's premiership. This meant that Pawtek’s 
conservative interpretation of the concept of estate prevailed.293 His predominance was 
contested by more liberal-minded members that considered that a non-nationalist 
interpretation of estate would result on de-emphasizing the focus on family farming and 
accept an agricultural reform based on efficiency principles. The party’s conservative outlook 
was also motivated by the virtual exclusion of right-wing parties from the SdRP-dominated 
parliament, inciting the party to take up such a role. However, the PSL’s adoption of a 
nationalist identity was not taken to its logical conclusion through the integration of a right- 
wing formation.
The PSL’s conflicts between 1995 and 1997 were documented in the proceedings and 
documents of a series of party conferences. Party documents of this epoch testify to the 
conflicts among factions. In the PSL’s V Congress in June 1997 one of the main party 
objectives was defined as “to profit from the historical shape given by the peasant movement 
to the system of values.”294 Another document, the party’s ideological declaration, commits the 
party to neo-agrarianism, and states that the PSL’s ideology draws upon the “centuries’ long 
endeavour of the peasantry to live in freedom and participate equally in the life of the state.”295 
The party document emphasized the role of “agriculture as one of the main areas of 
production and the basis for national survival” with “family farms constituting the foundation 
for the harmonious development of villages and the countryside” and the basis of the 
agricultural system. Another document of the epoch made references to the willingness to 
appeal more broadly to “that portion of the Polish society which lives in the countryside and
293
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the small towns, far-removed from the urban centre”296 but the dominant faction focused on 
assuring the support of the party’s traditional core constituency.297
The conflict over the definition of the party’s economic unit of mobilization and identity 
was expressed in the conflict between Roman Jagielinski, deputy Prime Minister and 
Agricultural Minister between 1995 and 1997, and the party hierarchy. Roman Jagielinski was 
seen as the supporter of “big farmers”, and generally proposing a broader interpretation of the 
concept of estate, which conflicted with the official line of the party. Jagielinski’s conceptions 
translated in its defence of a type of agricultural reform that favoured the transformation of 
parties and made him a persona non grata within the party, obliging him to resign from its 
Ministerial post.
It took a landslide defeat and a change of leadership for the party to abandon its 
previous conceptions of agricultural reform. Pawtak’s preponderance was gradually brought to 
an end by his poor results in the presidential elections of 1995 (4.31 percent) and the party’s 
defeat in the 1997 elections (7.31 percent against 15.6 percent in the 1993 elections). 
Eventually the dominant faction’s authoritarianism and nationalism298 was replaced by a 
modernising approach professed by the former deputy prime minister and Agriculture Minister 
Jarostaw Kalinowski, who replaced Waldemar Pawtak as party leader in October 1997.
Elected in October 1997 the new leader recognized that the party had defined too 
narrowly its constituency. “We allowed ourselves, mainly through our own fault, to be 
characterized as a ‘class party’... because we also took upon ourselves the role of a trade 
union... As a party we should express our views on the most important issues, such as the
296
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stabilization of production and the growth of incomes, and not concern ourselves solely with 
the price of specific agricultural products."299
The European attitudes of parties between 1993 and 1997
The SLD’s European attitude: The conversion of SLD’s attitudes towards European 
integration from Soft Euroscepticism to Hard Europhilism came during the 1993 election 
campaign.300 The support for NATO expansion, which the SLD had previously refused, was 
the visible face of this transformation. The party progressively made an unconditional support 
for accession to the European Union part of its prominent policy stances. Around 1994 the 
party started portraying integration as a one-time chance to avoid a peripheral status and 
access the centre of European economic power.301 The emphasis put by the party on its 
unconditional Europhilism paralleled the transformation to social democracy of a Western 
kind. Indeed, although the changing geopolitical circumstances of Poland in relation to the 
USSR account for an explanation of the party’s attitudes to European integration302 the 
transformation of the party and its experience in government resulted in a long-term change 
of the party’s appreciation of the EU’s policy regimes.
Indeed, governmental experience changed the party’s perception of the EU policy 
regimes. Although having been elected on a platform of opposition to shock therapy, once in 
government, the SLD quickly realised the constraining effect of international commitments on 
its economic policies. During the period in office the party progressively considered the 
relatively protective character of the European Union’s policy regimes in relation to the
299 Quoted in interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, “S3. Granice Roznorodnosci”, (There are Limits to Diversity), 
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301 Socialdemokratvczna Alternatvwa: Polska Demokratvczna. Sorawiedliwa. Bezoieczna (The Social Democratic 
Alternative: a Democratic, Just, Safe Poland) Biuletyn Wewnqtrzpartyjny, Warsaw: June 1993.
302 Author’s interview with Krzysztof Szamalek, Advisor of President Kwasniewski, October 2000.
145
international standards imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The party joined other 
European social democratic parties in its call for initiatives to bolster EU-level social policies. 
The change of stance of the party towards the European Union was consolidated, and during 
the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections the party portrayed itself as the most able 
force to lead Poland into membership of the European Union.303 The European issue 
appeared prominently on its electoral campaign.
The UP’s European attitudes: The UP’s attitude towards European integration was at 
this time one of conditional Euroscepticism. The party’s commitment to the maintenance of 
high levels of social protection by the state lead it to consider that it could only support 
European integration if the EU could guarantee high levels of social protection in the 
European space. The perception that European integration would just increase the pressures 
for the lowering of social standards, i.e., that the EU was mainly an agent of market 
liberalisation and contributed to the degradation of welfare state standards determined the 
party’s conditional Euroscepticism. The party proposes as conditions for support that the 
European Union set itself the task of labour market regulation.304
When mentioning the concerns on the social effects of European integration on 
disfavoured classes, the UP links it with the argument that Poland should quickly ratify the 
European Charter of Social Rights.305 The UP’s Soft Euroscepticism also stressed that Poland 
should fully adopt European Social regulation. The party’s cosmopolitan political ethos 
determined a conditional opposition to European integration. If the European Union further
303 Kucharczyk, J. (1998), Positions of European Parties in the Polish 1997 Parliamentary Elections. Warsaw: 
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develops its regulatory role as a guardian of high standards of social protection and fight 
against unemployment, the party would give it its full support.306
The PSL’s European Position: From 1993 to 1997 the PSL a priori rejected the 
coincidence between the national interest and European integration. The party’s Hard 
Euroscepticism was justified not only by fears of an asymmetric application of the CAP 
benefits to Poland but also by the party’s nationalist political ethos. The fear that market 
openness would lead not only to the flooding of the Polish market by European subsidized 
agricultural products, but would also give access of foreign investors to agricultural and food 
production, was the condition for PSL’s Euroscepticism. These fears were justified by the 
effects of the 1992 Association Agreements, which proved devastating for Polish small­
holding farmers. The Association Agreements were portrayed as revealing he protectionist 
attitude of the European Union, an organisation where poor and rich countries have 
asymmetric power in defending their interests.307 The party illustrated this stance with 
examples of the selective rewards of the CAP price mechanisms.308 The European issue also 
interfered with the conflicts between Jagielinski and Pawtak’s factions on the desirable type of 
agricultural reform. The Commission’s demands for an increase of the size of agricultural 
holdings dove-tailed with Jagielinski’s positions and threatened Pawtak’s stance that family- 
based agricultural exploitations be sustained with the help of an interventionist policy at the 
EU level.
306 This observation was taken while the author attended a meeting of the Working Group on European Enlargement 
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1997-2001: The left in opposition
The economic ethos of the SLD
By 2000 it was already clear that the SLD would probably dominate the next 
government. At this time the SLD was established as a party of power, capable of 
implementing reforms and run efficiently the state machinery, and being essentially a pro­
market force. However, as other left-wing parties elsewhere in Europe, the party leadership 
searched for a formula encompassing the transformation of its economic ethos, achieved 
through a new interpretation of the principle of social justice. This new interpretation implied 
the renouncing of budget-financed demand-side policies. This has, however, not been 
specifically pursued in governmental policies, when the SLD has shown a weak commitment 
to deficit restraint in face of economic crisis.
In an internal party speech, the SLD’s general secretary Leszek Miller enunciated the 
Polish Third Way, not in the fashion of Tito but of Tony Blair.309 In continuity with its previous 
programmatic evolution, the SLD attempted to further the image of a modern centre-left party 
not only through its left libertarian profile but also by striking a technocratic profile that 
implicitly meant the acceptance of the principles of budgetary discipline and giving up 
demand-side instruments of intervention for correcting market inequalities. Despite the 
differences of interpretation it sustained with the UP, still faithful to a traditional interpretation 
of the policies aimed at reducing market inequalities, the SLD proposed to the UP a coalition 
and the two parties ran on the same list in the 2001 elections. The appearance of a workers’ 
party was also maintained by the presence within its ranks of trade unionists from the OPZZ, 
but the UP’s alliance strongly reinforced the coalition’s role as a left-wing party. The eight-
309
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year resistance of the UP to a coalition with the SLD was then overcome after the party’s poor 
results in the 1997 elections and the change of leadership to Marek Pol.
The economic ethos of the PSL
Jarostaw Kalinowski, party leader elected in 1997, was successful in quelling the debate 
within the party and re-defining the PSL’s political and economic identity. Certainly, the 
parliamentary caucus after the 2001 elections was presided by a more hard-line 
representative, Janusz Dobrosz, and regional leaders, such as Zdistaw Podkanski from 
Lublin, kept a strong position within the party. But Kalinowski’s leadership imposed an overall 
strategy of openness to a wider electorate. In an interview to Gazeta Wyborcza, Kalinowski 
asserted that more radical measures (like the ones undertaken by the PSL leaders in 
Lublin310) would drive away new supporters outside the traditional electorate and concluded: 
“If we remain in the trenches we only can lose.”311
Kalinowski’s leadership made the party a possible coalition partner for both centre-right 
and centre-left governments.312 The PSL eventually joined the SLD in a governmental 
coalition in 2001 and Kalinowski became Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture Minister and 
negotiator of the controversial agricultural chapter with the European Commission. The 
negotiations leading to government formation showed once again the dividing lines within the 
PSL and the fact that Kalinowski’s efforts to carve a more open definition of the PSL’s political 
and economic identity met with high resistance within the party. The party portrayed itself as 
the representative of the whole rural population and proposed measures of agricultural reform 
that took into account the interests of the whole peasant class rather than aiming solely at
310 In early 2003 PSL's Lublin leaders decided to adopt radical measures of protect like road blockages to 
complement its already extremist language and Euroscepticism.
311 Interview with Kalinowski, “Kalinowski: Jednoczmv Sie Pod Sdiana”. (Kalinowski: W e Unite Against the Wall), 
Gazeta Wvborcza. 28 October 2003.
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assuring the survival of small-holding peasants. This change meant that although the party’s 
concept of estate still referred to the neo-agrarian roots, family farmers possessed a 
fundamental and almost sacred role in the Polish nation,313 Jarostaw Kalinowski took a 
centrist and pragmatic strategy to enlarge the appeal of the party beyond the traditional 
farmers.
The changing political ethos of Samoobrona
Despite having been formed in 1992 as a rural trade union, when Samoobrona attained 
parliamentary representation in 2001 it still resembled more a movement rather than a party. 
This was partly due to the fact that despite the party’s origins as a rural trade union, the 
Samoobrona’s ethos was based on an extreme interpretation of class. However, the 
adaptability of Samoobrona’s programmatic stances is one of the most notorious 
characteristics of the party. This flexibility results from the party not being positioned on either 
side of the communist/anti-communist political divide.314 The party was therefore successful in 
creating a series of coalitions with the most disparate groups, like the army, ultra-nationalists 
and utopic socialists. The Samoobrona’s secondary political ethos is nationalist, resulting 
from an aversion to a liberal international order.
The Samoobrona’s 1992 ideological declaration states that the movement “does not 
only represent farmers, but a wider spectrum of interests, such as those of workers, the 
unemployed, the pensioners and the milieu of culture and education.”315 The attempt to 
appeal to all those that suffer from transition was reflected not only in populist rhetoric, but 
also in a loose organization that engaged in a non-conventional, protest profile. ‘The
312 . ,Idem.
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Samoobrona is a cry to the Polish society to mobilize and fight to protect our national identity 
and sovereignty, the fight for the future of the country, the fight against politicians who lie and 
against the demoralization and the cynicism spread by the politicians that betray the 
people.”316 The Samoobrona also asserted that the role of the state in the domain of cultural 
policy should be that of promoting national culture by stressing the traditions of Polish culture. 
‘This road leads to an ‘organic system’ in which the great diversity of human behaviour is 
integrated through a system of cooperation in the interest of all the society, the nation and the 
state.”317 The Samoobrona’s nationalism is not linked to Catholicism or even to an 
authoritarian position in socio-cultural issues, and in fact Lepper often claimed to support 
freedom of religion and conscience. Such appeal for religious freedom evolved in recent 
years into an anti-clerical stance.
The Samoobrona’s vague ideological principles involved a commitment to a “healthy 
development, the care for disfavoured people and the national interest". Lepper articulated its 
protest in a conspiratorial tone against the liberal national and international elite. ‘The present 
domination in the system of global relations of an international coalition of liberal elites and 
political corporate finance, indifferent to ordinary people and whole nations, using methods of 
economic totalitarianism, financial terror, controlled information and a fagade of corrupt 
democracy, must give way to a humanitarian order, the enlightened representation of free 
peoples with universal principles, humanistic values and cooperative principles on the global 
international system.”318
On the wake of the registration of the Samoobrona as a political party in November 
1999, Andrzej Lepper adopted a more defined radical-left identity following a series of strikes 
that succeeded in paralyzing the country in January and February 1999. While in its Congress 
in April 1999 the Samoobrona still counted with a wing of supporters belonging to the extreme
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right-wing milieu, such as the notoriously anti-semitic General Wilecki,319 in the 1 May 1999 
demonstrations in Warsaw, Lepper called for the creation of a “worker-peasant alliance”, 
dismissed the extreme nationalist wing, and emphasized his friendly relations with Jerzy 
Urban, the left-wing radical editor of the anticlerical weekly Nie.
The economic ethos of the Samoobrona
The protection of the disfavoured classes from the alleged attacks of liberal international 
conspiracies is the basic tenet of the party’s economic doctrine. The farmers’ radical protest 
methods are shown as an example to the rest of the society: “Poland is being killed slowly, 
plant by plant, sector after sector. The protests of Polish farmers have shown the whole 
society the way these crimes are performed and the methods to prevent them.”320 Liberalism 
is portrayed as a crime, as a mechanism of thought which distorts reality and manipulates the 
Polish nation. “We denounce the untruthful thesis that there is no other alternative to the 
present reforms, which were imposed through blackmail by the foreign centres of political 
power.”321
To oppose such international liberal order Lepper advocated a strong state in the 
defence of the weaker social elements, guaranteeing “the right to work and fair pay, a roof 
over one’s head and a good health care system.” ‘The state should work to decrease 
unemployment, through a programme of massive job creation. The sponsoring of housing 
construction should also become one of the tasks of the state; the policy should have as its
318 , .Idem.
319 “Atrakcyjny Lepper", Rzeczpospolita. 6 April 1999, it is reported that the ultra nationalist General Wilecki called 
Andrzej Lepper “the jewel in the crown of the Polish Peasant Movement”.
320 Moze. a Wiec Muszi Bv6 Leoiei. Samoobronei Proaramv Narodowei (It Can, and it Must Get Better, National
Program of the Samoobrona), Warsaw: 1992.
321 . .Idem.
152
main purpose the creation of employment and bringing down house prices to “an affordable 
level.”322
To this strategy Lepper called the Third Way. “We have enough of the road to the ‘left’ 
and to the ‘right’. We will try to go straight to you, acting according to the natural law.”323 
Despite its claim to represent a centrist option during the 2000 presidential campaign, Lepper 
described himself as the most left-wing candidate, aspiring to raise low social benefits and 
pensions.324 This state-centred approach became more explicit with the statement that as a 
result of these pro-social policies “the Polish people should remain a society that respects its 
state, a power that represents its people rather than foreign interests.” 325
The European attitudes of left-wing parties between 1997 and 2001
The SLD’s European positions: The results of the 2001 elections made attitudes 
towards European integration one of the most divisive factors in parliament and within the 
SLD-PSL government. The SLD government’s readiness to compromise with the EU on 
contentious issues in Poland’s EU membership negotiations, including the purchase of land 
by foreigners and the free movement of labour, was taken by its right-wing opponents as the 
proof of the government’s unconditional Europhilism.326 This attitude was explained by J6sef 
Oleksy, widely held as the leading conceptual thinker on European integration, as a stance 
that is opposed to “the conservative way of understanding history, the state and the nation”. 
Oleksy argues that behind the right-wing discourse on European integration there is “an 
historical, sentimental patriotism and the common phobias and stereotypes that exist in Polish
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society.”327 Oleksy criticizes the right-wing portrayal of accession as a “return to the West”328 
and considers that this discourse derives from nationalist conceptions that hinder the 
acceptance of integration as an intrinsically good project pursuing the freedom and the 
citizens’ economic well-being. On another occasion, Oleksy pledges for a change in the 
character of Polish patriotism from a concept based on fear and protectionism to an open and 
cooperative concept.
The SLD’s Hard Europhilism derives from the coincidence of the economic objectives of 
the European Union and the party’s re-operationalised economic ethos. The change of the 
SLD’s position occurred after the change of EU policy regimes and was solely a result of the 
internal party change. As it adopted a new economic ethos and started to participate in 
meetings of European social democratic leaders, the SLD declared its support for Social 
Europe and gave its Europhilism a leftist tone.330
The PSL’s European positions: Between 1997 and 2001 the PSL’s positioning on the 
scale of attitudes towards Europe changed from a Hard Eurosceptic position to Soft 
Europhilism. The PSL’s a priori recognition that the EU interests are different from the Polish 
national interests has effectively evolved into conditional Europhilism. This change is mainly 
noticeable in the stances and conditions issued by the party during the accession 
negotiations.331 In 1997 the PSL demanded that Polish farmers be “included in the Common 
Agricultural Policy from the moment when Poland joins the EU (with Poland) entitled to the
326
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same payments and structural funds on the basis of principles that have operated in the 
Union up until now”.332 However, when reacting to the CAP reform in the mid-term review in 
2002, which intended to sever the link between farm subsidies and farm output and in time 
equalizing subsidies throughout the enlarged EU, the party’s conditions changed. The 
equality of conditions for all European farmers, rather than absolute levels of support, became 
the most crucial condition for support.333 Although the party still considered it necessary to 
claim an anti-discriminatory pledge,334 it accepted the EU’s supranational character of 
decision- making. The Peasant Party’s essential condition for supporting the EU was that a 
level playing field between Polish and EU farmers be established.
Europe was, however, a seriously dividing issue within the party, its most conservative 
faction defending the strict interpretation of neo-agrarianism and remaining sceptic of the 
effects of integration. The progressive faction of the party revised its position on the European 
Union and the CAP’S impact in the welfare of Polish farmers. This resulted from a learning 
process which took place as Polish relations with the EU evolved. Indeed, the accession 
negotiations, as a give and take process, resulted in the party abandoning its perception of 
the CAP as a system of domination of the poor by the rich and Kalinowski’s leadership stroke 
a more rational appreciation of the CAP’S effects on the Polish peasants335
Indeed, despite its Eurosceptic faction, the PSL campaigned for a Yes in the accession 
in the referendum campaign. The party linked its support for EU accession to the issuing of a 
land turnover law that was approved just before Easter 2003 and campaigned on the slogan 
“Don’t fear the Union. We are with you!” Kalinowski stated that the accession to the EU was 
an opportunity of unifying those forces that accept integration but see it as a challenge. “We 
can equate the Polish EU accession to the mobilization (of the peasant electorate) in the
332ldem, p. 35-37.
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nineteen twenties, which permitted to ignore many differences dividing politicians and unify 
the country. I repeat, the EU does not take away our independence but it is a big, epoch- 
making challenge.”336
The Samoobrona’s European position: The left-wing parties have seen the presence 
of a Eurosceptic party for the first time after the Samoobrona’s electoral feat on the 2001 
elections. Until the 2001 parliamentary elections the Samoobrona’s position has been one of 
outright Hard Euroscepticism. The Samoobrona rejected integration on the grounds that it 
threatens “the state and the national economic sovereignty”. Lepper’s defence of the 
economically disfavoured classes led him to focus primarily on the question of Polish 
economic sovereignty, which was threatened by the “transnational corporations that want to 
eliminate the Polish economy and provoke the demise of several branches of industry and 
agriculture.337 Poland is only needed for these corporations as a “reserve of cheap labour and 
an outlet of their products”. This lethal process can only be stopped through the “cooperation 
of all true patriots”.338 Instead of European integration, Lepper and his party offered Poland an 
ambiguous concept of political and economic autarchy to which is sometimes added a pan- 
Slavic ideology.339
During the 2001 election campaign Samoobrona’s attitude towards European 
integration changed. Andrzej Lepper was less vocal in its opposition to integration; “We do not 
share the arguments of certain opponents to European integration, for whom accession to the 
Union and the submission of our laws to the European institutions is equivalent to a loss or a 
restriction of Polish independence.” Lepper’s self-declared Euro-realism meant the party’s
336 Interview with Jarostaw Kalinowski, “Kalinowski: Jednoczmy Sie Pod Sciana", (Kalinowski: W e Unite against the 
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rational judgement of the pros and contras of integration,340 but his declarations were often 
contradictory. While in January 2002 he would declare in the Sejm: ‘Today we say a square 
‘No’ to the European Union, because we cannot see that we will ever attain any real 
partnership. We see nowadays that we are at Europe’s feet, submissive to its wishes. The 
Union offers us increasingly worse conditions and the government agrees to that -  in the 
name of which interests, I dare to ask?”341 However, in April 2002 Lepper would contradict 
these declarations and proclaim: “Contrarily to the accusations spread, the Samoobrona is 
not an anti-European party. If Poland is able to negotiate equal conditions of accession to the 
EU, (...) becoming a member of the Union in the shortest time possible is, from any point of 
view, a good idea”.342 Despite the ambiguity of its positions, Lepper seems to have matched 
the abandon of nationalist rhetoric with a conditional Euroscepticism.
Analysis
This chapter tests the hypothesis that the economic ethos determines social democrats, 
agrarian and far-left parties’ attitudes towards European integration. The evolution of the 
Polish left-wing presents us with three cases in which this proposition is confirmed. The 
transformation of two regime parties, the PZPR and the ZPL into social democracy and 
agrarianism implied a redefinition of their ethos. Class and estate became not only the 
identifying concepts of the parties but also the evaluation criteria for the a priori compatibility 
between the national interest and European integration.
The SLD’s progressive evolution in the Eurosceptic-Europhile axis ensues both from its 
transformation to social democracy and from a changed perception of the EU policy regimes.
340
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In the 1997 election campaign the party’s conversion to European integration took a very 
prominent position. The Hard Europhilism of the party resulted also from the class 
cosmopolitanism on which the political ethos is based upon. The party’s programmatic 
transformation, based on the Enlightenment’s pledge of individualism and secularism 
facilitated and reinforced the party’s acknowledgment that the European Single Market 
allowed for a higher level of social protection than Poland would enjoy if joining alone the 
international market. The SLD’s recognised that new international economic conditions 
demanded a different strategy to maintain redistribution and social justice away from demand- 
side policies designed to promote full employment. The party’s Europhilism resulted in a 
progressive convergence with social democratic thinking in Europe, which proposes a 
redefinition of the redistributive role of the state.
The EU’s responsibility in the creation of a regime of regulated capitalism made the 
SLD and other social democratic parties in Europe recognise the a priori coincidence between 
national interests and European integration. Support for Social Europe became an electoral 
and internal slogan of the party, so much so that it appeared part of the party’s identity and a 
synonym to the party’s own transformation. The SLD’s Hard Europhilism ensues from seeing 
the EU as an ally in pursuing its new interpretation of social justice.
The UP’s conditional Euroscepticism derives from the commitment of the party to a 
traditional interpretation of social democracy, which not only proposes that the state should 
remain committed to policies leading to full employment but also, due to its close relations 
with the OPZZ trade union, proposes more specific “club goods” for workers. It was the 
party’s traditional interpretation of the redistributive role of the state that determined the UP’s 
Soft Euroscepticism until it joined the SLD in a governing coalition. The conditionality of UP’s 
Euroscepticism derives from the UP’s commitment to a cosmopolitan and secular political 
order.
The PSL transformation is equally interesting in the context of the ethos theory. 
Although the European position derives primarily from the party’s conception of estate, the 
nationalist definition of the political community led the party to an unconditional objection to
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European accession. The nationalism of the party’s dominant faction between 1992 and 1997 
also contributed to the party interpreting the protectionism of the Europe Agreements in 
relation to Polish agricultural products as the sign of a structural bias of the EU’s CAP against 
poor countries.
When taking over the party leadership in 1997 Jarostaw Kalinowski substantially revised 
the party’s appreciation of the impact of the CAP on the Polish peasantry. The revision was 
certainly facilitated by the progress in the relationship between Poland and the EU when 
negotiations started and a discussion on CAP reform flared up again in Brussels in 2002. 
Since the early nineties the PSL’s official line had been that support for European accession 
depended on the conditions offered to Polish farmers. However, after 1997 the party changed 
its stances regarding support for accession. In the early nineties the PSL made the defence of 
family farming a condition for support for European integration; in 1997, it considered that an 
extension of CAP in its existing form was a sufficient condition for support for European 
integration; on the eve of accession, and in the context of the debate taking place in the 2002 
CAP mid-term review, the PSL defended the position that a de-coupling of production and 
subsidies, as long as this condition ensured the equal application of conditions of farmers 
across the enlarged Europe. This stance meant that the PSL accepted that the CAP reforms 
might imply a lowering of benefits of all farmers across Europe.
The different alliances that Andrzej Lepper established with disparate ideological groups 
make it difficult to pin down the basic political and economic values of the Samoobrona. 
However, an analysis of the evolution of the last years makes it apparent that the party 
identity is mainly based on a radical conception of economic class and is constituted by those 
heavily disadvantaged by the transition. The Samoobrona can therefore be classified as an 
extreme-left party. The abandoning of its early nationalism in 1999 was translated later into a 
more conditional Euroscepticism. This appears to confirm the hypothesis that the 
downgrading of the party’s nationalist political ethos meant a less principled opposition 
towards European integration. However, the fickle character of the Samoobrona’s ideology 
makes it rather difficult to attribute the party’s European positions to a change of ideology.
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Chapter V Testing government-opposition dynamics 
as an explanation for parties’ European attitudes
This chapter tests the hypothesis that Euroscepticism is a function of parties’ 
government and opposition dynamics. The most recent contribution to the literature portraying 
parties’ positions on European integration as deriving from strategic considerations is Sitter’s 
portrayal of Euroscepticism as a function of parties’ opposition strategies.343 Sitter’s theory 
draws on metaphors of the mechanisms of party competition, in particular on the centripetal 
and centrifugal modes of competition as a way to explain variation in the rise of party-based 
Euroscepticism. Parties’ opposition strategies to the government, conceived either as a 
cartelised group of parties or simply the party in government, determine parties’ European 
stances. Parties or factions within parties pursuing a polarising strategy (centrifugal tactics) 
are prone to adopt Euroscepticism. On the contrary, parties carrying out centrist or centripetal 
strategies are prone to be Europhiles. Sitter also maintains that the timing of structuration of 
the different segments of the party system influences the undertaking of Euroscepticism.
Considering that interest-based parties obey a different logic in their attitudes towards 
European integration, Sitter provides a third category of opposition as a source of 
Euroscepticism, the opposition of interest-based parties to the state. Sitter considers that 
opposition to the state derives from Dahl’s theory of opposition, therefore belonging to the 
same broad category of party strategies of competition.344 However, excluding interest-based 
parties from the working of the main theoretical logic of centripetal/centrifugal competitive 
positions is not theoretically justified. Sitter’s theory derives essentially from Downs spatial
o a o
Sitter, N. (2001), op.cit.
160
analysis of office-seeking party competition. Even if we transform Sitter’s interest-based 
category on an orthogonal dimension, alternative to the main axis of competition,345 this 
criterion still deviates from the main theoretical proposition.
The exclusion of interest-based parties from the governmental-opposition dynamics on 
the basis of their support or opposition to the state provides an exception based in a criterion 
that is unrelated to the theory’s fundamental assumptions. Parties that are based on well- 
defined and circumscribed economic interests, such as agrarian or regional parties, are not 
expected for any fundamental reason to be significantly different from parties based on an 
economic segmentation of the electorate that is wider by definition, like the socialists or the 
liberals. Both types of parties will eventually derive their fundamental European position either 
from their evaluation of the impact of European integration on their capacity to deliver 
economic welfare to their constituencies, or from their governmental or opposition status. The 
only difference between these two types of parties is that agrarian parties do not have an a 
priori political ethos. Since these parties are generally not catch-all types, their political 
conceptions are strongly subordinated to the protection of defined economic interests. The 
criterion of opposition to the state is closer to the ideological-based explanation and cannot 
therefore be integrated in a strategic theory of party positions.
The success of a party in becoming a centre party depends on its accomplishments as 
a pivot for political groups. Opposition to the core parties originates from those opposing the 
centripetal mode of competition (polarising parties). Core parties are therefore those that 
compete in a centripetal way by acting as magnets in the main space of competition. 
Polarising parties tend to extend the axis of competition, without changing its content, by 
choosing a centrifugal mode of competition and diverging from the main party coalitions.
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Rather than attempting to create a different dimension of competition, these parties occupy 
the extremes of the existing axis.
The development of the Polish party system since the start of the democratic transition 
is a good study case for testing centripetal and centrifugal dynamics. The Polish party system 
has frequently changed throughout the last ten years. Creating parties was an extremely 
popular activity in Poland, especially before elections, partly due to the incentives created by 
the electoral system. Three critical elections can be identified in the formation of the centre 
and peripheral segments of the party system. In each election, 1993, 1997, 2001, a de­
consolidation and reconstruction of the core and the periphery of the party system took 
place.346 The classification of parties in this chapter is structured around these three elections. 
For each section there were two separate sections accounting for parties acting in a 
centripetal or in centrifugal manner. The Polish case also presents a good test of the attitudes 
of interest-based parties to European integration. The Polish Peasant Party is a typical 
interest-based party and its strategic behaviour, identity formation and positions regarding 
European integration serve as a good test case for Sitter’s category.
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Centripetal parties
Operationalising Concepts
Party centripetalism is an office-seeking strategic behaviour with the objective of gaining 
office and retaining it throughout several elections. Centripetal parties choose a mode of 
moderate competition that implies a fight for the centre position in the axis, where the majority 
of the votes are cast through the use of moderate propaganda tactics and consensual 
politics.347 Following Capoccia’s classification of anti-system parties, I classify centripetalism 
as a behavioural concept, by separating ideology from behavioural strategic considerations.348 
Centripetal parties are those that compete through the themes of the main axis of 
competition, adopt a pivotal role for coalition making, accept that role by another party or 
promote the values in which the political regime is founded. Centripetal parties are regime- 
builders and relational centrism is operationalised through a general evaluation of a party’s 
coalition and propaganda strategy, rather than its location in the ideological space. In the 
event that this axis is not yet stable, centripetal parties are those shaping it. In cases where 
the party system is overcrowded with parties, and due to the exclusivity of office, a centripetal 
strategy implies that parties assume a pivotal role in the creation of large coalitions.
Other ways of classifying competitive party strategies stem from the proposition that 
ideologies can be the source of competition within a multi-party system. In these 
classifications parties are grouped through the content of their ideology and policy positions, 
and the degree of their ideological extremism is analyzed. Traditionally, anti-democratic
347 Downs, A. (1956), op. cit.; Daalder, H. (1984), “In Search of the Center of European Party Systems", American 
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ideologies were the touchstone of anti-systemic party stances.349 However, the decline of 
explicitly anti-democratic ideologies like fascism and communism, and the difficulty in finding 
an uncontested definition of democracy, has meant that ideological anti-democracy is no 
longer a conceptual equivalent to an anti-system stance350
Classifying centripetal parties
The 1991 elections were the first fully competitive elections in Poland. They produced a 
highly polarised and unstructured party system and legislature (twenty-nine parties gained 
seats in the parliament). The governments that followed the 1991 elections were as divided 
as they were unstable. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki first served as Prime Minister, presiding over a 
centrist liberal coalition consisting of post-Solidarity forces. This coalition was increasingly 
unstable and fell two months after the September 1991 elections. In December 1991, the 
government of Jan Olszewski initially formed a minority coalition dominated by the PC and the 
ZChN. This government stalled on several policy questions, including the privatisation 
programme announced in June 1991 by the previous government. After a disastrous attempt 
to oust communist collaborators from public life, initiated by the ZChN’s leader Antoni 
Macierewicz, the Olszewski government fell in July 1992.
Olszewski’s successor, Hanna Suchocka, formed a coalition that included the PC, the 
UD and the KLD. The UD and the KLD had constituted what was called the “small coalition” 
which had opposed the previous government’s interventionist bent in the economy. The PC 
and the liberals immediately clashed over the role of the Church in public life and over 
economic liberalisation. Due to the fragmentation of the right-wing, a coalition of many parties 
was necessary to attain office, which kept alive party hopes of participating in government.
349 Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983), “Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies” in 
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This resulted in delayed differentiation of core and polarising parties.351 The confusion was 
aggravated by a multitude of very small parties which “defined themselves as the moral 
guardians of political philosophies".352
The only party that until 1993 was clearly rejected by all the other parties was the post­
communist SdRP (later the SLD). Although coming second in the elections, the party was still 
marginalized from the core of acceptable coalition partners. “For all significant parties it was 
unacceptable at that time, and continued to remain unacceptable, to enter into any open 
coalition with, or even to officially cooperate with the SdRP as the heir to the defunct 
communist party (PZPR).”353 In the 1991 elections the SdRP did not seek a place in 
government but hoped for a strong parliamentary presence.354
The 1993 elections, however, changed this state of affairs and drew the limits of the 
emerging core. Not only were the ex-communists to form a government in coalition with the 
PSL but also most right-wing parties failed to pass the newly introduced threshold. Although 
the right-wing parties had attempted to unify in view of the elections, the negotiations 
collapsed, and the right went into the elections fragmented. Of the parties comprising 
Suchocka’s coalition government, only the UD survived in a six-party Sejm. The UD and the 
BBWR, both parties retaining a firm commitment to centre-right economic policies, performed 
the core opposition to the SLD-PSL government.
The transformation of the SLD into a legitimate catch-all party started before 1989 and 
involved the consistent change of the party’s image to one of moderation, professionalism 
and parliamentary cohesion 355 This strategy was explained by one of the party reformers,
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Josef Oleksy. “We became a pragmatic party. A criticism of this today may be justified, but it 
does not mean that we could have done it otherwise in 1989. We could not, and so after the 
dissolution of the PZPR we consciously became a non-ideological, pragmatic, electoral 
party.”356 To gain its place in the centre of the party system the SdRP coalesced with a large 
number of small parties, trade unions and social organisations under the head of the SLD. 
The SLD’s transformation into a centripetal party is due to the election of a small and young 
elite group for the party leadership in January 1990. Through the acceptance of the market 
and the staking of a laic and liberal social attitude this elite controlled not only the party’s 
strategic behaviour but also the transformation of its interpretation of class, creating in this 
way an alternative to the right’s political discourse.357
The PSL as a centripetal party
The 1993 parliamentary elections also marked the PSL’s entrance into the political 
centre. Parties representing a specific constituency have a strong tradition in Poland, 
inherited from the communist past and its opposition, the Solidarity trade union. The trade 
union revived its political role as the main force behind the AWS. However, not only has this 
role been transitory, but it also seems to have deflected Solidarity from its role of representing 
the interests of workers.358 The only surviving political force of interest representation from 
communist regime was therefore the Polish Peasant Party.
Historically the representation of farmers in a predominantly rural country has been a 
contested role among Polish parties. In the early days, the once satellite of the PZPR, the 
PSL, competed for this role with the successors of Rural Solidarity, the Peasant’s Agreement 
(PL). The United Peasant Party (ZPL) obtained four out of seven cabinet posts in the
356 Quoted in Trybuna, 13 May 1996; Andrzej Potocki, quoted in Wprost. 9 June 1996.
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Mazowiecki transition government in 1990. Although the PSL was a satellite of the ZPL it 
gained acceptance and legitimacy much quicker than the SLD, partly by leaving the PZPR 
block and allowing Solidarity to gain a majority in the post-1989 parliament. The PSL’s 
effectiveness in maintaining an extensive local network, maintained through auxiliary 
organisations such as the volunteer fire-fighting brigades, helped to maintain the loyalty of 
farmers inherited from communist times.359 The party also inherited from the ZPL 
considerable financial resources, which provided another advantage for the party. In 1991 the 
PSL’s leader Waldemar Pawlak was the first choice of Lech Waf?sa for prime minister, but 
failed in forming a cabinet. During the 1991-1993 parliament the PSL was already an 
acceptable coalition partner and was integrated into the category of core parties much earlier 
than the SLD.
By 1993 the PSL, already recovered from its communist past, became the only possible 
coalition partner for the SLD. The PSL’s quick recovery of a centrist status in the party system 
resulted both from the fact that the regime divide impeded any post-Solidarity parties to form 
a coalition with the SLD360 and results also from the fragmentation of the party scene in the 
early nineties. This fragmentation “presents a standing temptation to one or other of the 
smaller opposition parties to move over, as indeed the agrarians did repeatedly in 
Scandinavia.”361 The determination to restore an image of moderation also led the PSL to re­
establish good relations with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.362 The 1993 elections 
confirmed the PSL as the farmers’ political representative when the party got 15 percent of 
the vote.
359
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Although the SdRP tried to avoid the inevitable coalition with the PSL after the victory in 
the 1993 elections,363 the ostracism to which the SLD was devoted at the time impeded 
another outcome. The relationship between the two parties was rather strained, with the PSL 
acting as a brake on reforms and “thinking only about how much it can grab for the 
peasants” 364 Nevertheless, the party reinforced its governmental status through Pawtak’s 
brief tenure as Prime Minister in 1993-1994. In the long-term, however, this might have 
tainted the party image, since its ability to answer to the grievances of the rural population 
was rather limited. Rural populations were one of the most negatively affected by the 
transition process, and the PSL failed to mitigate the population’s problems while in 
government. The belief of voters in their capacity to do so also diminished, as the decrease of 
support from 15 percent in 1993 to 7 percent of the vote in 1997 indicates.
The party’s decline in electoral support, the exclusion from government in 1997 and the 
rise of the Samoobrona meant that the party faced an increasingly difficult environment. The 
party nevertheless promoted the image of a centre party and attempted to create international 
links with parties with similar genealogies, such as the Scandinavian Centre Parties.365 After 
the 2001 elections the PSL returned to government, again as a junior partner of the SLD, but 
with much less leverage, only to lose that status in 2002.
The 1993 election results fostered the split of the coalition of the right-wing parties in 
three main formations. The right faced the next election united into two large coalitions, the 
Election Action Solidarity (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW). A smaller party, the ROP, had 
a nationalist outlook. After the 1997 election, the AWS and the UW formed a majority 
government. The core of the Polish party system seemed to be structured around a Christian, 
a liberal and a Socialist identity, and could be characterised as moderately pluralist. The AWS
363 Nasz Program dla Polski: Trzv Lata Pracv Parlamentarnei. (Our Program for Poland: Three Years of
Parliamentary Activity SLD Parliamentary Club), Warsaw: 1996, p.8.
364 Marek Borowski, resignation speech as Finance Minister, Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 February 1994.
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campaign was based on a moderate platform and made inroads into the political centre 
ground by avoiding religious fundamentalist rhetoric.366 In its early days the AWS tactics 
proved successful in promoting the moderation of political forces such as the ZChN, by 
attracting it into the political centre ground.367 The AWS electoral platform was characterized 
by a moderate support for the Church’s intervention in public life and a conservative view of 
the social order.
Later in the term, however, the conflicts within the governmental coalition increased, 
and eventually led to its dissolution in June 2000. The AWS’s internal disputes were so strong 
that the party coalition started to disintegrate, triggered by the poor electoral results of its 
leader, Marian Krzaklewski, in the 2000 presidential elections and his refusal to withdraw as 
party leader. In the run up to the 2001 elections the centrifugal forces within the right-wing 
were dominant, and were aided by the change of the electoral law to favour smaller parties. 
The dissolution of the AWS and the UW gave rise to three new parties on the right. The right- 
wing core opposition remained in this way fragmented and organised around two new parties, 
the PO and the PiS. Both parties assumed the core opposition status.
The centripetal parties’ European positions
Sitter’s argument is essentially that the difficulties caused to government by opposition 
to Europe results in Europhilism being an endogenous characteristic of centripetal strategies. 
Parties belonging to the core are deemed to adopt Euroscepticism only temporarily and when 
in opposition. Although Sitter suggests that the existence of a Eurosceptic interest-based 
party can prevent the appearance of both core and polarising parties, the theory also deems a
365 Komunikat z Miedzvnarodowei Konferencii Partii Politvcznvch. (Communique in an International Conference of
Pesant Parties), Warsaw 21-22 June 1999.
366 Szczerbiak, A. (1998), “Electoral Politics in Poland: The Parliamentary Elections of 1997”, Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics. 14(3): 58-83, p. 63.
367 Deklaracia Proaramowa ZChN. (ZChN’s Programmatic Declaration), Warsaw: May 2000.
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core party in opposition as prone to adopt Euroscepticism. This theory therefore predicts that 
parties aspiring to office will drop their opposition to Europe.
Although Polish core parties do not develop a more critical tone towards Europe when 
in opposition, a party’s centripetal strategy is associated with taking pro-European stances. 
The centripetal strategies of parties are not, however, both sufficient and necessary 
conditions for the adoption of Europhilism, but appear to be a facilitating factor in the creation 
of a centrist unified identity. The development of the centre-left SLD and the centre-right AWS 
coalitions in the wake of the 1993 and the 1997 elections illustrates that centripetal party 
strategies have better chances of succeeding when Europhile. The change of SLD’s position 
on European integration came at a time when the rhetoric of a ’’Common European Home” 
was becoming obsolete and the opposition to NATO expansion a reminder of the ex- 
communists past. Therefore, when during the 1993 election campaign the party decided to 
support accession to NATO and deemed integration as a one-time chance to access the 
centre of European economic power; this seemed to follow both its ideological transformation 
and its centripetal strategies. This decision, taken at the II Party Congress, was portrayed by 
an adviser to President Aleksander Kwasniewski as a “rational decision to complete the 
party’s transformation and increase the party’s chances of attaining office.”368 Kwasniewski’s 
advisor for European Affairs, asked about the party stance in 2000, when the support for 
accession steeply declined among the party supporters,369 declared the party’s Hard 
Europhilism to be unchangeable. ‘The party is firmly committed to European integration and 
will remain so, independently of its voters’ opinions. There is absolutely no debate about this 
stance.”370
The AWS’s political debut in the 1997 elections resulted in a unified statement of the 
right-wing forces on the EU, hailing European integration as a Christian enterprise.371
368 Author’s interview with Krysztof Szamalek, advisor of President Kwasniewski. October 2000.
369 CBOS, Support for European Accession, 2000.
370 'Author’s interview with Pawel Swioboda, advisor to President Kwasniewski on European Affairs, July 2000
371 Program Akcii Wvborczei Solidarnosc. (Electoral Program of the AWS), Warsaw: May 1997.
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However, the unity displayed during the elections did not last. Once the AWS entered office 
the party became increasingly divided on European integration. When the accession 
negotiations started, the AWS and the UW government took charge of establishing the Polish 
positions for negotiating accession with the Commission. This gave rise to a sometimes 
conflictual bargaining process within the government regarding the negotiation stances; the 
government adopted a harsh negotiating style and raised hard negotiation stances towards 
the Commission, conveying the image of a tough negotiator. The most exacerbated of such 
conflicts was related to the demand of an 18-year transition period for authorizing land 
ownership by foreigners. This position was the result of negotiations between the ZChN and 
other nationalist groups, that wanted a permanent exception for foreign ownership of Polish 
land, the rest of the AWS coalition and the UW, that favoured more flexible stances regarding 
the purchase of land by foreigners.372 Given the nationalist rhetoric of the ZChN and other 
members of the coalition, foreign ownership of land became a highly symbolic issue, fuelled 
by fears of German revanchism over the lost territories in Western Poland.
A similar position had been taken in 1991 by the Centre Alliance (PC), a predecessor of 
the AWS; the PC was cautiously supportive of integration and despite its language of defence 
of the Polish national interest and poising for hard negotiation stances, it adopted an a priori 
acceptance of the coincidence between the Polish national interest and European integration. 
The PC depicted its support for integration as a matter of raison d’Etat. The disintegration of 
the PC in the sequence of centrifugal strategies by nationalist politicians resulted in the 
party’s disintegration and the undermining of a basis for right-wing consensus on European 
integration.
Throughout its existence the UD was fully supportive of European integration, not only 
in government but also in opposition. Its opposition status did not change its Hard 
Europhilism; on the contrary, it seemed to reinforce it. Frequently during the 1993-97
372 Author’s interview with Leszek Jesieii, member of the Polish negotiating team, June 2000.
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parliament the UD politicians made pro-integration declarations in the Sejm. The successor of 
the UD, the UW, in government after the 1997 elections, entered into open conflict with the 
most clerical and nationalist sectors of the AWS, a fight most visible in the conflicts over the 
leadership of the Committee of European Integration (UKIE). After the 1997 elections the 
ZChN’s leader Rychard Czarnecki had become the Under-Secretary of state of UKIE, a post 
given to him in the attempt to convert the party to Europhilism.373 Czarnecki’s fundamental 
opposition to the process resulted in an open conflict between the ZChN and the UW.374 The 
personal conflict between Czarnecki and under-secretary of state Piotr Nowina-Konopka led 
to the eventual dismissal of the former in 1998, after the Commission withheld the attribution 
of PHARE funds to Polish projects. Different preferences of negotiation strategy were also 
one of the causes of contention within the AWS-UW coalition, and such divergences were 
one of the causes behind the break of the government coalition in June 2000375 Also it was 
while in opposition, between 1997 and 2001, that the SLD became progressively more 
assertive in its Europhilism. The party criticised the government’s demands for an 18-year 
transition period and favoured softer and more flexible negotiation stances.
The Law and Justice kept an obscure attitude on European integration, partially out of 
internal disagreements on the ideological profile, part of strategic indecision. The issue was 
the subject of several internal discussions within the party, the most important of which 
occurred during a Congress in March 2003. These discussions involved two factions: the one 
formerly belonging to the nationalist ZChN and the faction once part of the Christian 
democratic PC. The nationalist Eurosceptic faction disagreed with the Christian democratic 
leaders’ advocacy of conditional Europhilism. The party remained ambiguously opposed: its
373 Author’s interview with Piotr Nowina-Konopka, UW MP and Under-Secretary of State of UKIE, November 2000.
374Ziednoczenie Chrzesciianski Narodowe. Memorandum do Przewodniczaceao Akcii Wvborczei “Solidamosc” Pana 
Mariana Krzaklewskieao. (ZChN’s Memorandum to the President of AWS, Marian Krzaklewski), Warsaw: November
1998.
375 Author’s interview with Alan Mayhew, advisor to the Polish Government on issues of European integration, June
2000.
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support is conditional on the limitation of political integration. According to PiS the EU should 
be an intergovernmental organisation with strong redistributive policies. During the 
negotiations on the European Constitutional treaty the party strongly criticised the 
government’s agreement on giving up the voting formula gained at Nice. The party also 
opposed a Constitutional Treaty for not mentioning Christianity as the main source of 
European identity. Law and Justice’s Soft Euroscepticism is often accompanied by a rhetoric 
suggesting the protection of Polish national identity, interests and moral values within the 
European Union, but its tone appears as rather sceptical of the coincidence between Polish 
national interests and European integration. Also illustrative of the PiS’s attitudes on 
European integration is the protocol the party prepared to be attached to the Accession 
Treaty stipulating that issues like abortion and morality are out of reach of European law.
The PSL’s European stances deserve a special attention for they disprove both Sitter’s 
theoretical propositions: first, that interest parties’ support of the state, rather than the 
representation of a certain cleavage, determines their Europhilism and secondly, that 
participation in government leads to Europhile positions. The evolution of the PSL’s European 
stance does not support these two propositions by Sitter. Not only was the PSL’s pro-state 
attitude not translated into Europhilism, but the PSL’s moving from Soft Europhilism to Soft 
Euroscepticism did not coincide with its participation in government or opposition. The party, 
having integrated the core of the party system in 1993, was not restrained by this move and 
issued several anti-European declarations.
In the early nineties, underneath the general consensual statements on EU accession, 
the PSL adopted a position of conditional support regarding the benefits of opening 
agricultural markets. “Being favourable to integration of Poland in the EEC, we underline the 
need to investigate if this road does not lead us to false hopes. We should know whether 
European integration is not simply guided by principles of liberal fundamentalism.”376 The PSL
376 ■Zvwa. Bronia. Gospodaruia. Dokumentv Proaramowe. (Living, Defending, Farming), Warsaw: 1993.
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also considered that “market openness is not always good” and that the party prefers the 
formula of “Europe of the Nations”377.
The PSL’s Eurosceptic position during the 1993-97 government seems to have been 
triggered by the Europe Agreements and the shock therapy. When integrating the 
government in 1993 the PSL became particularly critical of the EU’s protectionist attitude, 
which disadvantaged Polish products, and demanded its renegotiation. The discrimination felt 
by Polish farmers had long lasting effects and set the party’s attitude towards accession 
negotiations. The party’s documents expressed an attitude of a priori disapproval of European 
integration. In 1997 this theme was still present in party declarations: “one can not tolerate the 
asymmetry privileging the EU in opening the Polish market to agricultural products.”378
From 1996 onwards the PSL formulated more precise stances, developed throughout 
the party’s prolific literature on the issue. On the one hand, as the Commission became more 
specific on the requirements for accession preparations (White Book on Accession), it 
became clearer that the PSL’s neo-agrarianism clashed with the concept of agrarian reform 
pursued by the Commission. ’While the Commission demands the increase of the size of the 
agricultural holdings, the PSL favours the maintenance of the family-based agricultural 
exploitations”.379 This interventionist policy, which should help to tackle unemployment, would 
be sustained with the help of funds from the EU.380
However, despite the objections created by neo-agrarianism, the PSL shifted slowly into 
a position of cautious Europhilism when the accession negotiations started. The party rhetoric
377
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determined that its positions towards accession should not be based on vague considerations 
but on the objective assessment of the costs and benefits of accession, in particular to 
farmers.381 This position implied that if European accession would bring economic benefits to 
Polish farmers, the party would be favourable. This implied abandoning the nationalist 
definition of its constituency as the class of small, family-sized farms to mean all the rural 
population. This same reasoning led the party to advocate a referendum on accession.382 The 
tough protection of Polish economic interests became the dominant discourse of the party. “In 
industries where liberalisation is dangerous for us the Union contests our attempts to protect 
our market. In sectors where we are not prepared and frontal competition would mean their 
liquidation we should be prepared to negotiate with realism and hard positions.”383 When the 
PSL defined that the interests of farmers were to maintain agricultural protectionism and 
increased interventionism, the fundamental condition for supporting integration was the 
extension of the CAP to Polish farmers384 “from the moment of accession, such as market 
surfaces, the structural funds and direct benefits to farmers. This means that the Polish 
farmers should acquire the same rights as most of the farmers of present member states.”385 
With such declarations the PSL articulates its Soft, conditional Europhilism.
In the early months of coalition government with the SLD in 2001 the PSL’s internal 
controversy over European integration and party identity unfolded again. Hardliners within the
381 PSL Wobec Naiwaznieiszvch Problemow Spoteczno-Gospodarczvch Kraiu. (The PSL Facing the Most Important 
Political and Economic Problems of the Country), Warsaw: November 1996.
382
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Letter of Jarostaw Kalinowski to all Leaders of Political Parties. 11 August 1998, 
Warsaw: 1998, Stanowisku VI Konaresu PSL o Sprawie Intearacii Polska z Unia Europeiska. 21 November 1998
Warsaw: 1998.
383 PSL Wobec Naiwaznieiszvch Problemow SDofeczno-Gospodarczvch Kraiu. (The PSL Facing the Most Important 
Political and Economic Problems of the Country), Warsaw: November 1996.
384
V Konares PSL. Dokumentv Proaramowe. (V PSL Congress), Warsaw: June 1997; VI Konaresu PSL. (VI PSL 
Congress), 21 November 1998, pk. 8; VII Konares Polskieao Stronnictwa Ludoweao Dokumentv Proaramowv. (VII 
Congress PSL, Programatic Documents), Warsaw: March 2000.
385 VII Konares Polskieao Stronnictwa Ludoweao. Dokumentv Proaramowv. (VII Congress of PSL, Programatic 
Documents), Warsaw: March 2000.
175
party were weary on trying to conciliate their position as coalition partners with the SLD’s pro- 
Europeanism and soft negotiation stances on land issues. The moderate stance prevailed 
again over the nationalist wing of the party. The PSL’s leadership reinforced the attitude that 
they were “not expecting a preferential treatment, just conditions that make possible the 
development of Poland in all sectors”386. Jarostew Kalinowski, party leader and Minister of 
Agriculture, developed a more flexible position by declaring that what is essential for the party 
is a “level playing field” between Polish and EU farmers, not necessarily direct subsidies from 
the EU. This position seems more flexible and conciliatory in view of the expected CAP 
reform, which intends to sever the link between farm subsidies and farm output, in time 
equalising subsidies throughout the enlarged EU.387
The PSL’s shift between Europhilism and Euroscepticism does not seem to derive from 
cycles of government and opposition, nor from support and opposition to the state. From its 
inception, the PSL has been the most etatist of the Polish parties, in particular as regards the 
strengthening of the duties of the state as a redistributive agent towards farmers. The party’s 
shift from Soft Europhilism to Hard Europhilism, and back, does not match the governmental 
cycles of the PSL; on the contrary it goes against them and seems to be rather a result of a 
learning process on the meaning of the CAP.
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Polarising parties
Capoccia defines polarising parties through the disentanglement of Sartori’s definition of 
anti-system parties, by downplaying the ideological aspects of the concept. Capoccia’s more 
refined typology of party behaviour combines ideological and relational aspects of the concept 
and offers a new variant of anti-system party, the polarising party. Although not ideologically 
anti-systemic, the polarising party is defined by its opposition to the party system centre. The 
assessment of relational anti-systemness is based on a general evaluation of a party’s 
coalition and propaganda strategies, rather than its location in the ideological space.
A polarising party “adopts isolationist strategies, tends to build a separate pole of the 
system, refuses to enter coalitions (at the national level) and resorts to outbidding 
propaganda tactics, systematically opposing and discrediting some founding values of the 
regime, on which all other parties agree.”388 Contrary to the typical anti-system party, which 
combines location and ideological anti-systemness, i.e. an incompatibility with the democratic 
ideological referents, the polarising party does not present a clear cut opposition to 
democratic values.
One chief consequence of the unstructured nature of the Polish party system is that 
many parties could aspire to be part of the government. This incentive resulted in polarising 
parties tempering their criticism of the government, their propaganda tactics and their 
alliances so as to remain acceptable as coalition parties. Until 1997 it was difficult to 
distinguish between polarising and centre parties in the Polish party system. The classification 
of parties therefore follows the assessment of the parties’ medium-term strategies rather than 
their punctual actions or declarations.
388 Capoccia, G. (2002), “Anti-System Parties, a Conceptual Reassessment”, Journal of Theoretical Politics. 14(1 ):9-
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Classifying polarising parties
The KPN status as a polarising party is undisputed. Known for its penchant for direct 
action, in 1991 the KPN’s Chairman Leszek Moczulski was excluded from the government 
coalition because of the concessions he demanded for entering the Bielecki government. 
Although participating in the Olszewski government in 1992, Moczulski quickly decided to 
leave it, hoping to benefit from his absence from government to mobilise social discontent in 
subsequent elections.389 The success of such strategy led to a rise in popularity in 1992, at 
which moment the party attempted to take a more centrist outlook and retreat from alliances 
with the ultra-nationalist right.390 While the KPN avoided the involvement with more radical 
nationalist parties, during the 1993 election campaign the party’s extreme propaganda tactics 
involved defaming other parties, especially the governmental ones.
The ZChN’s polarising statute is more difficult to assess. The party was very radical in 
its opposition to the separation of the church and the state and its support to the 
“Christianisation of political life”, placing itself in the extremes of the main axis of competition. 
However, it participated in almost all right-wing governments until 1993 and this had a 
moderating effect on its rhetoric and behaviour. Once in government, the party’s behaviour 
was more mixed. The responsibility of the ZChN’s leader, Antoni Macierewicz, in provoking 
the fall of the Olszewski government, where he served as Justice Minister, gives the party an 
image of an unreliable force.391 However, during the Suchocka’s government the ZChN, 
although routinely torpedoing proposals they saw as “antifamily”, anti-Church or too liberal, 
attempted to establish itself as a core party, by remaining loyal in votes that did not imply 
sacrificing the party’s Christian Values. When the vote of confidence in the government was
389 Millard, F. (1994), “The Polish Parliamentary Election of September 1993”, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies. 27(3): 295-314.
390 Prazmowska, A. (1995), ‘The New Right in Poland", in Cheles, L. Ferguson, R. et. al. The Far Right in Western 
and Eastern Europe. London, Longman.
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lost by one vote, the ZChN Member of Parliament that voted against the government was 
immediately dismissed392. The drive for office seems to have guided the party to more 
moderate political stances. “Whatever our ideology, the ZChN politicians have always been 
flexible enough to make cooperation with the centre-right a priority. This implied leaving 
behind extremists like Antoni Macierewicz or Jan topuszanski”.393
The defeat of the right in the 1993 elections was partly due to the personal 
antagonisms. The unwillingness of the KPN, the ZChN and Jan Olszewski’s Movement for the 
Republic (RdR) to cooperate resulted in the exclusion of these parties from parliament. 
Although altogether the right-wing did not lack popular support, the fragmentation of the right- 
wing scene led to the fact that only the KPN passed the threshold for representation in the 
Sejm. After the 1993 elections the KPN adopted a more pro-church rhetoric, in its attempt to 
occupy the space of the Catholic nationalist right. Only after Kwasniewski’s victory over 
Wat?sa in the presidential elections of 1995, did the right successfully started to mobilise to 
defeat the ex-communist SLD with a unified party.
The rebirth of the nationalist right resumed with the foundation of ROP as an anchor of 
this sector in 1996. Jan Olszewski’s success in the presidential elections was a building block 
for the constitution of the party. The ROP’s entry in the political scene mobilized the remaining 
players on the right, who formed a broad coalition around the Solidarity trade union, the AWS. 
Small parties faced the choice of joining one or the other group. The ZChN, despite its earlier 
clericalism and nationalism, opted for joining the AWS, committing itself to a more consensual 
behaviour, and thus joined the group of core parties. As a result of this move, the party 
eventually expelled the most extremist and uncompromising elements, like Jan topuszanski, 
who created of a new parliamentary group, the Polish Agreement (PP), on an ultra-Catholic
Q^1
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and nationalist ticket.394 The PP set itself clearly against the core of politics. “In the last 
elections, Poles voted but did not choose. Whether they support the left, the centre or the 
right -they supported the same security, foreign and economic policies. Elections do not bring 
change. The PP wants to give the Poles the possibility of authentic choice.”395
Attempts of cooperation between the AWS and the ROP, be it in the form of pre- 
electoral or post-electoral coalitions, failed on tactical and ideological grounds.396 Contrary to 
the AWS, the ROP showed signs of extremist propaganda tactics during the Constitutional 
debate in 1997.397 In the run up to the 2001 elections the ROP initially joined the AWSP, only 
to leave it shortly before the elections. After refusing advances from Lech Kaszynski’s PiS, 
Jan Olszewski and some followers joined the extremist LPR.398
The 2001 elections gave rise to a polarised pluralist system399 by giving parliamentary 
representation to two polarising parties of a left and right character. The ultra-clerical and 
nationalist ideology of the LPR is not a new phenomenon in Poland. Although it is primarily 
the project of a newcomer, the 31-year old Roman Giertych, it counts Jan Olszewski, Antoni 
Macierewicz and Jan Lopuszanski within its ranks. The novelty in this parliament was that the 
ideological space was extended by the success of the Samoobrona and its transformation 
into a radical left-wing party. Since 1992 Lepper has organised mass protest meetings of 
different kinds, rallies, stay-in demonstrations in public buildings, blockades of public roads 
demanding the clearing of peasants' debts, cheap credits, and a ban on import of foreign
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foodstuffs. The Samoobrona’s behaviour in parliament, which included slandering several of 
the SLD’s and the PO’s politicians, left no doubt of the polarising status of the Samoobrona. 
The party’s propaganda tactics are in total opposition to the “status quo”.
The European positions of polarising parties
The most established use of Euroscepticism relates to the logic of polarisation, since 
Euroscepticism is seen as a way to mark opposition to the main parties’ cartel, the so-called 
“touchstone of dissent”400. Sitter predicts that polarising parties will more easily adopt 
Eurosceptic rhetoric if the core parties and the territorial, value or interest-based opposition 
follow a consensual policy on European affairs at the moment of the polarising parties’ 
formation. This consensus creates an incentive for new political forces to exploit the issue.
Although the consensus on European policy in the early years of democratisation 
appeared strong, a careful analysis of parties’ attitudes on European integration shows a 
different picture. There were two proximate causes for the raising of critical voices and 
discussions on European integration. First, the negotiation of the Europe Agreements in 1990 
and 1991, when the level of market openness in crucial areas such as steel and agriculture 
was set, resulted on an unfavourable outcome for some of the most important areas of the 
Polish economy.401 Second, the proposal of the Commission to integrate Polish regions into 
an European cross-border region was portrayed as an attempt to erode Polish territorial 
integrity.
The KPN’s manifestoes do not mention the issue of European integration, and the 
difficulty to discuss European integration using a political language owing to the party’s
400 Taggart, P. (1998), “A Touchstone of Dissent”, op.cit.
401 Mayhew, A. (1998), Recreating Europe, the European Union’s Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 21-3.
Pttsudskist ideology seems to be at the origin of such lacuna. The party thus did not seem to 
make sense of its position towards integration, which made it difficult for the leaders to 
produce any statements on European integration.
The ZChN was the first party to become critical of the terms of the Europe Agreements 
in 1991, despite its participation in governmental coalitions. ‘The EU is egoistic since it did not 
help Poland to overcome the crisis by opening trade in the most important areas for the Polish 
products”.402 The party also revolted against the Euro-Regions project, portraying it as an 
attempt to divide Poland and to threaten its sovereignty. “One should not force the integration 
of Poland as quickly as possible in the EU.”
A change in the party stance was visible in the run-up to the 1997 elections. Facing the 
choice of integrating two right-wing blocks, the ROP and AWS, the ZChN chose the later. This 
decision resulted in the change of the party leader, with Marian Pilka replacing Rychard 
Czarnecki.403 The ZChN’s integration in the AWS coalition led the party to take several steps 
aimed at making the party an acceptable coalition partner. The party expelled its most 
extremist Eurosceptic members, such as Jan topuszanski who created the PP. Campaigning 
for the Presidency in 2000 topuszanski rejected integration to preserve Polish sovereignty.404 
The party also ended up marginalising Rychard Czarnecki, after he was dismissed as 
Secretary of State of UKIE due to its Eurosceptic practices. Even though the prevailing faction 
in the party was a moderate one, the abandon of a fundamentally Eurosceptic position 
derived from the nationalist ethos of the party. After the pro-European interpellation of John 
Paul II in the Sejm the party issued a programmatic declaration in which he stated: “with filial 
love and respect we heard the words of our Saint Father John Paul II in the Polish parliament. 
We decided to support the construction of the European Community under certain
402 Program Wvborczv Ziednoczenia Chrzesciiansko-Narodoweao. (ZChN’s Electoral Program), 1993.
403 Fedorowicz, H. “Marian Pilka Zastqpil Ryszarda Czarneckiego”, (Marian Pilka replaces Ryczard Czarnecki), 
Rzeczpospolita. 26 February 1996
404 Program Wvborczv Kandvdata na Prezvdenta RP Jana Lopuszanskieao. Wvbieram Niepodleala Polske. 
(Electoral Program of the Candidate to the Polish Presidency, Jan Lopuszanski, W e Choose an Independent 
Poland), Warsaw: 2000.
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conditions.”405 These conditions were the “maintenance of the concept of Europe of the 
Nations as the guiding principle” and the observance of “Christian rules”. For these objectives 
the party would be ready to support European integration.
In 1993 Olszewski’s RdR demanded the renegotiation of the Europe Agreements, 
assuming an uncompromising tone when calling for the protection of national economic 
interests in relation with the EU, in particular the protection of internal agricultural market406 
The RdR was equally critical of the “dictates of international organizations”, and supported the 
concept of “Europe of the Nations”. Olszewski’s attitude became more explicit in 1996 with 
the creation of ROP, which he defined as a Eurorealist party 407 In its founding declarations 
“Agreement with Poland” the ROP demanded that integration takes place only as a 
partnership project. The ROP started to advocate tough conditions for Polish accession408 
This attitude was especially directed at protecting agriculture and was formulated at the time 
when 80 percent of the population supported Poland’s accession bid.409 The ROP’s European 
attitude opened the way for the clear rejection of integration on the basis of sovereignty.
It was however, the 2001 elections that established the consolidation of parliamentary 
party-based Euroscepticism. Both the LPR and the Samoobrona opposed integration, but on 
different grounds. While the Samoobrona’s position is essentially based on the assumption 
that the EU is the instrument of a liberal conspiracy of rich countries, the LPR campaigns on 
sovereignty issues, for example claiming that EU law overrules Polish legislation.410 The LPR
405
Deklaracia Proaramowa ZChN. (ZChN’s Programatic Declaration), Warsaw: May 2000.
406 Koalicia dla Rzeczvpospolitei. Materiafv Wvborcze. (Electoral Material, KLR), Warsaw: June 1993
407 Umowa z Polska. (Agreement with Poland ), Warsaw: May 1996.
408 Zatozenia Proaramowe Spoteczno-Gospodarcze Odbudowv Kraiu. (Socio-Economic Program for the 
Reconstruction of the Country), Warsaw: November 1996.
RFE/RL Newsline, 6 August 1996.
410 Author’s interview with Mariusz Daca, UKIE’s official in charge of relations with the Polish Sejm on issues of law 
harmonization, July 2002.
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ran a campaign against integration denouncing the supremacy of European Law over the 
Polish Constitution.
Analysis
This chapter tests a modified version of Sitter’s governmental-opposition dynamics as 
the primary determinant of a party’s choice between Euroscepticism and Europhilism. Testing 
the Polish case leads us to think that government-opposition dynamics are not primary 
determinants of parties’ European positions.
The intention to integrate the core of the party system and occupy office seems to have 
encouraged the SLD’s change of attitude towards the EU before 1993. The AWS positioning 
as a pro-European force in 1997 can also be related to the coalition’s office-seeking strategy. 
The moderation of the ZChN’s nationalism, through the addition of a neo-liberal economic 
ethos when joining the AWS, fits the party’s transformation associated with a centrist profile. 
Centripetal strategies lead parties to move from Euroscepticism to Europhilism, effectively 
suspending their ethos. However, the suspension of a party’s ethos does not last long. While 
in office some nationalists were confronted with the dilemma between its principled opposition 
to integration and the expected role demanded by their office position. A case in point is that 
despite its Euroscepticism, Prime Minister Jan Olszewski signed the Europe Agreements in 
1992. However, the different attitudes within his party, the PC, ultimately led to the secession 
of its nationalist factions and the creation of the Eurosceptic RdR in 1993.
The empirical material on the Polish case shows that parties in government do adopt 
anti-European stances, even if they experience severe tensions as a result of these stances. 
The ZChN and the PSL’s stances exemplify this stance; the disintegration of the AWS 
partially testifies to the tensions arising from Eurosceptic positions. This confirms the ethos 
theory of parties’ European positions and relegates office-seeking strategies to the place of a 
mediating factor, neither sufficient nor necessary for a certain party European position. The 
Polish case also does not support the inference that core parties in opposition adopt a more
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accentuated Eurosceptic attitude. No core parties in opposition adopt or reinforce their 
Euroscepticism, although it is difficult to test this proposition extensively since Polish parties 
tend to disintegrate after an electoral defeat. In cases where they did not disintegrate, core 
parties in opposition have intensified their support for Europe, as in case of the PSL and the 
SLD after 1997 and the liberals between 1993 and 1997.
Euroscepticism and the consolidation of the party system centre
Sitter’s propositions on the timing of the segmentation of the party system and its 
impact on parties’ Euroscepticism are partially confirmed, but again these results seem to be 
mediated by the political identities of the new political parties. Sitter’s theory predicts that 
polarising parties adopt Euroscepticism only if, at the time of their formation, the core and 
interest based parties display a low level of Euroscepticism. The absence of a consolidated 
centre-right leaves the space for polarising Eurosceptic parties. However, although the 
absence of a centre party accounts for one less constraint on the moderation of radical party 
identities, the creation of polarising Eurosceptic parties has been based on available political 
identities incompatible with European integration. Although their names and organizations 
have varied throughout the last ten years, most of the polarising parties kept elements of their 
ideology and their membership from earlier parties.
The European positions of interest-based parties
The PSL’s position in the party system seems to confirm Sitter’s suggestion that 
interest-based parties have the potential to influence the European positions of other parties. 
According to this assumption, the PSL’s Euroscepticism between 1993 and 1997 would 
impede other centre parties from adopting an anti-European stance. However, the ROP, a 
Eurosceptic party was formed at that time. Moreover, Sitter’s suggestions regarding the 
origins of Euroscepticism in interest-based parties do not hold true in the Polish case. The 
PSL’s anti-Europeanism can be attributed neither to an anti-state stance nor to a centrifugal
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strategy. Opposition to the state or to government is not responsible for the PSL’s 
Euroscepticism. The PSL’s European stance seems to result from the party’s ethos, i.e., on 
the evaluation of the impact of integration on its constituency. In fact the PSL moved into a 
position of cautious Europhilism, dependent on the terms of accession for Polish agriculture, 
with special emphasis on the achievement of a “level-playing field” among European farmers.
While the first category of opposition to government, i.e. the anti-government strategy of 
a party that is fundamentally centrist but is temporarily out of government, appears to be 
definitely unfit to account for parties’ choices of European attitudes, the second category of 
opposition, i.e., the polarising behaviour of parties permanently excluded from governmental 
coalitions appears associated with Eurosceptic positions.
However, the test of Sitter’s theory shows that the relationship between these strategies 
and European integration is rather complex. The fact that all polarising parties are 
Eurosceptic, but not all Eurosceptic parties display a centripetal behaviour leads us to think 
that competitive behaviour is endogenously related to parties’ European attitudes. The 
relationship between the three variables, competitive behaviour, party ethos and parties’ 
European attitudes is reciprocal.
The testing of Sitter’s theory led us to issue a hypothesis of the relationship between 
parties’ positions and European integration, presented in the theoretical chapter and tested in 
the following chapter. Although the party family theory overrides the government-opposition 
dynamic, the creation of core and polarising segments depends on the parties’ ethos and on 
the compatibility between these and European integration. The reciprocity between the three 
variables of European integration is therefore the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter VI Testing the new strategic hypothesis
This chapter tests the hypotheses that party strategy is not a necessary condition, and 
in the long-run is not a sufficient condition, for determining a party’s European positions. In 
the short-run, however, party strategy can be sufficient to condition a party’s European 
positions. This is because in the short-run parties can signal both their readiness to integrate 
government with a Europhile position, and their opposition to the government with a 
Eurosceptic position. In the long-run, however, this position will be reversed if parties do not 
reassess their appreciation of the compatibility between their goals and European integration.
Despite the problems that Euroscepticism creates for governmental parties, a centrist 
strategy is in the long-run neither sufficient nor necessary for a party to sustain a Europhile 
position. In the long-run the parties’ basic conceptions bind their European positions, 
therefore the compatibility between parties’ conceptions of the political and economic ethos 
and parties’ European positions are necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the 
choice between parties European attitudes.
The European multilevel system of governance makes Eurosceptic parties an odd-fit in 
government. However, since parties can only sustain support for European integration if they 
consider it congruent with their conception of the political and the economic community, a 
strategic-driven attempt to resolve the tensions between Euroscepticism and centripetal 
strategies will only be successful if it prompts a revision of the assessment of European policy 
regimes. The resilience of the definition of political and economic communities engraved in 
parties’ ethos constrains this re-evaluation.
The ability to remain at the centre of the party system through an alteration of their 
European positions depends on parties’ ability to re-evaluate the relation between their 
political and economic conditions and European integration. Since political concepts derive 
from a moral conception of human nature, responses to European integration of parties based 
on political ethos are, due to the non-quantifiable nature of the political conceptions, both
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unconditional and unchangeable. This makes European supranational authority a problematic 
issue for parties based on the nation. Economic concepts translate in more prosaic issues 
amenable to quantification; therefore, parties based on an economic ethos can reassess the 
relationship between their goals and the European policy regimes.
In party systems where the constituent parts argue as to whether and, if so, how market 
inequalities should be compensated, conflicts over European integration will tend to be less 
permanent and intense because of the conditional nature of their European attitudes and the 
changing European policy regimes. In party systems where the predominant competition is 
over the definition of the political community, conflicts on European integration are to be more 
entrenched and intense. The impossibility of changing the interpretation of a political concept 
makes Eurosceptic and Europhile positions unconditional and unchangeable. In the context of 
European integration nationalism appears an even more divisive force and restrains the 
possibilities of alliances of these parties.
Testing the hypotheses
In this chapter I demonstrate the different dynamics between European positions, ethos 
and strategies of parties based on a political ethos or on an economic ethos. These 
differences are exemplified by showing the interaction between the European issue and the 
creation of centre-left and centre-right parties. While on the right the persistence and 
increased importance of nationalism, a sufficient and necessary condition of Hard 
Euroscepticism, meant that parties’ European positions and competitive strategies were 
incongruent, on the left the interaction between centripetal considerations, party ethos and the 
development of European economic regimes facilitated the creation of a centre-left party. The 
process of accession to the EU made nationalism more divisive. Thus, nationalist parties’ 
objections to European integration made their presence in governing coalitions also more 
troublesome. These parties’ Euroscepticism became the touchstone of their dissent towards 
liberal and Christian democratic coalition partners. On the left, the transformation to European
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social democracy was made smoother by European accession.
This chapter spells out the effects of the interaction between the three sets of variables, 
thus proposing that Europeanization implies heavy constrains on the ideological formation of 
centre parties, and consequently, on the structuration of the party system. The success and 
failure of parties’ long-term change of European attitudes has implications for their ability to 
create a stable centre party and be a constitutive element of governing coalitions. The 
predominance of parties’ ethos as permanent elements of competition means that strong 
limits are imposed on the Europeanization of party systems.411
A further illation of the ethos theory is that constrains posed by an economic and 
political ethos vary with the different flexibility of economic and political concepts. While class 
benefits are divisible and quantifiable and the European policy regimes evolve, the nation is 
by nature non-divisible and unquantifiable and the nature of supranational political integration 
set. Therefore, while left-wing parties, based on economic concepts, can change their 
appreciation of evolving European policy regimes, right-wing parties’ European attitudes 
based on political concepts are immovable in their appreciation of European integration.
The first section of this chapter explains the failure to create a centre-right party by 
pointing to the divisive effects of a nationalist definition of the political community in the 
context of Europeanization. Nationalism was a structural impediment to the creation of a 
broad-based party, more so because it resulted in Euroscepticism, which made governing 
difficult. The attempts of the Polish right-wing illustrates that the creation of sizeable centre 
parties implies not only coalition choices but also that coalescent parties find an ideological 
common denominator compatible with the values informing the process of integration.
The study of nationalist parties shows that the threat posed by the EU to national 
sovereignty is the underlying determinant of a party’s choice of European position. 
Nationalists therefore face the dilemma of changing their identifying core values or remaining 
a hazardous force in government. The definition of a political community establishes the
189
party’s Euroscepticism and the party’s exclusion from governmental coalitions.412 The 
exclusion from the centre gives parties little choice but to resort to polarising behaviour.
The failure to create a Polish broad-based right-wing party illustrates how the nature of 
nationalist concepts determines parties’ European attitudes and in the long-run limits their 
choice of strategy. Regardless of the centrist strategies of some of the Polish right-wing 
parties, the resilience of parties’ nationalism determines the party’s sceptical attitude towards 
European integration. The resilience of nationalism and Euroscepticism is significant because 
it hinders these parties’ aspirations to office. It appears that, in the long run, ideology is 
stronger than office and electoral considerations in determining the party’s attitude towards 
European integration even if this seriously hinders a party’s competitive changes. Eurosceptic 
parties in government have maintained an a priori incompatibility between European 
integration and the national interest.
The second section of this chapter analyses the interaction between left-wing parties’ 
European stances, economic ethos and competitive strategies. The quantifiable nature of 
economic concepts and the changing nature of European economic policy regimes results in 
a change of left-wing parties’ European attitudes. The accession to the EU provided for a 
synergetic relationship between the office-seeking strategies of some parties, the choice of 
economic ethos and the party’s European attitudes. A particularly successful case was that of 
ex-communist parties’ transformation to social democracy.
411 Ragin, C. (1987), The Comparative Method: Moving Bevond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p.99.
412 This has been made clear by many authors, especially neo-realists, that see integration as an exclusive 
enterprise of governments. Moravsik, A. (1993), “Preferences and Power in the European Community -  a Liberal 
Intergovernm ental Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies. 31(4); Sitter, N. (2001), op.cit.
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The creation of a centre-right party: the dichotomy 
between nationalism and European integration
The effectiveness of a nationalist identity in forming a party’s opposition to the 
European project is clearly illustrated by those Polish nationalist parties that, following both 
centripetal and centrifugal competitive strategies (see chapters III and V), maintained a 
coherent opposition to further European integration. The Polish nationalists show that a 
competitive strategy is in the long-run neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
parties’ European positions. Despite their continuous attempts to participate in governing 
coalitions, nationalist parties were not able to maintain their declared support for European 
integration, and, in the context of accession to the European Union, became particularly 
divisive elements within the governmental coalitions. Despite the strategic-driven attempt to 
make national conceptions of the political community compatible with European integration, 
nationalist parties remained Eurosceptic.
The limits imposed by basic identities on the Europeanization of party systems is clearly 
illustrated by the interaction between the three variables in the attempt to unify the right-wing 
in a viable party, first around the PC and, in the 1997-2001 period, the AWS. The appearance 
of a polarising nationalist party, the LPR, reflects the eventual marginalisation of nationalism 
in the Polish party system, this not being matched, however, by the creation of a stable 
centre-right party. This section depicts the failed attempts of right-wing leaders in overcoming 
ideological differences, and in particular in muting the Euroscepticism of nationalists.
Literature on this issue has called attention to the fact that parties are subject to a 
learning process that allows them to compete in a centrist way, independently of ideology or 
party system format.413 The exclusivity of public office implies that parties competing in a
413 Daalder, H. (1984), “In Search of the Center of European Party Systems”, American Political Science Review. 
78(1): 92-109.
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centripetal manner are prepared to change their ideologies by diluting or totally muting issues 
that prevent cooperation with other parties. This process demands that centrist parties “find 
compromises, reach agreements and eventually collude in order to find the party profile that 
best serves the overall common interests of governmental competitiveness”.414 A virtuous 
spiral would see the party system unify and stabilise around a number of ideological options 
and party organisations by agreeing to silence political competition on a number of issues.
My analysis of the Polish right-wing coalition formation between 1991 and 1993, and of 
the AWS experiment between 1997 and 2001, considers how the failure to create a unified 
centre-right party impacts on the smaller parties’ European positions. Although a Christian 
democratic party appeared a good basis for a unified centre-right party415 every attempt to 
base a centre party on a Catholic identity eventually failed and resulted in an unusually high 
number of Eurosceptic nationalist formations. Many Polish right-wing unifiers saw Christian 
democracy as the profile that best expressed the common identity of centre-right parties and 
one that could earn the trust of voters. Christian democracy combines the appeals of 
Catholicism and social protection of the family, both respected institutions in Poland416 
Religious affiliation remained the most important determinant of voting behaviour and a CBOS 
poll in the late eighties revealed that 44 percent of the Poles accepted Christian democracy 
as a desirable centre-right ideology while only 24 percent of the respondents rejected it.
The failure of Christian democracy fuelled the historical persistence of nationalist parties 
and eventually resulted in a high number of Eurosceptic parties. The result was 
insurmountable ideological divergences, the use of nationalism by central figures in electoral 
or governmental coalitions and the demise of parties attempting to unify the centre-right. The 
persistent power of nationalism in Poland is not surprising. Nationalism is the strongest
414 Bartolini, S. (2000), “Collusion, Competition and Democracy, Part II”, Journal of Theoretical Politics. 12(1):33-65
415 Wuthnow, R. (1989), Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
416 Kitschelt, H. (1999), “Post-Communist Party Systems”, op. cit.
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endogenous political ideology in Poland. The legacies of romantic and Catholic nationalism 
took root in the XIX and early XX century Polish history. During communism, Dmowski’s and 
Piteudski’s ideologies were the main source of right-wing opposition to the repressive 
Moscow-led communist party. From the early days of the democratisation process, several 
parties competed for the role of guardians of nationalist values. The messianic nationalist 
legacy of Dmowski assigns Poland with a special role in the European order: Poland should 
become the missionary in charge of the Christianisation of the continent.417 By their own 
account, the Pitsudskist independentist legacy was no less radical in claiming that the highest 
priority of any Pole should be the defence of their fatherland’s independence. Therefore, the 
priority of a Pitsudskist is to fight any threat to Polish independence, whatever form it may 
take. Such a mission is hardly easily transformed into pragmatic objectives, be they of 
economic or social order, and therefore these legacies have been the basis for 
uncompromising behaviour418
1991-1993 Governmental coalitions
The highly fragmented parliament resulting from the 1991 elections provided the context 
for the first attempts at right-wing coalition formation in Polish democracy. The high number of 
coalescing parties partly explains the difficulty in finding a compromise among parties, while 
ideological differences also explains the incapacity of governmental coalitions to unify.
417 Dmowski, R. (1953), Mvsli Nowoczesneao Polaka (Thoughts of a Modem Pole), London: Koto Mtodych 
Stronnictwa Narodowego.
418 Walicki, A. (2000), “The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski”, East European Politics and Societies. 14(1): 12-
46.
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The Olszewski government
The Solidarity split between liberals and nationalists orchestrated by Lech Wat?sa 
before the 1991 elections did not impede their governmental coalition. Immediately after the 
1991 elections a short-lived government coalition led by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki attempted to 
join nationalists and liberals. However, the experiment quickly collapsed when the parties 
involved failed to agree on several economic and political policy stances issues.
When Jan Olszewski reconvened negotiations to establish a grand coalition in the 
Sejm, ideological coherence again won over office-seeking strategic considerations and the 
two post-Solidarity liberal parties, the UD and the KLD were excluded. These parties had 
formed a “small coalition” and spelt out their principles for coalition with the remaining seven 
parties.419 Despite the willingness to bridge the differences in economic policy between the 
two groups, the negotiations fell through on 22 April 1992 when Olszewski refused to make 
any changes in the cabinet 420 Olszewski declared that his decision had been based on the 
attempt to prevent his government from “decomposing”.421 In fact this meant that Olszewski 
was determined to keep the identity of its government by excluding the liberal UD or the KLD. 
The Olszewski government was to be a minority government of the PC, the ZChN and PL.
The government acquired a divisive and combative style and concentrated on symbolic 
issues such as lustration, i.e., the process of excluding communist collaborators from public 
life. Lustration can be interpreted as part of a nationalist agenda in the context of the Polish 
democratic transition from communism. Much more was at stake than the question of past 
collaboration. Indeed, the conflict seemed to centre on the nature of the Polish state. The 
project of the nationalist right-wing was to create a national political community of which the 
ex-communists were excluded. The nation’s natural historic progression should resume from
419 Sabbat-Swidlicka, A. (1992), “Poland’s Two Camps Specify Terms for Grand Coalition”, RFE/RL Research 
Report. 1(18).
420 Sabbat-Swidlicka, A. (1992), “Poland: Weak Government, Fractious Sejm, Isolated President”, RFE/RL Research 
Report. 1(15).
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where it had been forced off course in 1939. Moved by moral revulsion at the communist 
system and a sense of justice denied, Olszewski and his allies argued that communism was 
an alien period that should be excised from Polish history, its perpetrators punished and its 
victims rewarded. Judging from the rhetoric, lustration was a nation-building task and a 
patriotic duty. On the other hand, liberal politicians, prompted both by pragmatism and a civic 
vision that the political community should include the willing and not the deserving, argued 
that communism had left an indelible mark on Polish society.
The Olszewski government illustrates the opposing logics of nationalist ideology and 
governmental imperatives. After five trying months the government fell following the 
elaboration of a list of supposed collaborators with the communist regime put up by the 
interior minister Antoni Macierewicz, a list which included several well-known Solidarity 
activists, and aimed to ban them from taking office. The government was brought down by a 
vote of confidence supported by the liberal parties of the “small coalition” and the SLD. 
Olszewski’s priorities in government are also a good illustration of how nationalism narrows 
the possibilities of coalition between right-wing parties. The government’s reformist mission 
against the political prominence of forces associated with the communist system meant that 
UD politicians, by having “collaborated” with the communists and taken part in the Round 
Table agreements, were considered evil. During the vote of confidence on the government on 
4 July 1993, Olszewski declared that the vote would help to determine to “whom Poland 
belongs”.422
The Suchocka’s government
Although for many analysts it had seemed impossible to create a wider coalition than 
the one achieved by Olszewski on 4 July 1992, while in the Sejm parties were still
421 Rzeczpospolita. 12 June 1992.
422 Rzeczpospolita. 5 June 1992.
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acrimoniously discussing the Macierewicz List, representatives of the warring parties met over 
a period of nineteen hours. A coalition whose main components were the UD and the ZChN 
was put together with the help of the trade unionists from Solidarity under the direction of 
Hanna Suchocka, a technocrat from the UD. Although the presence of the ZChN and the UD 
in the same coalition was a surprise for many, the fact is that ZChN had since the Bielecki 
government attempted to downplay nationalism and adopted a centripetal strategy aiming at 
taking office. The pragmatism of its leadership made it possible for the party, although having 
claimed a radical version of Catholic nationalism as its ideology, to ally with the most liberal 
parties. The PC’s opting out during the negotiations marked a turning point in the coalition 
patterns of the right. By failing to find an agreement with the liberals, the PC’s leaders 
decisively relinquished their role as the pivotal element of the right.
The Suchocka’s coalition formula was based on a truce between the secular liberals of 
the Democratic Union and the Catholic nationalists of the ZChN. The limits of this formula 
were that if the government would lean too far either left or right on social, economic or 
political questions, this would antagonize one of the major coalition partners, thereby 
undermining the government from within. Although the liberals were careful in avoiding 
antagonising the nationalists, the ZChN’s hard line factions did not play along with the party’s 
leadership and consistently torpedoed projects considered as anti-family or anti-national. This 
revealed the limits of the party’s ideological transformation. The absence of two ZChN 
members on the vote of confidence that brought down the coalition on 31 May 1993 by one 
vote therefore came as no surprise.
The 1993 elections: further fragmentation
Parliament’s dissolution on 29 May 1993 was quickly followed by plans for coalition 
formation on the right. On 4 June 1993 an appeal was launched to unite all the parties “for 
whom the overriding aim is an independent, democratic, and affluent Poland faithful to the
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patriotic traditions of our fathers”.423 Although it was recognised that the grouping should 
involve a large ideological spectrum, Olszewski started negotiations by imposing an a priori 
exclusion of liberal parties (the UD and the KLD), as well as the ZChN, from this coalition424 
The new coalition was to be called the Polish Union (ZP). Underlying the project was the 
attempt to reunify the original PC and the ZChN’s radical splinters organised in the RdR, the 
Akcja Polska and Ruch III Rzeczpospolitej. The only ideological dissonance from the 
otherwise nationalist profile of the coalition was the presence of the historical Christian 
Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic -  Labour Movement (CD-SP). The CD-SP’s 
historical membership of the Christian Democratic International (CDI) explains the interest of 
the party unifiers in its integration in the coalition. The coalescent parties expected to get the 
CD-SP’s membership in the CDI transferred to the Polish Union. Although the president of the 
EUCD (European Union of Christian Democrats) Wilfred Martens, agreed to this plan, its 
execution was hampered by the German CDU, its leaders arguing that the membership of the 
EUCD should only be granted after the election results were known. According to Thomas 
Jackowski, the leader of the CD-SP at the time, the incentive that international affiliation of the 
CDI implied was the only factor that could have prevented the dissolution of the ZP.425
The conflicts within the ZP originated in the disagreements between the PC and its 
splinters over the definition of the political community. Olszewski’s nationalism followed 
Piteudskist’ independentist tradition while the PC’s brothers Kaszynski followed the Christian 
democratic tradition. These differing traditions were reflected in different strategies of 
competition.426 The Polish Union eventually broke under these multiple pressures.427
423 Lentowicz, Z. (1993), “W Strong Bloku Centroprawicy", (On the Side of the Centre-Right Block), Rzeczpospolita. 4 
June 1993.
424
Zdort, M. (1993), “RdR Stawia Warunki’’,(RdR Puts Conditions), Rzeczpospolita. 7 June 1993.
425
Author’s interview with Tomasz Jackowski, centre-right politician, June 2001.
426 Zdort, M. “Centroprawica Juz w Koalicji", (The Centre-right already in Coalition), Rzeczpospolita. 21 June 1993.
427 Kaminski, M. Lissowski, G. and Swistak, P. (1998), “The Revival of Communism or the Effect of Institutions? The 
1993 Polish Parliamentary Elections”, Public Choice. 97(3): 429-449, p. 436.
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With hindsight, Olszewski’s choices in 1993 had long lasting effects. Olszewski’s 
nationalism became the basis of an exclusivist conception of his political movement and 
strongly restricted his coalition options. Olszewski’s choice for ideological coherence in 
opposition to the broadening of government coalition implied that the chances of ideological 
moderation and the broadening of the electoral appeal dramatically decreased. The radical 
nature of the nationalist tradition followed by the Olszewski government proved incompatible 
with the PC’s centrist strategy. After suffering a series of splits, the PC leadership decided to 
follow Olszewski’s radical path and abandon the aspiration of becoming a centrist Christian 
democratic party.
The ZChN factions’ nationalism is another illustration that parties’ strategy can be 
limited by its ethos. Despite the willingness of its leaders to be part of Suchocka’s 
government, the ZChN was a disruptive force in parliament, frequently acting to defeat 
projects of law that it found unpatriotic or anti-family. On the eve of the 1993 elections the 
right-wing parties composing the governmental coalition chose to run as independent parties. 
The ZChN ended up integrating a Church-brokered coalition with three minor right-wing 
parties allied under the heading of Ojczyzna (Fatherland). The fate of Ojczyzna was a prime 
example of nationalists’ insistence on their separate identity: despite the threshold for election 
coalitions being 8 percent and the opinion polls attributing 6 percent of the vote intentions to 
the party, the leaders insisted on registering as an electoral coalition rather than a party, 
which could have passed the electoral threshold for parties, 5 percent. Given that the inability 
to coalesce was crucial for the disastrous results of the elections428 and perceived as such by 
the leaders429, it appears that ideological nationalism and strategic considerations clashed not 
only during the 1991-1993 period but also on the run up to the 1993 parliamentary elections.
428 Kaminski, M., Lissowski, G. and Swistak, P. (1998), op.cit.
429 Jarostaw Kaszynski called the separate electoral lists “electoral death lists”.
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1997-2001: the AWS government
The AWS, formed in the wake of the 1997 elections as a coalition of thirty parties, 
aimed at challenging the SLD’s supremacy. Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of the Solidarity 
trade union played the role of unifier and opened the electoral coalition to all right-wing forces. 
The places in the party list were attributed according to the popularity of each party as 
expressed in the opinion polls. Krzaklewski ascribed to the trade union a coordinating role 
and exerted personal influence over the AWS’s formation. In the chief legislative and 
coordinating body of the AWS, the National Council, votes were allocated by a formula 
measuring the relative input of every partner to coalitional power. Krzaklewski, a computer 
scientist, operationalised the input of the partners with a formula based on several variables, 
including poll estimates.430 The essence of the scheme was that the Solidarity trade union had 
blocking power in all national and regional executive and legislative bodies.
The Solidarity trade union was perceived as roughly equidistant to all right-wing parties 
and Krzaklewski was regarded as its unbiased arbiter. The AWS aimed at recreating the 
ideological scope of the Solidarity movement in the eighties. Therefore, alongside the 
conservatives of the SKL and the trade unionists, Krzaklewski integrated several formations 
of soft and hard catholic nationalists, such as the Stowarzyczenia Rodzin Katolickich, the 
Rodzina Polska, and the Liga Krajowa.
Controversy emerged over the inclusion of Hard Eurosceptic nationalists in the AWS. 
While some considered them necessary partners of a successful centre-right formation,431 
others argued that giving the nationalists a place in the AWS’s electoral lists meant assuring 
the survival of non-reformable parties that would otherwise have been eliminated from the
430 Variables included membership, numbers of representatives in legislatures at all levels, territorial span, media 
access, know-how potential, input to local AWS organizations, votes in recent presidential and parliamentary 
elections, and the mean support in recent polls for parties and leaders. The formula was not released to the public.
431 /b^towski, M. “Trzymac Si§ Prawej Sciany", (Holding the Right-Wing Wall), Rzeczpospolita. 16 June 1998.
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political scene.432 In fact, their integration in the centre-right confirmed a distinctive feature of 
the Polish party system. While nationalist parties were prominent in most other countries of 
the region,433 only in Poland did nationalists have such a prominence in the centre of the party 
system. Even members of the AWS associated with Christian democracy, like Maciej 
t^towski, were of the opinion that extreme nationalists should always be included in a right- 
wing coalition to avoid the creation of a sizeable nationalist right.434 It was also believed that 
the support of Radio Marjia was very advantageous in the elections, and helped the centre- 
right to achieve a majority in the parliament.435
The result of the inclusion of the nationalists in the AWS was disastrous for the 
discipline of its parliamentary caucus. Their penchant for extreme behaviour is well 
encapsulated in Jan topuszanski’s declaration: “In the AWS we must use confrontation” 436 
The AWS unifiers, especially Krzaklewski and the trade unionists, had hoped to keep a grip 
on the smaller nationalist parties of the coalition and predicted that the governing experience 
would have a moderating effect on them. The governing experience not only did not change 
their behaviour but increased their capacity to exert vetoing power. Ultimately Krzaklewski’s 
position was weakened by the nationalist’ ability to put the government in check.
Given the smaller parties’ potential for blackmail, the AWS was gradually modified into a 
coalition clustered around five main constituent elements that were to jointly take decisions. 
Meanwhile a new Solidarity-sponsored political party, the Solidarity Electoral Action-Social 
Movement (RS AWS), led by the Prime Minister Buzek, was set up in November 1997 to take 
over the union’s political functions as the union gradually withdrew from politics. A more equal
432
Majcherek, J. “Ktopoty na Wlasne Zyczenia", (The Trouble of our Wishes), Rzeczpospolita. 13 June 1998; 
Majcherek, J. “A Ktopoty Pozostaly" (And the Trouble Persist), Rzeczpospolita. 30 June 1998.
433 Vago, R. (1991), ‘T he  East European Radical Right and European Integration". Paper to the Conference on the 
Radical Right in Western Europe, University of Minnesota.
434 'iftow ski, M ." Trzvmac Sie Prawei Scianv", (Holding the Right-Wing Wall), 19 June 1998.
435
Majcherek, J. “A Ktoootv Pozostalv". (And the Troubles Persist), Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1998.
436
Slowo Ludu in 12 June 1998, quoted in Politika on 27.06.1998.
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distribution of power between the larger and more structured parties, the Conservative 
People’s Party (SKL), the Polish Agreement of Christian Democrats (PPChD) and the ZChN 
was established. The increased power of these three parties put some checks on 
Krzaklewski’s power as a party leader.
Krzaklewski’s intention had been to fulfil the decade-old project of unifying the right by 
transforming the AWS into a single party. The purpose of the RS-AWS was not only to 
separate the political from the industrial functions of the Solidarity trade union but also to 
create an organisational basis for the unification of the right-wing. The founders of RS AWS 
expected that AWS parliamentarians relinquish the membership of their parties to become 
members of the RS AWS. However, none of the AWS’s MPs but the trade unionists left their 
original parties and the RS AWS never fulfilled the hopes of its leaders. The fact that each of 
the main AWS partners strongly underlined their distinctive identity and could potentially 
threaten the government’s majority also meant that the government had to constantly square 
off their various partisan interests. This obviously jeopardised the party’s coordination 
capacity and the efficiency of the government.
Squaring the circle: impossible ideological combinations
Krzaklewski’s pre-electoral speech illustrates how much the formation of the AWS in 
1997 was a pragmatic affair in which parties coalesced without questioning the compatibility 
of their identities: ‘This large, modern formation will embrace the national, Christian, 
democratic and independent traditions.”437 The attempt to create an encompassing party 
organisation was not accompanied by any agreement on a common overarching identity. The 
founders initially focused on attaining and controlling state power by building party structures 
capable of controlling the state administration.
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It was already clear when the party attained power in early 1998 that the idea of 
developing a Christian democratic identity was taken with some enthusiasm by the party 
unifiers. Christian democracy was seen as the ideology with the best chances of attracting 
overall support. Within the circles of the founders of the RS AWS, Christian democracy was 
seen as a neutraliser of ideological disagreements between the Catholic nationalists and the 
liberals.
However, although Krzaklewski and the trade union had been regarded as unbiased 
arbiters, when the choice of a common presidential candidate was to be made, his impartiality 
was quickly doubted. His candidature was controversial from the outset, and opposed by the 
liberal and conservative wings of the party. Krzaklewski’s campaign strategy was one of 
polarisation on nationalist grounds438 which made any agreement between the AWS’s parties 
even more difficult to achieve. The leader of the SKL, Jan Maria Rokita, led a coalition of 
moderate conservatives and asked for an internal party referendum to choose the presidential 
candidate. However, the leadership and the rank-and-file of the Solidarity trade union refused 
to question Krzaklewski’s right to present itself as the AWS’s presidential candidate. By 
choosing a nationalist tactic Krzaklewski provoked an irate response from the AWS’s 
moderate conservative parties. By taking the side of the nationalists and accepting the 
support of Radio Marjia, the trade union leader relinquished the role of moderator that he had 
devised for himself. Krzaklewski nationalist electoral strategy jeopardised the possibilities of a 
Christian democratic identity.
Without ideological or organisational settlement within the AWS, Krzaklewski’s landslide 
defeat in autumn 2000 provoked a crisis that would tear apart the AWS in the run-up to the 
2001 parliamentary elections. Despite the internal opposition, Krzaklewski refused to step 
down from the AWS leadership. The AWS statutes foresaw that a change of leadership
437 Przemowienie Marian Krzaklewski na Konwencii Przedwvborczei w Radomiu. (Foreword by Marian Krzaklewski 
at the Pre-Elecotral Convention in Radom), October 1997.
438 t^towski, M. "Trzymac s\q prawej sciany", 19 June 1998 and Zdort, M. D. "Kandydat Katolicki I Radykalny", 
(Catholic and Radical Candidates), Rzeczpospolita. 22 June 1998.
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required 75 percent of the votes in the Political Council. The two constituent parties controlled 
by Krzaklewski, the Solidarity trade union and the RS AWS counted 48 percent of the votes. 
Therefore, the change of leadership envisaged by the other parties of the coalition was not 
attainable through statutory means. Krzaklewski initial reaction was to try to get rid of the SKL 
and other rebellious elements. “We always had problems with the group of the AWS 
politicians that oscillated between the AWS and the UW. This problem has to be solved once 
and for all.”439 However, the rebellious parties did not show willingness to leave peacefully, 
and considered that the AWS was “as much theirs as it was Solidarity’s”. After two months of 
negotiations mediated by Prime Minister Buzek, the historical leader of the ZChN, Wiestaw 
Chrzanowski, and the Catholic Church, the rebelling parties founded a federation excluding 
the trade union and the nationalists and threatened to leave the AWS as a tactical move to 
provoke change.
Although the resistance of the constituent AWS party leaders was partially motivated by 
Krzaklewski’s tactics to centralise power,440 the opposing parties justified their resistance to 
Krzaklewski’s tactics with ideological arguments. Jan Maria Rokita, Krzaklewski’s main 
opponent within the AWS, stated that the strategy embraced by the trade union leader 
“threatens the AWS with a Lepenisation process, a radicalisation that does not allow the AWS 
to govern.”441 Rokita also alluded to the fact that Krzaklewski had jeopardised his own role of 
mediator and the possibility of unification of the right around a Christian democratic option by 
adopting a radical right nationalist discourse in the run-up to the presidential elections.
After Krzaklewski eventually stepped down as party leader, its succession came to the 
fore, bringing again into light the ideological conflicts that had hampered the unification of the 
AWS. Nationalists and liberal candidates were rejected as they were not acceptable to one or 
the other of the parties’ in the coalition. “For the trade unionists Krzaklewski is their man (...).
Gazeta Polska, 11 October 2000.
440 Waszkielewicz, B. and Zdort, M. “Toszamosc Partii Wtadzy", (Idenitites of the Parties of Power), Rzeczpospolita
24 October 2000.
441 Jan Maria Rokita’s speech to SKL’s Political Council, quoted in Rzeczpospolita. 16 October 2000.
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Liberals, which want to change their leaders, are a fifth column”.442 The increased influence of 
the SKL conservatives in the AWS after the defeat of Krzaklewski and the creation of a 
federation of parties, the Federation AWS, made the conservative option embodied in Maciej 
Ptazynski desirable. Part of the conservative wing of the SKL, Ptazynski was a member of the 
AWS RS and was widely accepted as a future leader of the centre-right party.
However, Ptazynski’s plans were different. Andrzej Olechowski’s performance in the 
presidential elections had triggered in the conservatives the hope of creating a successful 
liberal conservative party able to dominate the centre-right. Krzaklewski acknowledged this 
fact when he stepped down as the AWS political leader in early December 2000. “Politicians 
of the centre-right tend to marginalise the role and the meaning of Solidarity. The 
predominance of the conservative liberal programme is in conflict with a Christian social 
vision of the centre-right. The trade unionists must react to the attempt to de-solidarise the 
centre-right”.443 During the following months the AWS would slowly disintegrate into several 
small parties. The project of a Christian democratic party based on the trade union was over.
The EU accession proved a particularly difficult context for the Polish right-wing 
unification. The parties of the post-Solidarity camp differed in their attitudes towards the EU; 
in government these differences proved extremely divisive, and European integration became 
the touchstone of disagreement between the parties. Nationalists’ Euroscepticism translated 
into each of these attempting to hinder the accession process while in office and this, in term, 
heightened the conflicts with the other coalition members. Despite their office-driven attempts 
to reinterpret their ideology into compatibility with European integration, the defence of the 
Polish nation remained necessary and sufficient to dictate a Eurosceptic attitude. The context 
of European integration made the disagreements between the right-wing coalition partners 
more concrete, and deepened the divisiveness of nationalists.
442 Quoted in Gazeta Wvborcza. October 2000.
443 Declaration to the XIII Meeting of the Solidarity trade union in Spale, quoted in Rzeczpospolita, 12 December
No party illustrates the difficulty of overcoming Euroscepticism as well as the ZChN. 
The primacy of the ZChN nationalist ethos over its centripetal strategies was particularly 
obvious when Rychard Czamecki was appointed chair of the Committee of European 
Integration (KIE) in late 1997. When integration in the AWS in 1996 became a possibility the 
ZChN centrist strategy resulted in the choice of the moderate Marian Pitka as a leader. 
However, when in February 1998 Pitka tried to take the party transformation one step further 
by drawing it closer to the UW by strengthening the economic ethos,444 the leader faced 
strong internal opposition and was eventually closely challenged by a hard liner, Henryk 
Goryszewski, in the party’s internal elections.
Despite the attempts of the party to reinterpret its ethos into compatibility with European 
integration and one of the party’s leaders, Ryszard Czarnecki, being made chairman of the 
office for European integration (KIE), the ZChN’s presence in office after 1997 was sill marked 
by the party’s attempts to hinder European integration. Czamecki’s performance as KIE’s 
chair resulted in a sharp conflict with the liberal leaders. Due to the ensuing institutional 
paralysis in KIE, the prime minister started chairing the Committee in order to reinforce its 
authority over matters of European integration. The controversy over Czarnecki’s leadership 
had far reaching consequences for the progress of accession preparations. After Czarnecki’s 
resignation in June 1998 the KIE’s position was weakened by a long period of institutional 
instability as a coalition deadlock prevented the prime minister from appointing a permanent 
KIE secretary. The Freedom Union’s insistence on its right to propose a candidate for the KIE 
secretary, and the ZChN’s opposition to the notion illustrates the ideological fight for the 
control of the process of European integration.445 The ZChN inspired a number of negotiation 
stances, such as that of an 18-year transition period for the sale of land to foreigners. In 
parliament the harmonisation of Polish legislation with the acquis communautaire was also 
encumbered by nationalist members of the coalition who opposed the process and impeded
444 Zdort, M. “Partyjni Weekend”, (Weekend Parties), Rzeczpospolita. 2 March 1998.
445 Author’s interview with Piotr Nowina-Konopka, July 2000.
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the transposition of directives into Polish law, making the failure to implement the acquis one 
of Polish chief liabilities. When the disintegration of the AWS produced a more polarised 
environment in parliament, one group of ZChN’s politicians joined the PO’s conservative 
liberals, the other the national conservative PiS.
2001: The search for ideological coherence
Once the chances of AWS’s survival appeared minimal, the incentives for conservatives 
from the SKL to remain in the coalition decreased considerably. The temporary settlement of 
the AWS crisis was jeopardised in early 2001 when the chosen leader of the new AWS, 
Maciej Ptazynski, abandoned the party to form a new conservative liberal party project, the 
Platform of Citizens, with Andrzej Olechowski. The exit options also determined splits from 
the UW and, after some months of hesitation, the splitting of the SKL and its integration into 
the PO.
The demise of the AWS Christian democratic project was a critical moment in the right- 
wing’s evolution, making the creation of a broad Christian democratic party less likely.446 Once 
a cooperative endeavour fails to endure, the chances are that fragmented and small parties 
will return to their initial identity. Small parties, with lower competitive capacities, tend to have 
higher ideological consistency (even if a less appealing one). Parties in a weak competitive 
position are dependent on loyal members and activists. When parties become weaker 
competitors, militants are more likely to advance447 and leaders attempt to maximise existing 
supporter loyalty by retaining symbols and appeals with their organisational forms or the 
symbolic past treasured by its membership.
446
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37(3), p.407.
206
The project of unifying the centre-right was not dead. In their early days both right-wing 
parties, the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Citizens’ Platform (PO), maintained explicitly fuzzy 
identities as a way to preserve a range of choices. The triple leadership of the PO 
encompassed a socially conservative wing and a faction based on economic neo-liberalism. 
The supremacy of economic neo-liberalism became clear. Contrary to the expectations of 
some of its leaders, the PO’s identity was overwhelmingly dictated by economic neo­
liberalism, which led one of the conservative party founders to leave the party. There was no 
desire in the Civic Platform to widen its electorate, while there was a desire of a large part of 
the electorate for stabilization in the centre. That is a difference of ideas” Ptazynski said, 
adding that Poland needs a "popular, broad-based, right-wing party that is not associated with 
just one circle."448 To this claim the liberals answered that Ptazynski’s proposals that included 
an approximation with the PiS national conservatives would disorientate their electorate, 
especially in matters related to European Union. “For a long time we did not know what is the 
position of the PiS in this matter. We have the impression that Ptazynski is nostalgic of the 
political majority of the AWS, but for the politicians originating in the UW, the AWS is a 
warning and not an inspiration.”449 As Krzysztof Piesewicz emphasised: ‘We want to build a 
formation of people that think in the same way about the values, the objectives and the ways 
of acting of the party. We are not interested in a party that has as an objective supporting 
someone to the presidency, or a party to oppose that. That would finish, as always, in a 
permanent parliamentary crisis.”450
448 Kublik, A. “Maciej Ptazynski Odchodzy z Platformy”, (Maciej Ptazynski Leaves the Platform), Gazeta Wvborcza. 
April 2003.
449 Interview with Janusz Lewandowski, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 April 2003.
450 Krzysztof Piesewicz, quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 2003.
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Polarisation and nationalism
The analysis of the interaction between European attitudes, strategies of competition 
and ethos shows the prevalence of the latter over the other two elements. Despite the attempt 
to mute nationalist identities integrating into governmental coalitions, these parties remained 
wary of shedding political sovereignty. This resulted in nationalists’ disruption of the accession 
process. When the accession negotiations started in September 1997 the Euroscepticism of 
some of the governmental parties started being seen as a danger and the imperatives of the 
process of law harmonisation led the AWS to exclude Jan topuszanski from the 
government’s parliamentary circle.
The failure to form a Christian democratic party resulted in the increased importance of 
nationalism and the unusual number of Eurosceptic parties in the 2001 elections. The 
electoral success of two Hard Eurosceptic parties resulted in the establishment of a strong 
Eurosceptic lobby in parliament flanking both centre-left and centre-right parties in 
government.
The predominance of parties’ nationalist political ethos in dictating parties European 
positions seems also to have contributed to the establishment of the polarising identities of 
the LPR and the Samoobrona. The evolution of the nationalist polarising right suggests that 
Eurosceptic parties were progressively excluded from the centre. This exclusion has met with 
a mode of competition that explicitly adopts “isolationist strategies, tends to build a separate 
pole of the system, refuses to enter coalitions (at the national level) and resorts to outbidding 
propaganda tactics, systematically opposing and discrediting some founding values of the 
regime, on which all other parties agree.”451.
451
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Synergies between identities and strategic behaviour 
The PSL and the SLD’s transformations
The transformation of the PZPR and ZPL from regime parties implied a transformation 
of their ethos and doctrine, by abandoning communism and embracing social democracy and 
agrarianism. Without betraying their left-wing orientation, the parties’ leaders based their new 
identities on the definition of the economic concepts of class and estate. Their political ethos 
had diverse origins: while the Polish Communist Party was one of the most entrenched 
parties in class internationalism of the Central and Eastern European communist parties,452 
the PSL is the inheritor of nationalist conceptions inherent to biological agrarianism, the 
ideology of the inter-war peasant movements.
Being based on divisible and quantifiable economic concepts, the PSL and SLD’s 
European positions had a conditional nature, and the transformation of the parties resulted in 
a different appreciation of the CAP and the Single Market regime. The governmental drive of 
the two parties, its ethos transformation and their European positions became mutually 
reinforcing elements.
The SLD’s class-based cosmopolitanism
The transformation of the SLD is an example of the synergies created by the consistent 
pursuit of a social democratic ethos, governmental office and Europhilism. The SLD’s 
ideological transformation from communism to social democracy was, arguably, one of the 
drivers of transition itself. By accepting market economy, an internationalist conception of the 
political community and stressing their liberal social policies the new party leadership elected
452
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in January 1990 steered the party into the core of the party system. The ideological choices of 
the SdRP made possible both the incorporation of several minor parties into a single structure 
and the broadening of the party’s public appeal. The drive to attain governmental office also 
consisted of the search for international recognition, and the party multiplied its efforts to gain 
membership of the Socialist International and integrate the Party of European Socialists.
As I have argued in chapter IV, the victory of the SdRP’s reformist leadership in taking 
control of the party determined its rapid transformation. The office-seeking drive of the party 
went hand-in-hand with the transformation of the party’s ethos, which consisted not only in 
stressing a liberal social and political stance but also the abandon of Keynesian demand-side 
policies. By the mid-nineties the SLD’s leadership had understood, through direct 
governmental participation, the constrains on the development of a strong welfare state 
imposed by international commitments and considered the EU’s policy regime as a relatively 
more protective environment of class interests. This transformation was in pace both with 
European social democratic transformations and with the economic policies pursued by the 
European Union.
The legacy of communist internationalist ideals in Poland is now embodied in SLD’s 
Hard Europhilism. The support for European integration results essentially from the party 
viewing the EU as a facilitator of social democratic economic ideals. Moreover, whenever 
class-based cosmopolitanism is combined with the perception of a synergetic relationship 
between the party’s economic goals and those of the EU,453 the sufficient conditions for 
unconditional Europhilism are met. Also, although in the 1980s communist leaders attempted 
to revamp failing support for the regime by using nationalist rhetoric and symbolism, the 
Soviet imposition of communism on Poland made Polish national communism a contradiction 
in terms. The SLD’s Hard Europhilism therefore also derives from the communist legacy of 
internationalism.
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The PSL’s re-working of the concept of estate
The PSL transformation and survival was anchored in the division between rural and 
urban ethos.454 Although farmers do not constitute a class and therefore their political ethos is 
not a priori given 455 due to the historical circumstances of the birth of the agrarian movement 
in XlX-century partitioned Poland, the PSL’s political ethos is founded on the concept of 
nation 456 Agrarian parties are primarily based on the idea that land ownership should be 
rewarded by support and privileges from the central state. However, the freeze imposed by 
communism on the development of the farmers’ movements in Poland meant that the PSL’s 
ideological resources deriving from interwar ideologies combined the two conceptions in the 
concept of family farming. The PSL’s interpretation of the concept of estate was therefore 
influenced by the nationalist concept of the role of farmers.
The success of the PSL’s transformation from communist satellite party, as well as its 
resistance to the catholic parties’ attempts to incorporate it,457 certainly owes much to the 
conception of the particular role of farmers in the survival of the Polish nation. However, the 
main identifying element of the PSL is economic in nature and the identification of the 
peasantry with the nation practically elevates peasants’ interests to national interest. The
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party’s evaluation of the compatibility between European integration and the national interest 
impinge on the evaluation of CAP’S impact on farmers’ welfare.
The PSL’s changing European position can be understood in the context of a dynamic 
relationship between the EU and Poland. The uncertainty of the conditions of application of 
the CAP on the new member states meant that as negotiations on the EU evolved between 
September 1997 and 2001, a new assessment of the impact of accession on Polish 
agriculture was demanded. Since the economic interests of the party’s constituency are 
directly relevant for the party’s position on the EU, the party increased its expertise on the 
application of CAP benefits and price mechanisms to the Polish market. With time, the party 
came to understand that integration of the Polish agricultural market would be advantageous, 
therefore staking a Soft Europhile position.
The analysis of PSL’s move between Euroscepticism to Europhilism indicates that 
office-seeking considerations also played a part in the revaluation of parties’ European 
positions. A landslide electoral defeat in the 1997 elections resulted in the election of a leader 
more open to a revaluation of the impact of European integration for the peasant class as a 
whole. However, although the shift to conditional Europhilism certainly incorporated office- 
seeking considerations, this centrist stance is in the long-run dependent on the fulfilment of 
the farmers’ interests by integrating the European Common Agricultural Policy. The evolution 
of the PSL’s European positions also illustrates that when the parties’ chances of government 
participation appear small, more extremist middle-level cadres can push for a different 
interpretation of the party’s economic ethos and constituencies’ interests and lead to a 
Eurosceptic stance. A Eurosceptic position, in turn, marks the exclusion of governmental 
coalitions and reinforces a polarising stance.
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Analysis
The analysis of the interaction between the three variables carried out in this chapter 
confirms that party strategies are not necessary and in the short-term sufficient but in the 
long-term insufficient for parties’ positions on European integration. It emerges that only the 
re-assessment of the relationship between parties’ definitions of the political and the 
economic community and European integration allows a lasting change of parties’ European 
positions. The sufficiency but not necessity of a polarising strategy for Euroscepticism is 
consistent with the assumption that a party’s core conception determines its ideological 
positions down the line. This suggests that a party’s opposition to European integration 
undermines the stability of nationalist parties in the centre and therefore conditions the party’s 
competitive strategy.
The analysis of the Polish right-wing attempts to create a sizeable centre party testifies 
to the resistance of parties’ ethos to strategic-driven efforts to mute parties’ opposition to 
European integration. The cases of discrepancy between the effects of the ethos and a 
competitive strategy on a party’s European positions demonstrate that parties can suspend 
their ethos only temporarily.
The ZChN’s evolution throughout the 1990s perfectly illustrates this proposition. Despite 
its centrist strategy and the addition of a neo-liberal economic ethos the party’s national 
Catholicism remained the primary source of its ideological and policy positions. In order to 
integrate the liberal governments of Bielecki, Suchocka and the AWS, the party’s leadership 
tried to silence, dilute or reinterpret its nationalist ethos. However, when in government, the 
parties’ ideological and policy stances often disrupted the workings of the cabinets and the 
consistency of the parliamentary caucus with its principled opposition to Polish participation in 
a supranational institution. By not choosing between nationalism and a centrist position, the 
ZChN contributed neither to the formation of a centrist party nor to a nationalist polarising 
pole, which was eventually filled by the League of Polish Families after the 2001 elections.
When searching for support for its contested presidential bid in the nationalist wing of 
the AWS, Marian Krzaklewski’s first speech took a Eurosceptic tone. The centrifugal tactics
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and nationalist rhetoric of the AWS's leader at the end of its period in office reasserted the 
heightened divisions between lines of support and opposition to Europe within the governing 
coalition. The disintegration of the AWS along these lines of conflict resulted in an unusual 
number of Eurosceptic parties gaining parliamentary representation, demonstrating the 
resilience of the nationalist ethos and the failure to create a Christian democratic party. 
Embodied in different organisations, nationalism proved in the long-term both necessary and 
sufficient for staking an unconditional opposition to European integration. The presence of 
nationalists in the mainstream political scene in Poland made the ideological distance 
between the post-Solidarity parties impossible to surmount. The European question became 
the hallmark of the ideological disagreements of the Polish right.
The developments of the Polish right-wing shows nationalism as an identity that is hard 
to combine with governmental office. The limits to changing a party’s ethos, and consequently 
the limits to changing a party’s opposition to European integration, determine the strategic 
options available to parties. The predominance of political nationalism over strategic-driven 
attempts to change the party’s European attitude results in their marginalisation within the 
party system. The analysis of the interaction between the three variables shows that a party 
ethos is the predominant element.
The analysis of the Polish left shows that the interaction between a party’s choice of 
ethos, strategies and European attitudes facilitated the transformation of the Polish left from 
communism to social democracy. This virtuous spiral resulted primarily from the compatibility 
between the social democracy and the European policy regime in the mid 1990s. Being 
based on quantifiable economic concepts the SLD and the PSL could more easily re-evaluate 
the effects of the European policy regimes.
Conversely, the incompatibility between nationalism and European integration is part of 
the explanation for the failure to create a centre-right party in Poland. This results in the fact 
that, despite being the first country to initiate the transition process, Poland has been the CEE 
state where the emergence of Euroscepticism has been higher. Despite the expectations that 
a Christian democratic party would emerge from the post-Solidarity camp and fill the centre- 
right space, the predominance of nationalism over Catholic universalism, prevented the
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development of both Christian democracy and a unified centre-right party. The nationalist 
ideology proved enduring and divisive and impeded a synergetic relationship between 
Christian cosmopolitanism, Europhilism and a centrist strategy.
The predominance and stability of ethos poses strict limits to the impact of 
Europeanization on party systems. The mismatch between a party’s identity and its 
competitive strategy can lead to insurmountable tensions. Consequently, a stable centre and 
periphery should be defined not only by the parties’ coalition options and their propaganda 
tactics, but also through a discursive dimension. The creation of a centre party is thus as 
much a practical problem of coalition strategy as is a question of the elite finding agreement 
on the values of a common “community of discourse”. The different nature of the political and 
the economic ethos explains the different degree of conflict in party systems based on the 
economic and the political axis.
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Chapter VII Conclusion
The theory proposed in this thesis is based on an understanding of parties as 
embodiments of political ideas. The concepts imprinted in the party ethos are vital elements of 
parties’ existence and guide their response to contemporary issues. The way parties respond 
to the integration of the continent is, in the long run, determined by the way parties define the 
political and economic communities. Party ethos, and their degree of conceptual flexibility, 
limits the impact of centripetal and centrifugal strategies of competition on party responses to 
European integration.
The ethos theory of party positions on Europe differs not only from strategically-driven 
theories, such as Sitter’s, but also from Marks and Wilson’s cleavage-based theory of party 
responses on European integration. In their 2000 article Marks and Wilson represent political 
cleavages almost exclusively in terms of reflecting social groups’ diverse economic 
preferences.458 In a later article (2002) the same authors (with Hooghe) note the omission of 
the political cleavage and admit to its ascendancy over the left/right economic axis in 
determining parties’ European positions.459 However, in the introduction to the special issue of 
Comparative Political Studies dedicated to political contestation in the EU, the authors hedge 
their position by stating that the political dimension is highly correlated to the left-right 
economic dimension, so much so that the two can be considered part of the same axis.460
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By assuming that the left-right axis explains party positions on European integration 
Marks, Hooghe and Wilson461 follow a long tradition of party analysis that understands 
ideology primarily as the representation of social group economic interests. The primordial 
character of economic interests results in a single (mainly) economic axis. The 
conceptualisation of the left-right axis as the synthesis of left-wing social libertarianism and 
right-wing social authoritarianism was first proposed by Inglehart. Although the 
conceptualisation of the rise of a cultural conflict of competition has been Inglehart’s main 
contribution to the literature, he asserts that the opposition between materialist/post­
materialist values has eventually fused with the left-right economic axis and created a one­
dimensional space of competition.
In this thesis a typology of political and economic ethos takes the place of the left-right 
axis to explain party European positions. This typology differs from the latter in two ways. 
First, the bi-dimensional character of this typology implies that the political dimension is 
independent of the left-right dimension (or the economic ethos) and that the political ethos 
can prevail over the economic ethos (and vice versa). Second, this typology defines the 
vertical axis not as a reflection of socio-cultural attitudes but reflecting party’s prescriptions of 
the relation between the individual and the political community. By specifying the 
interpretative concepts binding parties’ rationality462 this typology represents a more 
fundamental way to conceive the ideological space. The party ethos determines not only 
parties’ positions on European integration but could also explain the stability of parties’ policy 
positions.463
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The Polish party system demonstrates in a vivid way that although a one-dimensional 
left-right conceptualisation of party systems is widely accepted,464 a two-dimensional 
classification of party identities appears to provide a better classification of parties European 
positions. In spite of the necessity and sufficiency of the central element of a party’s identity 
for the party fundamental choice between Euroscepticism and Europhilism, the other 
dimension of identity still bears an independent effect on a party’s positioning in the 
Eurosceptic-Europhile scale. The framework proposes that while party attitudes to the 
European issue based on an indivisible political concept are unchangeable, attitudes based 
on economic concepts can more easily be reassessed.
The testing of the ethos theory on the Polish case has shown it broadly successful in 
explaining both left- and right-wing parties’ European attitudes. The Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA)465 and the language of sufficiency and necessity proved a productive method 
to test the theoretical framework, helping to identity cases of theoretically interesting 
combinations of strategic and ideological conditions. This resulted in a better understanding of 
the dynamic interaction between conceptions of political and economic ethos, strategies of 
centripetal or centrifugal mode of competition, and parties’ attitudes towards European 
integration.
A further inference to the systemic level can be derived from the ethos theory. It 
appears that in a party system where the political axis is predominant, European integration 
will be more intensely contested. The antidote to the disruption caused by the European issue 
on these party systems is a Hard Europhile Christian democratic party. In its absence, 
political nationalism is likely to be mobilised and becoming a disruptive element of the political 
spectrum. In party systems based on the economic axis the European issue will be more 
easily accommodated; parties based the economic ethos have conditional and changeable
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European positions and a reassessment of the changing European policy regimes is therefore 
possible.466
In Poland divergent ideological and office-seeking strategies have led to a highly 
unstable right-wing. The failure of Christian democracy to thrive in Poland resulted in the 
success of a high number of Eurosceptic parties. The instability of the Polish centre-right is 
related to the ideological importance of nationalism for the post-Solidarity camp and the 
impossibility of its reconciliation with a Europhile position. Although office-seeking strategies 
can serve as incentives to moderation, they are not sufficient either to determine parties’ 
attitudes towards European integration. The resolution of the contradiction between parties’ 
appreciation of European attitudes and their strategies of competition is necessary for the 
achievement of a stable centre-right identity.
A dynamic theory
In Chapter V I criticised the government-opposition theory for failing to explain parties’ 
long-term positions on European integration, in Chapter VI it was conceded that, in the short­
term, modified competitive strategies can explain the short-term adoption of pro- or anti- 
European positions. Parties signalling their will to enter government will adopt Europhilism 
and parties’ opposing the government can also indicate such strategy by temporarily 
opposing European integration. The change of European position resulting from strategic 
considerations implies the suspension of the party ethos. This suspension is, however, only 
sustainable in the short-run since it provokes untenable tensions within the party.
A change in a party’s position on European integration in the long-term can only derive 
from the re-assessment of the relationship between parties’ ethos and European attitudes. 
Although Eurosceptic parties will feel uncomfortable in governmental positions they will stick
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with their ideological evaluation of European integration. In the long-run, the tension between 
Euroscepticism and office makes these parties drift to the margins of the system.
A further inference of the ethos theory is that a party’s external action is strongly 
determined by the conditions needed for internal cohesion.467 The concepts defining a party’s 
ethos are a reserve out of reach of bids for or opposition to government. Ideological change is 
a separate and long process, subject to its own conceptual limits. Thus, parties based on the 
conception of class will not propose policies that promote market efficiency to the detriment of 
redistributive policies, but they can devise policies counteracting inequalities stemming from 
positions in the labour market through demand- or supply-side policies. Equally, ecological 
parties will not propose policies that put economic growth ahead of ecological concerns, but 
the form of conceiving the ecological crisis will determine the types of policies they advocate.
The change in a party’s position on Europe can be triggered by a bid for government. 
However, this change will only be sustainable if it provokes a permanent reassessment of the 
relationship between parties’ ethos and European policy regimes. This process is likely to 
occur only in parties in which the economic ethos is predominant. Since political concepts are 
indivisible and unquantifiable, parties based on a predominant political ethos hold 
unconditional support or opposition to European integration. Replacing the concept of the 
community at the core of a party’s identity is subject to even stronger limits, only attainable 
through a longer time span and normally involving the creation of a different party 
organisation. Therefore, the impact of party’s office-seeking strategies will be limited by the 
political and economic conceptions. The incompatibility between Euroscepticism and office 
condemns parties whose values are incompatible to European integration to a polarising 
position. Party systems competing on a political axis will experience strong conflicts over 
European integration.
The constraints imposed on party strategies by core values become most evident in the 
Euroscepticism of nationalist formations. The sufficiency of nationalism for Euroscepticism,
467 Bartolini, S. (2000), op.cit.
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even when a party is part of a governing coalition, is illustrated by several parties in Poland. 
Even when pursuing a centripetal strategy, nationalists remain Eurosceptic. In the 1991-1993 
and the 1997-2001 governments several political formations showed the resilience of 
nationalism in face of strategic pressures. The history of the AWS coalition and its failed 
attempts to achieve a unified party organisation and stay in office illustrates the instability that 
nationalist Eurosceptic parties impose on a party system where conflicts over the definition of 
the political community run high. Despite the acute awareness that the right should be united 
in order to face the SLD’s centre-left block, the AWS’s nationalist factions remained 
Eurosceptic. When the disintegration of the party coalition proved irreversible several 
Eurosceptic and centrifugal parties gained parliamentary representation.
The analysis of the Polish case confirms the ethos theory and also suggests that the 
establishment of a party’s identity and its strategic behaviour are not independent from the 
process of Europeanization. In post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, “Europe”, as the 
only symbol referring to the future, gained a more prominent meaning than in Western 
Europe. Scrutinising the compatibility between parties’ core concepts and European 
integration quickly became a task of the party.
Europe seen from the political prism
The typology of parties’ ethos assumes that parties are primarily based on either a 
political or an economic core conception. The different nature of political and economic 
concepts means that some families are more prone to change than others. Since economic 
values are more amenable to quantification and attainable by degrees, parties based on 
economic values can change their attitudes towards the European Union. In contrast, political 
values are absolute concepts while those parties whose identities are based on political 
conceptions are fixed in their positions.
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The nation and its problematic place on the European sphere
The nation is the political conception that has become the main source of opposition to 
European integration. Resistance to the transfer of political authority from the nation-state to 
the European level in the last half century mainly derived from the ideology that legitimises 
the political authority of nation states, i.e., nationalism. Concepts of political community are 
indivisible and result in an absolute rejection of European integration. The Polish case also 
illustrates that nationalism is a powerful basis for political action even when it hinders parties’ 
chances of keeping office, for example, by leading them to adopt Eurosceptic positions.
Two party types take the nation as their central identifying concept: nationalists and 
national conservatives. The difference between them is that while nationalists are locked in 
their political conceptions, national conservatives can switch to a neo-liberal economic 
identity. Although nationalists often try to develop a neo-liberal economic identity to dilute their 
nationalism, this new identity does not replace parties’ core identity. The centrality of the 
nation in a party’s identity determines the resilience of its scepticism despite a positive 
evaluation of the economic effects of European integration and a centripetal strategy of 
competition. Therefore, nationalist parties and national conservatives often meet increasing 
difficulties in their attempts to gain and stay in office.
Since nationalists’ understanding of the political community is necessarily incompatible 
with the principles of European integration, these parties become troublesome partners in 
government. In a multi-level system of governance a Eurosceptic party’s opposition to an 
essential feature of the political system turn difficult their participation in government. 
Therefore, in the long-term, Eurosceptic parties will be gradually excluded from the centre. 
Party systems organised around the political axis, i.e. where the conflicts between nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism run high, tend to become arenas of conflicts on European integration. 
The irreducible nature of political concepts makes European integration a disruptive and 
contentious issue. Nationalist parties may attempt to integrate government, but their strategy- 
derived Europhilism is necessarily temporary.
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The increased importance of nationalism in Poland is far from an isolated phenomenon. 
In several other European countries nationalist parties have gained increased electoral 
support. Not only have nationalist parties proved resilient in their beliefs, but new parties 
based on such appeals have successfully entered the electoral arena. The limits to the 
transformation of the nationalist ethos are illustrated by the evolution of the nationalist camp 
in Poland, in particular of its most representative party, the ZChN. Despite its centripetal 
strategy and willingness to reject Euroscepticism, the ZChN remained an unsettling element 
of centre-right coalitions. The attempts of the ZChN to forge a conservative identity based on 
neo-liberalism were unsuccessful and lacked credibility. Despite the party’s emphasis on 
nationalism having been diluted through the addition of a liberal economic doctrine, the 
ZChN’s Catholic nationalism remained its identifying element, as the difficulties of the party in 
developing a positive European stance, and the several splits it suffered while attempting to 
do so, demonstrate.
The re-organisation of the right in the wake of the 2001 elections opened the way for a 
new Catholic nationalist formation in the League of Polish Families (LPR). The LPR’s ideology 
is a more radical example of the synthesis of Catholicism and Polish nationalism that proves 
the continuing appeal of “national democracy” (Endecja) of Roman Dmowski. In its major 
oeuvre MyStt Nowoczesnego Polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) Dmowski opposed the 
romantic nationalism prevalent in XIX century Poland with a combination of Catholicism and 
Polishness that cancels out the cosmopolitanism inherent in the Catholicism and Christian 
democratic legacy. The LPR’s leader, Roman Gyertych, is therefore the inheritor of a long 
tradition of Polish nationalist thought, now finding its number one enemy in European 
integration.
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The Christian cosmopolitanism: Christian democrats, the hardest Europhiles
Due to the demise of civil society as the identifying element of liberal parties, currently, 
Christian democrats are the only party type based on a cosmopolitan conception of the 
political community. Political actors viewing the politics of the continent through the prism of 
Christian cosmopolitanism consistently promote European integration as the way to overcome 
national approaches and advance the political integration of Europe. Christian democrats are 
therefore the unalterable supporters of a project that fulfils the vision of overcoming the 
nation-state and achieving a cosmopolitan political order.
However, the decline of Western European Christian democracy has been matched by 
the failure to establish viable Christian democratic parties as the main centre-right formation 
in Central and Eastern Europe. This failure is most intriguing in Poland and, with hindsight, 
has had the most dramatic effects. The persistence and increased importance of nationalism 
has prevented the development of a strong party with a Christian democratic political ethos, 
and provides an effective explanation for the unusually high propensity of Polish right-wing 
parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions.
In party systems where the political axis is predominant, a sizeable Christian democratic 
party can prevent the emergence of strong conflicts over European integration. The presence 
of a strong Christian democratic party assures a Europhile centre-right core. Conflicts over 
integration will appear less vivid and confined to the margins of the party system. Christian 
democracy appears the most effective ideological antidote to political nationalism in party 
systems where conflicts over the definition of political community are intense.
The failure of Polish Christian democracy demonstrates the importance of the ideas 
informing political “communities of discourse” for the formation of political parties. The legacy 
of national Catholicism continued to divide the right-wing political elite after 1989, as it had 
done also in the interwar period. The division of post-Solidarity political elite between 
Christian nationalists and Christian cosmopolitans reflected the divisions between liberals and 
traditionalists within the Polish Catholic Church. The disagreements between those preaching 
universal Catholicism in the Polish episcopate and those advocating Polish national
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Catholicism prevented the Church from acting as a unifying force and supporting one political 
party or even in succeeding as mediators of political forces.
The ideological divergences within the post-Solidarity elite resulted in a highly 
fragmented right-wing political scene throughout the nineties, which became further 
fragmented after the 2001 elections. The AWS’s increasingly Eurosceptic rhetoric while in 
office illustrates the resilience of a nationalist identity against office-seeking considerations. 
The centrifugal tactics and nationalist rhetoric of the AWS’s factions at the end of the 1997- 
2001 parliaments led to the dissolution of the coalition for the subsequent 2001 parliamentary 
elections in which national Catholicism achieved success through its advocacy of protecting 
the national culture and the state’s political sovereignty.
Europe seen from the economic prism
Parties whose identifying community is of economic nature are able to successfully alter 
their stance on European integration. First, the divisible and quantifiable nature of economic 
concepts results in a conditional appreciation of the European economic regime. Second, 
since the European Single Market is not positively based on either a liberal or a social 
democratic model, the EU has adopted both market opening and regulatory policy regimes. 
Changes occurring at these two levels result in the re-appreciation of European integration.468
The reassessment of European economic regimes by parties based on the economic 
ethos appears linked to a centripetal mode of competition. In the last decade the positive 
interaction between centripetalism and a change in the European policy regimes, allowed 
social democratic and economic conservatives to preserve their centrist status. While in 
Western Europe the positive evaluation of the EU by social democrats has mostly resulted
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from a surge of regulatory activity by the Commission, the change in the positions of Central 
and Eastern European social democrats on the EU was caused by their internal 
transformation from communism to a modern conception of social democracy, combining a 
liberal political stance with supply-side conceptions of class-based economic policies. This 
transformation coincided with the clarification of the relations between the European Union 
and Poland, which allowed for a reassessment of European integration. For example, the 
conclusion of the negotiation of the agricultural chapter regulating the application of the CAP 
subsidies led the PSL to abandon the opposition to a system previously considered 
discriminatory of Polish farmers.
The class: social democrats and their more extreme cousins
Social democrats, the defenders of the working class and the promoters of the welfare 
state, have been committed to the elimination of class differences by counteracting 
inequalities stemming from positions in the labour market and protecting low and minimum 
income groups.469 Although social democrats have been one of the parties with a stronger 
commitment to class internationalism, their understanding of the international economic 
system has in the past led them to consider that the nation-state is the most appropriate 
setting for correcting market inequalities on the basis of class. Therefore, despite 
internationalism being embedded in the ideological roots of left-wing movements 470 during its 
evolution, social democracy has often held a nationalist political ethos. The nation-state was 
regarded as the best setting to apply class-based policies that challenged an international 
economic order that benefits capital rather than labour and creates pressures for the lowering 
of welfare state standards.
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Since its inception both the socialist and communist movements have defended workers’ interests at the 
international level. The International Socialist, as a separate entity from the PES, embodies this effort.
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However, in the context of a global international economy the perception that national 
Keynesianism is no longer viable has compelled social democrats to renounce demand-side 
policies and undertake the pursuit of a new growth path to compete in global markets by 
maintaining certain instruments for influencing the supply-side of the economy.471 The re­
operationalisation of parties’ ethos underway in Western Europe in the nineteen eighties and 
nineties is however bound by the limits established by the concept of class. Social democrats 
will not embrace policies that pursue growth at the expense of social justice, and will only 
support European integration if they see it as furthering this goal.
In the early nineties, following the Single European Act (SEA), the EU began developing 
market regulation instruments. Since its inception, the European institutions had worked for 
the de-regulation of the European market. The SEA was thus hailed by Social Democrats as 
a new policy approach, and gradually came to support integration.472 The endorsement of 
policies promoting supply-side correctors to the market at the European level coincided with 
the change of national social democratic parties’ supply-side policy preferences at the 
national level. Social democrats’ Hard Europhilism mainly derives from their changed 
appreciation of integration as a project occupied not only with the completion of the internal 
market but also with its regulation. Social democratic parties therefore support the deepening 
of political integration in the European Union as a necessary step to correct the failures of 
national states in promoting market regulation. Moreover, social democrats’ Europhilism is 
strengthened by a cosmopolitan political ethos.
While the change of attitude of Western European social democratic parties was the 
result of these two processes, in Central and Eastern Europe the change of attitude of social 
democrats has resulted from a different understanding of class. The Polish case shows that 
although the former communist party’s inherited internationalism predisposed it to 
Europhilism, it was the party’s embracement of social democracy and the transformation of its
471 Boix, C. (2000), op. cit.
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economic beliefs away from state ownership that drove the party’s change of attitude towards 
the European Union. The legacy of communist internationalist ideals is now embodied in the 
SLD’s Europhilism. The party supports European integration because it views the EU as a 
promoter of left-wing economic ideals and judges it a politically valid project to overcome the 
shortcomings of the nation-state.
The SLD’s transformation is not, however, exclusively a result of the Europeanization 
process. The specific interpretation of its left-wing inheritance devised by the party 
modernizers is the result of a clear choice of the party leaders to model themselves on 
European social democracy and support European Integration. This support for European 
integration -  a symbol of the transformation of the party and a source of its legitimacy -  has, 
to an extent, determined the direction of the transformation of the SLD, and the specific form 
of its present identity.
The conversion of social democrats to a pro-integration position was not accomplished 
by those factions that interpret the concept of class in extreme terms. They consider that 
European integration prevents the attainment of the policy regimes that are essential for 
correcting inequalities deriving from positions in the labour market, such as public control over 
capital flows, extensive public investment in industrial policy and the statutory right to work 
and housing.
In Poland, Self-Defence (Samoobrona), originally a protest movement of agrarian 
origins, articulated an extreme interpretation of the concept of class. Noteworthy for the non­
intellectual character of its programme, the Samoobrona defined its ethos over time as an 
extreme interpretation of class concepts. Its policies addressed the needs of the losers of 
transition. Initially, the political ethos of the Samoobrona was clearly nationalist, but in 2000 
the party dropped nationalism as a source of party identification. The move coincided with a 
conditional rather than an outright rejection of European integration. The fact exemplifies the 
effects that a secondary political ethos has on parties’ European attitudes. The protection of 
vulnerable economic groups against the vagaries of a liberal economic system formed the 
basis of both Samoobrona’s polarising strategy, and its perception of an a priori 
incompatibility between European integration and the national interest.
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The market: liberals and liberal conservatives
Since the free market represents liberals’ identifying concept, their evaluation of the EU 
is based on whether it contributes to the creation of a free European-wide market. While 
broadly in favour of a project that appears geared to the abolition of barriers to trade and the 
creation of economic competition at the European level, liberals have become more sceptical 
of integration since the Delors’ Commission launched policies to increase market regulation 
and redistribution at the European level. While the positioning of liberal parties on either side 
of the Europhilism-Euroscepticism line depends on their evaluation of the effects of the EU’s 
economic policy regime. Liberals’ support for the EU’s economic regime, if combined with the 
civil society as the secondary identifying element, results in unconditional Europhilism.
The liberal conservatives, holding the nation as their political ethos, will be either Soft 
Europhiles or Hard Eurosceptics. When judging the EU’s economic regime as too regulatory, 
their opposition to the effects of economic integration is reinforced by the opposition of their 
nationalism to political integration. A positive evaluation of the European policy regimes is 
mitigated by the nationalist view of the political order.
In Poland the liberal conservatism of the right-wing Citizens Platform’s resulted in the 
centre-right’s varying support for integration. While in the early nineties the civil society was 
the identifying concept of political liberalism, after the 2001 elections and the formation of the 
Citizens’ Platform (PO), economic liberalism emerged as the dominant liberal identity. 
Therefore the early liberal parties’ appraisal of European integration in terms of civil society 
gave way to a conditional and economically based approval of the EU. The centre-right in 
Poland therefore appears to be consolidating around a neo-liberal economic ethos.
The liberals’ troubled development is a mirror image of the failure of Catholic 
cosmopolitanism to thrive in the Polish party system. Christian and liberal political 
cosmopolitanism have not thrived as central identifying elements of Polish parties and the 
ideological anchors of a Europhile right-wing coalition. The replacement of political with 
economic liberalism as the identifying element resulted in the disappearance of an
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unconditional support for European integration as a community of civil societies. The 
economic appraisal of integration is conditional and dependent on the policy regimes of 
European integration. The political and unconditional support for the European project in the 
post-Solidarity camp now appears to have been a phenomenon of the transition. The centre- 
right now approaches European integration through the prism of the market.
The estate and its elusive operationalisation
The farmers have been the social group that has most strongly benefited from 
European integration through the CAP.473 The concept of estate, on which agrarians are 
founded, means that farmers are entitled to benefits from the state. Nevertheless, the 
agrarian party family is a vivid example of how the understanding of economic community 
determines the perceptions of the benefits and costs of the CAP. The form in which the 
concept of estate is operationalised by parties is as important for their appreciation of 
integration as the real benefits deriving from the EU.
The stance on Europe taken by the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) illustrates well the 
decisiveness that a favourable evaluation of the application of the CAP on Polish agriculture 
had on the attitude the party towards European integration. Until 1997 the party’s nationalist 
interpretation of the role of family farming was incompatible with the reforms proposed by the 
European Union. The PSL’s peasant ideology, inherited from inter-war Poland, considered 
small family farms as the backbone of the Polish nation and the defence of small farmers’ as 
vital constituents of the nation became the justification for a farmer’s party.
Following the landslide defeat in the 1997 election, the party changed its leadership. 
This resulted in attempts to widen the party’s appeal beyond small family farmers. The party 
changed its discourse away from the nationalist interpretation of family farming into a wider 
and more pragmatic understanding of the farming community. A re-evaluation of the
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extension of the CAP on Polish farmers was also facilitated by the beginning of the 
negotiations between Poland and the EU. In contrast to the party’s previous insistence on the 
promotion of conditions that maintained family farming, by 2001, Jarostaw Kalinowski, 
claimed that the party’s support for Europe depended exclusively on whether Polish farmers 
would enjoy similar competitive conditions as their counterparts in the EU member states. 
This case thus shows that parties founded on specific agrarian cleavages are constrained by 
their specific constituencies’ economic interests.
The general applicability of the ethos theory
The strength of nationalism as a political identity makes Poland an extreme case in 
which to test the ethos theory. Poland thus serves as a basis for producing and testing a 
theory of heterogeneous causality of parties’ European positions. Although the level of 
structuration provided by the political axis to Polish political competition is unusually high,474 
the ethos framework appears relevant to explain the dilemmas experienced by nationalist 
parties holding office in other European states and the interaction between political and 
economic primary identities. For the last ten years, nationalist parties have proven 
increasingly successful in gaining a central place in European party systems, and in providing 
a strong challenge to established centrist parties.
Moving beyond the immediate context of this study, we can test this explanation in two 
different sets of cases. The first set consists of cases from Central and Eastern Europe, 
where the European issue determined the original ideological set up of party systems, i.e.,
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where it seemed to influence which types of parties occupy the left and right-wing space. The 
ethos theory proposes that success in unifying the centre-right in the Central and Eastern 
European democracies hinges on the ability of the different ideological groups to agree on 
basic identities and the compatibility of those with the values informing European integration.
Hungary
Hungary provides a good control case for testing the ethos theory’s main claim, i.e., that 
the dominant element in a party’s ethos determines the choice between support and 
opposition to European integration. On the one hand, the failure of Eurosceptic parties to 
enter parliament in the 2002 elections contrasts with the Polish outcome in the 2001 
elections, where 20 percent of the vote went to Eurosceptic parties. On the other hand, the 
similarity of the Hungarian and the Polish negotiated transitions, the occupation of the left- 
wing political space by the successor communist parties, as well as the predominance of the 
political axis in structuring political competition, make the two cases fit for a comparison.
The successful unification of the Hungarian right in a liberal conservative party shows 
that despite the relevance of conflicts over the definition of political community for party 
competition, nationalism was successfully subordinated to a neo-liberal economic ethos.475 
The transformation of the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) from liberalism to 
conservatism476 allowed the party to occupy effectively the centre-right space and sustain a 
Soft Europhile position in harmony with the party’s centrist strategies. The FIDESZ captured 
the nationalist appeal while turning it into a secondary element of its identity.
The strong leadership of the FIDESZ captured the window of opportunity provided by 
the disintegration of the anti-communist umbrella organisation, the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (MDF) and the weakening of the senior liberal party, the Alliance of Free Democrats
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(SzDSz), when it joined a governmental coalition with the ex-communist Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSzP). The FIDESZ galvanised the right-wing spectrum and, in the run up to the 2002 
elections, it incorporated minor right-wing parties, in an attempt to control the right-wing 
space. From 1994 onwards the FIDESZ detached its destiny from the SzDSz, previously its 
senior counterpart, and set about its ideological transformation, stressing a family-based 
social policy, defending the creation of a strong state and espousing conservative Catholic 
morals. However, FIDESZ did not adopt a Christian democratic identity, and remained 
entrenched in the commitment to the individual, understood as an economic entity. In 
rejecting the option of transforming itself into a Christian democratic party, the party avoided 
being regarded as a replacement for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which had attempted 
to unify diverse beliefs under the overall label of Christian democracy.
Progressively, the FIDESZ adopted the nation as the community defining its political 
identity. In the 1998 elections, the FIDESZ defeated the Socialists and entered government. 
While in office, the rhetoric of the party was increasingly determined by nationalist elements. 
In 1998 Prime Minister Orban asked the parliament to vote for the government’s programme 
and thereby demonstrate who “belongs to the nation”.477 As the subsequent parliamentary 
elections of 2002 approached and the new identity of the party consolidated, Laszlo Kover, 
the party chairman after the 2000 Congress, made clear that “the nation is only important to 
us”, and "only we have a message for the nation”.478 However, despite the strong nationalist 
language, the party’s commitment to economic liberalism remained the central element of the 
party’s identity and the basis of its governmental policy. The creation of a strong middle-class 
based on private enterprise became the central plank of government policy. Under these 
conditions, FIDESZ remained broadly positive regarding the compatibility between the 
perceived national interest and European integration. FIDESZ mobilisation of the right-wing 
vote in the 2001 election resulted in the exclusion of polarising Eurosceptic parties from the
477
Ripp, Z. “A Letamas Mergele” (The balance of the attack), Mozgo Vilag, 25, 4 quoted in Kiss, C. (2003), op.cit.
478
Budula, I. “Szemelyi kerdesek” (Questions of Personnel), Magyar Narancs, 23 December 1999 quoted in Kiss, C. 
(2003), op.cit.
parliament.479 The evolution of the Hungarian right-wing thus proves that agreement on a 
central identity compatible with European integration facilitates a stable centrist party.
The ethos theory also explains why the Hungarian agrarian party, the Independent 
Smallholders Party (FKGP) is, despite its nationalist ethos, Soft Europhile.480 Agrarian parties 
are fundamentally determined by the conception of estate as their basic economic 
community. Their evaluation of the EU depends is based on whether the EU facilitates 
transfers to farmers. Contradicting previous explanations that consider the party’s positive 
attitude towards European integration the result of its competitive strategies,481 the ethos 
theory considers FKGP’s Europhilism the result of a positive evaluation of integration’s impact 
on state support for farmers. Nationalism, as a secondary element in the party’s identity, 
merely determines whether this support is conditional or unconditional.
Czech Republic
The manner in which the European issue determined the Czech party system is not 
directly comparable to the Polish case since the Czech transition resulted in a party system 
where political competition is structured around economic issues.482 In the Czech Republic 
the left appears in the pro-European camp while the right takes a Eurosceptic position. 
Nevertheless, the ethos framework explains the Soft Euroscepticism of the Czech centre-right 
party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The ODS’s choice of an extreme interpretation of 
the individual as the central economic identity leads the party to consider European 
integration as detrimental to the national interest. This interpretation of economic liberalism
479 Batory, A. (2002), “Europe and the Hungarian Parliamentary Elections of April 2002”, RIIA/OERN Election 
Briefing Paper. 1.
480 Batory, A. (2002), “Attitudes to Europe: Ideology, Strategy and the issue of European Union membership in 
Hungarian Party Politics", Party Politics. 8(5): 525-540, p.543.
461
Batory, A. (2002), “Attitudes to Europe, Ideology, Strategy and the issue of European Union membership in 
Hungarian Party Politics", Party Politics. 8(5).
482 Kitschelt, H. et al. (1999), op. cit.
234
has led the party to oscillate between a conditional positive appraisal of European integration 
and, more recently, to a rejection of integration under the name of Eurorealism, a position that 
claims to evaluate European integration according to “real” as opposed to “ideological” 
criteria. The outspoken opposition of Vaclav Klaus, party chairman and Czech president, to 
European integration is backed by economic arguments, and complemented by criticism of 
European supranational bureaucracy portrayed as an agent of market regulation.483
West European parties
The second setting to test the theory is the West European party systems, where the 
European issue gained relevance when the party systems had achieved a degree of 
ideological structuration. Despite the consolidation of the ideological space characteristic of 
West European party systems, the evolution of modes of European-level governance, in 
particular since the Maastricht Treaty which provided for the extension of majority voting, has 
also had indirect effects on the ideological identity of parties. The long-term incompatibility 
between political nationalism as the central core party ethos and centrist strategies appears 
particularly marked in the case of right-wing parties in Western Europe.
The British Conservative Party’s change of dominant ethos from neo-liberalism to 
nationalism during the second half of the 1990s explains the move of the party from Soft 
Europhilism to Hard Euroscepticism. As a mirror image of this development, the French 
Gaullist camp’s move from nationalism to economic liberalism explains the Europhilism of the 
Movement for the Republic (RPR). The impossibility of changing their fundamental identity 
underpins the Euroscepticism of Austrian and French nationalist parties, as well as the 
tensions arising between their stance on Europe and their desire to participate in government.
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Such tensions were most visible in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), with the European 
issue rising to prominence when the party became the junior partner in a governmental 
coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (OVP) in 2000. The sanctions imposed by the 
member states of the EU on the Austrian government were a factor in the resignation of its 
leader and ideological mentor, Jorg Haider. However, the impossibility of replacing its 
nationalist ethos resulted in a severe party crisis, causing the demise of the governmental 
coalition and the subsequent electoral decline of the party.
France
The ethos theory helps to explain why parties with a nationalist ethos, if this is not 
central to their identity, can conditionally support European integration. The evolution of the 
French right-wing camp illustrates how downgrading its legacy of nationalism to a secondary 
element, allowed the French Gaullist camp to support European integration. The 
transformation of the French right in the context of the conversion of governance at the 
European level into a more supranational regime was characterised by a clear division 
between nationalists like the Front National and the creation of a liberal conservative camp 
consisting of the UDF and, with increased dominance, the Union for the Republic (RPR).
The Gaullist camp was effectively split in the late seventies when, in 1976, Jacques 
Chirac created the Union for the Republic (RPR) and attempted to make the party the 
inheritor of de Gaulle’s legacy. Initially, Chirac adopted a nationalistic Eurosceptic attitude. 
This became the defining difference with respect to the cosmopolitan and pro-European 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) created in 1978 and led by Giscard d’Estaing. In founding 
the RPR, Chirac attempted to reoccupy the Gaullist high ground on the issue of French 
national sovereignty. However, his intention was not simply to be a passive inheritor of the 
Gaullist legacy, but to renew the right-wing. He set out to achieve this by reinterpreting the 
fundamental concepts of Gaullism. During the late seventies and early eighties, Chirac’s 
reinterpretation of Gaullism was based on the assumption that the increasing degree of 
European integration meant that economic liberalism should be the central identifying concept
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of a Gaullist party rather than political nationalism. The RPR’s central identifying reference 
became neo-liberalism. References to de Gaulle’s nationalism became much rarer.484 Instead 
the party stressed an economic programme clearly based on the conception of the market as 
the perfect distributor.485
The victory of the Socialist Party on an interventionist economic platform in the 1981 
elections gave the RPR a platform against which to stand. This reinforced the reinterpretation 
of de Gaulle’s legacy away from a nationalist vision of the national interest. The party’s 
programme stressed the centrality of economic liberalism, strongly attacking the socialists’ 
plans for reforming the French economy and defending the merits of deregulation, 
privatization and market forces.486 The French centre-right moved away from national 
conservatism to liberal conservatism.487
In the elaboration of the party’s identity, economic liberalism and the commitment to the 
market went hand-in-hand with a Soft Europhile stance based on a vision of European 
integration as the consolidation of a European free market. With the conversion of the party to 
market liberalism, the appeal of Europe as an economic space came to outweigh the political 
threat posed to national sovereignty. The role of Jacques Chirac in this transformation fits the 
theory outlined in this thesis. The Soft Europhile stance deriving from the new party identity 
made possible the compatibility between the party’s ethos, European position and office- 
attaining ambitions. Jacques Chirac’s reinterpretation of de Gaulle’s legacy allowed the RPR 
to conditionally support a more supranational mode of governance, thus making Chirac an 
odd figure among Gaullists. Chirac understood that the “cosmopolitan dimension” bestowed 
by de Gaulle’s to French nationalism, i.e., presenting a “Grand Europe” as a continuation of
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the defence of French national interests, was not well suited to the project of creating the 
European Union. The Maastricht Treaty and the extension of qualified majority voting made it 
explicit that the loss of sovereignty implied in European integration would be too severe for a 
nationalist party to bear.
The transformation of the RPR from national conservatism to liberal conservatism was 
not a consensual process and divided the ranks of the party on several occasions, most 
vividly during the campaign for the Maastricht Treaty. The primary cause of the split arose 
from differing visions of the party’s identity as the inheritor of de Gaulle’s nationalist legacy. A 
centralised and unified party saw the strongest opposition to the leadership of Jacques Chirac 
and the Maastricht Treaty emerge through the voices of Charles Pasqua and Philippe Seguin. 
So serious was the contestation mounted by Philippe Seguin’s defence of democracy as 
inseparable from national sovereignty against “Maastricht Europe” that he became a serious 
rival to Chirac for the leadership of the party, and even for the presidency. The party 
eventually split on the issue of European integration.
The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty ultimately showed the contradiction between 
nationalism and Europhilism that had marked Le Pen’s rhetoric until then. The Gaullist 
Europhilism and nationalist identity proved too difficult to reconcile in the face of the 
Maastricht Treaty provisions for extending majority voting to new areas of policy making.488 
Previously, Le Pen had attempted to reproduce de Gaulle’s combination of nationalism and 
Europhilism, by portraying integration as a process serving the French national interest. In the 
1989 European elections, Le Pen outlined a Gaullist vision of European integration, stating 
that France would only allow a pooling of national sovereignty where this appeared beneficial 
to its own interest, for example in the area of defence. This implied that the process of
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European integration remained under French control. The Europhilism of Le Pen was part of 
a strategy to appear statesman-like, i.e., it derived from his centrist, office-seeking strategy. 
Le Pen campaigned for a “No” vote, in a concerted strategy that stated that the consequences 
of a yes vote would be “worse than losing a war”’, the triumph of an “international conspiracy 
mounted by hidden forces and vested interests against our nation”, the end of the “France 
eternal”.489 The alternative proposed by Le Pen was a European concert of nations where 
France was to have a commanding role.
The French case shows that a nationalist party’s inability to change its central 
commitment to the nation as the central element of its identity condemns it to Euroscepticism 
and leads to a polarising strategy. Nationalist parties differ from conservatives in that the latter 
are able to subjugate a nationalist legacy to economic neo-liberalism and maintain their 
centripetal strategy.
Britain
The same dilemmas over loss of sovereignty versus economic liberalism run high in the 
British right-wing camp. The ethos theory explains the variation in the British Conservatives’ 
European position in the same way as it does for the French right. In a mirror image of the 
developments occurring in the French RPR, where the reinterpretation of the Gaullist legacy 
meant that economic neo-liberalism became the central party identity and allowed the RPR to 
adopt a Europhile attitude, the British Conservative’s Euroscepticism derives opposition to 
both developments accomplished in Maastricht: the regulation of European markets and the 
extension of policy areas subject to qualified majority. The party’s Eurosceptic attitude
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resulted also from the replacement of economic neo-liberalism as the party’s central element 
in the party identity with political nationalism.
During the seventies, the Conservatives’ reluctance to accept any form of supranational 
governance had been overcome by Edward Heath, and in the Conservatives led Britain to 
membership of the EEC. The party’s Soft Europhilism resulted from a positive evaluation of 
European integration’s contribution to economic liberalisation, the central goal of the party. 
Later, Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberalism reinforced the individual and the market as the 
identifying concept of the party. European integration was welcomed as a way to create an 
internal free market within the EC and as a security guarantee against the communist threat. 
Although the Conservatives’ backing of British participation in the EEC was still a balancing 
act between the positive evaluation staked by neo-liberals and the opposition of nationalists, 
Margaret Thatcher was one of the strong supporters of the 1985 SEA.490 However, after the 
SEA and the completion of the Single Market, Jacques Delors’s EU agenda moved towards 
European market regulation and a supranational mode of governance. Margaret Thatcher’s 
1989 Bruges speech marked a shift in the party’s position on integration. T. Margaret 
Thatcher defined British Conservatives in relation to European integration as the party of 
economic deregulation and nationalism.491
Although Thatcher’s Euroscepticism resulted from seeing the European Union as 
“socialism through the back door” , opposition to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty also 
derived from nationalist elements within the Conservative Party, and the issue provided a 
platform against which to rally. The issue became highly salient since Margaret Thatcher’s 
resignation as Prime Minister was partially related to her stance on European integration. To 
deal with the party’s divisions on Maastricht, the next Prime Minister, John Major, resorted to 
the argument that ideological disagreement should be muted in order to maintain party unity. 
This argument implied that nationalist’s opposition to European integration should keep silent
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for so that the party could retain its centrist, office-seeking strategy. In order to make 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty possible, John Major had to demand a parliamentary vote 
of confidence.492 However, in the long-run, efforts to combat a Eurosceptic attitude with an 
instrumental justification based on strategic, office-seeking considerations, in the long-run 
weakened the neo-liberal wing of the party by not properly linking the party’s Europhile stance 
with economic neo-liberal arguments. John Major’s stance provided the nationalists with a 
rallying platform and came to be seen as an office-seeking strategy. Once out of office, under 
the leadership of William Hague, the nationalist faction’s ascendancy ensured that the party’s 
identity was increasingly determined by the concept of a national political community and 
resulted in a decidedly Hard Eurosceptic stance in the 2001 parliamentary elections.
Austria
The Austrian case shows in a forceful way how, in the context of European integration, 
tensions caused by the participation of a nationalist party in a governmental coalition are 
bound to be highly disruptive. The weakening of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) in the 
2002 parliamentary elections primarily stemmed from tensions between office-holding 
constraints and the party’s nationalist identity. This tension was reinforced by the European 
question. The transformation of the FPO into a liberal conservative party was impeded by 
structural difficulties in overcoming the commitment to the nation as the fundamental political 
community.
The FPO’s ideology has its origins in the nationalist camp that, at the time of democratic 
mobilisation, represented the aspirations of the German-speaking majority within the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. During World War II, the predecessor of the FPO was linked with the Nazi
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regime, leading to its exclusion from government until 1983.493 In the seventies and eighties, 
the party attempted to change its identity and overcome its exclusion from office, by replacing 
nationalism with economic liberalism. However, the limits to the possibility of changing the 
basic ethos of the party’s identity soon became apparent.
The temporary success in reversing the hierarchy of values between nationalism and 
economic liberalism allowed the party to become part of a government coalition with the 
Socialist Party. This was made possible by the domination exerted by the top liberal elite 
which had the party renamed internationally as the Liberal Party of Austria and made it a 
member of the Liberal International. In 1985, Vice Chancellor Steger and G. Stix attempted to 
formalise this change by introducing the concept of freedom as the centre-piece in the new 
party programme. Freedom was conceptualised as autonomy for the individual and the 
national community, but the attempt to reconcile the two party traditions also meant a reversal 
of the FPO’s tradition of subordinating liberalism to nationalism.494
However, the constraints and compromises imposed by participation in government 
alienated parts of the party’s rank-and-file, in particular in the regional structures of the party. 
Taking advantage of the strengthened position of nationalists within the party regional 
structures, Jorg Haider exploited the differences between the liberal leadership and the 
membership, and gained the leadership of the party on a nationalist platform. A reversal of 
the ideological transformation from nationalism to liberalism quickly followed, and in the next 
elections the FPO, campaigning on a nationalist platform, significantly increased its share of 
the vote. The electoral success of the party grew with time, drawing voters away from the 
Austrian Christian Democratic Party (OVP). In what is interpreted a posteriori by some 
analysts as a strategy to undermine the party’s electoral success in January 2000, after failing 
to conclude negotiations with the Socialist Party, the OVP formed a governmental coalition
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with the FPO. The formation of the OVP-FPO coalition, which included a nationalist party with 
past links with the Nazis, provoked an outcry among the governments of EU member states 
for and led to the imposition of diplomatic sanctions.
The diplomatic sanctions introduced by Austria’s EU partners increased internal 
pressures and served to mobilise Austria’s anti-FPO forces and led to the resignation of Jorg 
Haider from the party’s chairmanship. On 1 May 2000 Haider resigned from the chairmanship 
in favour of Susanne Riess-Passer, who became Vice-Chancellor and led the FPO’s 
government team.495 However, Haider’s resignation did not exclude him from party politics, 
and he remained the FPO’s leader behind the scenes and a member of the coalition 
committee. Haider considered himself responsible for the FPO’s success496 and resented the 
popularity of the moderate FPO leaders with ministerial posts, like Riess-Passer and Finance 
Minister Karl Heinz Grasser.497 Enmeshed in this conflict of personalities was the deeper 
issue of the nationalist party identity. The conflict between the office-seeking moderate wing 
of the party and Jorg Haider and his followers implied the (re)definition of the party’s identity 
away from nationalism. However, neither Haider nor his followers were inclined to let that 
happen, and in the midst of a party crisis involving the two factions, one of Haider’s followers, 
Stadler, launched a petition against the party’s moderate wing in order “to ensure the FPO 
remains Haider’s party” . Among the conditions raised in the petition were typical demands 
destined to reinforce the party’s identity, like vetoing the EU enlargement if the Czech 
government did not revoke the Benes decrees.
The FPO’s unambiguously nationalist identity is the basis of its Hard Euroscepticism. 
The tensions between the centripetal strategies of the FPO while in office and its nationalist 
ethos embodied in Jorg Haider became evident and contributed to the disintegration of the
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party soon after its participation in the governmental coalition. Three of the FPO’s ministers 
resigned and the government finally fell, which led to early elections in early 2002.498 Much 
more was at stake than the question of Haider’s leadership. Indeed, the conflict seemed to 
centre on the identity of the party. Once again the historic confrontation between the liberal 
and centrist wing of the party, on the one hand, and the nationalist elements of the party on 
the other, led to a fierce factional fight. This showed the impossibility of reconciling the 
symbolic policy stances serving the party’s identity and the constraints imposed by a centrist 
strategy.
The poor election results in early 2002, when the FPO lost two-thirds of its vote despite 
being part of the government, meant that the party lost a number of ministries and 
parliamentary committees -  weakening its chance of staying in office. The evolution of the 
FPO illustrates that nationalism and the preservation of a centrist position are in the long run 
incompatible.
The divisiveness of the European issue was more marked in the case of the FPO 
because of the diplomatic sanctions introduced by the European Union. In Austria the 
incompatibility between nationalism and the constraints imposed by office materialised in an 
unusually concrete way. When Jbrg Haider, the agent of the party’s nationalist identity had to 
resign from the party’s leadership due to European objections to a party with a Nazi past 
being instated in government, the nationalist elements in the party rebelled against what they 
saw as a process of undermining the nationalist identity of the party, provoking the fall of 
government coalition.
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Denmark
The causes of the evolution of the Scandinavian social democratic parties from Soft 
Eurosceptic positions in the seventies and eighties to Hard Europhilism in the late nineties 
illustrate the result of two related but separate processes. The Scandinavian states, and in 
particular Denmark, developed a much more comprehensive welfare state than other 
European states. Throughout the seventies and eighties the Danish social democratic party 
(SD) maintained an interpretation of the core class ethos through the prisms of a national 
Keynesian policy.499 The party’s commitment to the left-wing ideal of workers’ involvement in 
salary decisions further prevented the party from staking an effective income policy of wage 
restraint. This worsened the effects of the economic crisis that followed the 1970s oil price 
hikes.
The SD’s belief in national Keynesianism led the party to evaluate negatively the effects 
of economic integration on the national economic regime. Social democrats saw the 
European Single Market as a mechanism for promoting tax competition and attempting to 
insulate markets from political interference by combining a European-wide market under 
selective supranational surveillance with intergovernmental decision-making vested in 
sovereign national governments. Therefore, until the early nineties the Danish social 
democrats were among the parties with the lowest support for European integration.500 A 
strongly regulated national market with a sizeable welfare and social transfers implied their 
considering that European integration was a threat to the Danish national interest.
The re-appreciation of the SD’s position on Europe resulted from changes in the 
European agenda and Jacques Delors’ initiatives leading to regulated capitalism in line with 
European social democratic and Christian democratic traditions.501 The EU became the
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provider of a series of supply-side policies of collective goods. Simultaneously, the SD 
leadership came to realise that national Keynesianism was not a viable option in a global 
economic environment where capital is free to move. In 1992 the party elected a new leader, 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and in its 1993 electoral programme the SD proceeded to shed 
traditional claims, such as workers’ participation in enterprises’ decision-making. The 
abandon of national Keynesianism and the acceptance that all European economic regimes 
are interconnected became part of the programmatic claims of the party. Traditional claims to 
economic democracy, i.e., the belief that workers should have a say in the decision-making 
process of the firms in which they work, was replaced with an insistence on good economic 
governance as the priority of the party.
After winning office in 1993, the party changed the labour law and performed a reform 
of the tax system. The SD seemed to have achieved a new formula for combining social 
justice and effective economic governance after the failure of the Keynesian formula in the 
1970s and the 1980s.502 The party advocated a retrenchment of unemployment benefits, and 
focused on active labour market policies. The extent and speed of party reinterpretation of its 
economic ethos is illustrated in the change of attitude towards reform of the welfare state. In 
the late eighties the party had refused to support the conservative government attempts to 
implement a package of tax and labour reforms, aiming at wage moderation. This reform was 
supported by the trade unions. However, after winning office in 1993, the social democratic 
government implemented a series of reforms with the objective of rolling back the welfare 
state.
Although Eurosceptic factions remain present within the SD, the party can today be 
characterised as Hard Europhile.503 The progressive transformation of its stance on the EU 
was shaped by the re-assessment of the impact of EU policies on the national economic
502 Green-Pedersen, C. and van Kersbergen, K. (2002), “The Politics of the Third Way: The Transformation of Social 
Democracy in Denmark and The Netherlands”, Party Politics. 8(5): 507-524.
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regime. Since 1992 the SD’s conditional Euroscepticism504 evolved in a consolidated pro- 
European attitude. For the Danish social democrats, Europhilism became attractive, feasible 
and consistent with the party’s policy goals. While domestic political calculations have been 
important determinants of the SD’s Europhilism, the change in the party’s position is not mere 
political convenience. The SD’s repositioning on the European issue reflects the 
acknowledgement that the EU provides the most appropriate framework for pursuing many of 
its left-wing objectives.
The wider picture: the contribution to the literature on party 
positions on European integration
This thesis is based on the understanding that parties are constituted by a core nucleus 
of conceptions of the political and economic realities. The process of modern ideological 
creation implies the abstractisation of certain elements of social and economic reality that 
remain available to be used at different times and circumstances. Political parties are created 
around such ideological cores, and these account for the resemblance of political competition 
across Europe. The understanding of nucleus of ideas, i.e., the party ethos, as the party’s 
fundamental element resulted in a theory that sees long-run party positions on European 
integration as largely independent of the mobilisation and representation of social groups. 
Party responses to the fifty-year process of construction of a European supranational entity 
and the step-by-step creation of a template of European economic norms is thus largely 
determined by the compatibility of parties’ basic conceptions with this process.
504
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This understanding of political parties admits that although parties are “layered 
institutions”, thus able to respond to contemporary concerns by conceiving new appeals and 
policies,505 when taking positions on European integration parties will be consistent with the 
conceptual core of their identities. This links with the ideas of those authors that consider the 
dual imperatives of a party’s internal need for collusion and the conditions of external 
competition as structural elements of political life.506 The concept of party ethos is thus 
consistent with the ideas of those authors for whom the preservation of party identity is in the 
long-term as important for party survival as successfully responding to office competitive 
drives.
This vision of parties is thus at odds with the strategic theories of party positions on 
European integration. Both Taggart and Sitter based their theories on a Downsian conception 
of political parties, and assumed that parties are prepared to compromise any of their stances 
in order to gain office or oppose it. Indeed, the ethos theory assumption of the primordial 
nature of a party’s political and economic identity contradicts the assumptions of strategic 
predominance. The ethos theory predicts that when political ideologies and strategic 
considerations clash, in the long-run parties will be consistent with their conceptions of the 
national interest. Beyond attaining office or representing socio-economic groups, political 
parties’ rationality for adopting positions on European integration ultimately results from basic 
conceptions of the political and economic reality.
The typology of party ethos, and in particular the concept of political community, 
appears a better classification tool, and a more fundamental explanation for parties’ European 
attitudes than Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s GAL-TAN axis. The definition of the political 
community incorporates both the socio-cultural dimension, i.e., it defines the degree of
505 Schickler, E. (2001), Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress. 
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desirable cultural openness within the community, and the nationalist/cosmopolitan 
dimension, i.e., the degree of the political community’s openness towards other political 
communities. A party’s basic characterisation of a political community thus appears a more 
fundamental explanation for parties European attitudes than a party’s positioning on the GAL- 
TAN axis.
By specifying the conditions of the predominance of parties’ ideology while testing for 
the effects of a specified strategic hypothesis on parties’ European positions, the thesis also 
speaks to the literature on the impact of Europeanization on political competition. Peter Mair’s 
2000 article “The Limited impact of Europeanization on National Party Systems? argues that 
Europeanization has a very limited impact on party systems, both in terms of its format and 
mechanics.507 The present thesis reinforces this statement by suggesting that the European 
issue is fought along pre-existing lines of competition. However, the analysis of European 
attitudes, party values and competitive behaviour suggests that, despite the preponderance of 
political values, the three elements interact, i.e., that the centripetal and ideological 
transformation of left-wing parties towards Europhilism was facilitated by the compatibility of 
their aims with European values and policies. This effect is maybe more accentuated in party 
systems like the Polish, where Europeanization and the formation of the party systems have 
been taking place simultaneously.
The coincidence of the processes of European accession and transition to democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe reinforces the relationship between Europhilism and the 
formation of the centre of the party system, posing a constraint on the type of identities in the 
centre of party systems. Party identities prevent compromise on issues that are institutional or 
informal preconditions of governmental participation. The most obvious effect and the one 
most accounted for in this thesis is the corruptive effect of nationalism in the centre of a party 
system. Because political ideologies take the high ground over party strategies in determining
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parties’ European attitudes, nationalist parties will in the long-run remain Eurosceptic. 
Nevertheless, nationalist Eurosceptic parties appear ill-suited for the practice of multi-level 
government in the context of integrated Europe. Euroscepticism thus reinforces nationalist 
parties’ long-run incompatibility with centrist politics. The constraints imposed by core 
identities on parties’ European positions can thus limit the choices of competitive strategic 
behaviour available to parties, for example by constraining parties to take a polarising 
strategy.
By basing and testing the ethos theory from the Polish case, the present thesis also 
speaks to the literature on party formation in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the 
understanding of parties as bound by core concepts is particularly contentious in the context 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The low degree of party institutionalisation in most Central 
and Eastern European countries has been interpreted by some authors as a sign that political 
competition in the region is mainly structured by office-seeking considerations and that 
political parties are mere ad hoc coalitions of office-seeking individuals. Authors claiming that 
vote-seeking concerns prevail over value-driven considerations argue that the predominant 
party form is a sort of catch-all party with a very light ideological baggage;508 parties of this 
nature are successful in catching the centre position and achieving office without committing 
to any form of value-based policies. Party formation is a function not of ideological differences 
“but rather the consequence of fierce battles over party leadership, personal aversions among 
party leaders, and an intolerance of minority opinions within the party”.509
507 Mair, P. (2000), “The Limited Impact of Europeanisation on National Party Systems”, West European Politics. 
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The test in the Polish case of a theory arguing that a party’s core identity provides the 
long-term anchorage for its subsequent programmatic choices endorses the views of those 
authors that claim that political competition in Central and Eastern Europe is structured mainly 
by parties’ programmatic choices. Kitschelt et al Post-Communist Parties and Party Systems 
is based on the premise that political competition in the Central and Eastern European new 
democracies is structured along defined ideological dimensions of competition.510
The same premise underlies Gabor Toka’s studies on the forging of stable party-voter 
loyalties in Central and Eastern Europe. When stating that stark ideological language 
contributes to the forging of stable relations between political elites and voters, the author 
strengthens the idea that parties’ identities are key to the establishment of an ideologically 
structured space of political competition.511. “Value preferences seem to provide for relatively 
more solid, stable basis for enduring partisan attachments.(...) In the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, voters’ willingness to stay with party preferences over time is a 
function of their Value voting’ along such dimensions as religious-secular, left-right, and
nationalism-anti-nationalism.” 512 Clear and sharp value-based choices are the main factor
entrenching voters’ choices in Central and Eastern European countries.
This thesis thus builds on the literature analysing the development of party systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe through the prism of parties as policy-seeking entities. The thesis 
thus bases the classification of Polish political parties on the premise that once the ideological 
space is established party organisations may come and go but political identities are stable. If 
a particular party occupying a certain ideological space disappears, another party will 
succeed it and inherit its political and economic ethos.
510
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Conclusion
The analysis of the Polish case study shows that the repeated failure of right-wing 
political leaders to create a stable centrist party based on a Christian democratic identity has 
led to a proliferation of Eurosceptic parties on the right. Even when in government, nationalist 
parties or factions continued to oppose European integration. This tendency was persistent in 
1991-1993 and the 1997-2001 right-wing governments. Although the need to be competitive 
at the governmental level may lead parties not to oppose European integration openly, 
nationalists within government coalitions or parties are uneasy and rebel against this solution. 
Therefore, even if Polish right-wing coalitions attempted to formulate their European positions 
in a way as to obscure contradictions, for example by portraying European integration as an 
enterprise of Christian nations, in the medium and long-term divergences among liberals and 
nationalists were magnified by the necessity to devise concrete positions on European 
accession. The splitting of the centre-right, facilitated by the European issue, freed the space 
for the victory of the Eurosceptic nationalist right.
A further contribution of this thesis concerns the link between the dominant identifying 
discourse of parties and the contestation of European integration within a political system. 
Political opposition to European integration leads to the debate on Europe being fought along 
the axis on less versus more Europe, rather than what should Europe do.513 In Poland the 
European debate and the positions taken by its governments in negotiations with their 
European counterparts, reflects the salience of sovereignty issues. This is visible in the 
emphasis given by the right-wing governments’ negotiating stances on issues such as land
512
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acquisition by foreigners, declarations of sovereignty on issues of morality, references to the 
need for a return to fundamental values and European spiritual traditions, and the strident 
opposition to the modification of the voting formula in the Council of Ministers decided at Nice. 
All this suggests that the European question is framed by the conceptions of political 
community and that party responses depend on their core political ethos.
The reluctance of Poland to compromise on the issue of voting rights once it had been 
decided at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference is a manifestation of European integration 
being taken hostage by nationalism. The Nice voting formula is regarded by the Polish 
political elites as limiting the loss of sovereignty inflicted by accession, and the political class 
was unanimous in its support for the government’s position. The voting formula gained in the 
Nice Treaty was regarded as an assurance that integration remains partially in the hands of 
the Polish nation. Reluctance to shed sovereignty is natural in a country of the size and 
history of Poland. However, the submission of the ideologies opposing communism which 
surfaced in the Round Table negotiations in 1989, Catholicism and political liberalism, to an 
essential nationalist stance, has to be explained by the process of right-wing party formation. 
The success in creating a centre-left social democratic party compatible with European 
integration was not matched by a similar outcome on the centre-right. On the contrary, the 
centre-right parties running for the 2001 elections abandoned the Christian democratic ethos, 
and the post-Solidarity political elite was divided among liberal conservatives, national 
conservatives and nationalists. Such developments lead us to expect that the Polish 
participation in European integration will continue to be marked by the country’s troubled past. 
The resistance to accept changes to the model of political and economic organisation 
inscribed in parties identities at the time of their formation appears to determine not only the 
behaviour of the Polish political elite, but to affect the process of political and economic 
integration across the whole continent.
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